A Bill to Create the Transpacific Security Organization to Counter Chinese Expansionism

This post analyzes a proposed bill to create the Transpacific Security Organization (TSO), a new security alliance aimed at countering Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific region. The bill proposes a collective defense principle, similar to NATO, where an act of aggression against one member will be met with a joint response from all members. The founding members would include the United States, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. This analysis will examine the bill’s provisions in detail, exploring its potential benefits and drawbacks, legal and logistical challenges, and its potential impact on regional stability and U.S. foreign policy.

Existing Security Organizations and Potential Interaction with the TSO

The Asia-Pacific region is already home to several security organizations, each with its own focus and membership. The proposed TSO would need to interact with these existing mechanisms, potentially complementing or competing with them. Some of the most prominent organizations in the region include:

• ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): Founded in 1967, ASEAN is a political and economic union of 10 Southeast Asian countries. While ASEAN’s origins can be traced to the Cold War era, its primary focus today is to promote regional political and economic cooperation and regional stability1. ASEAN also plays a role in regional security through dialogue and confidence-building measures2. ASEAN has a diverse membership with varying political systems and levels of economic development3. It operates on the principles of consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states2. Notably, all Quad members are strong supporters of ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture4. This concept of ASEAN centrality is crucial for understanding the regional security dynamics, as it emphasizes the importance of ASEAN’s role in maintaining regional stability and cooperation. The TSO should be designed to complement and not undermine ASEAN’s role, ensuring that it contributes to a cohesive and effective regional security architecture4.
• ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum): Established in 1994, the ARF is a multilateral forum for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. It includes 27 members, including ASEAN countries, major powers like the United States and China, and other regional stakeholders1. The ARF primarily focuses on fostering discussion and confidence-building rather than direct intervention in conflicts2.
• Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad): The Quad is an informal strategic forum comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia5. It aims to support an open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region4. The Quad’s agenda includes addressing regional challenges such as health security, climate change, and critical and emerging technologies4.

The interaction between the TSO and these existing organizations could take various forms:

• Complementary Roles: The TSO could complement existing organizations by focusing on collective defense, while other organizations continue to address broader security issues through dialogue and cooperation6.
• Coordination and Cooperation: The TSO could coordinate its activities with existing organizations to avoid duplication and ensure a cohesive regional security architecture7.
• Competition and Overlap: The TSO could potentially compete with existing organizations for influence and resources, potentially leading to tensions and inefficiency8.

The success of the TSO would depend in part on its ability to effectively interact with these existing mechanisms and contribute to a stable and cooperative regional security environment.

China’s Actions in the South China Sea

China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, including its expansive territorial claims and island-building activities, have raised concerns among its neighbors and the international community. China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, based on its “nine-dash line,” which overlaps with the claims of several Southeast Asian countries9. China has been building artificial islands and militarizing existing features in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, deploying fighter jets, cruise missiles, and radar systems10. These actions have been criticized for violating international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)11.

In addition to these actions, China has employed various “gray zone” tactics to assert its claims in the South China Sea. These tactics involve actions that fall below the threshold of armed conflict but are intended to achieve strategic objectives12. Some examples of these tactics include:

• Deploying its maritime militia, disguised as fishing vessels, to harass and intimidate vessels from other countries.
• Constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed areas.
• Using military-grade lasers and water cannons against vessels from other countries.

These gray zone tactics have contributed to regional instability and undermined the rules-based international order.

China’s Relations with Proposed TSO Members

China’s relations with the proposed TSO members are complex and varied. The following table summarizes the key issues and dynamics in these relationships:

These complex relationships would influence the dynamics within the TSO and its effectiveness in countering Chinese influence. It is important to note that China has significant economic leverage over many of these countries18. This raises the possibility that China could use its economic influence to discourage countries from joining or supporting the TSO, potentially undermining its effectiveness.

Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of Creating the TSO

The proposed TSO could offer several potential benefits:

• Deterrence: A collective defense pact could deter Chinese aggression by raising the costs of any potential conflict. The prospect of facing a united front of several regional powers might discourage China from taking actions that could trigger a military response19.
• Enhanced Security Cooperation: The TSO could facilitate greater security cooperation among its members, including joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and coordinated defense planning. This could improve interoperability and enhance the overall defense capabilities of the member states20.
• Strengthened Alliances: The TSO could strengthen existing U.S. alliances in the region and solidify partnerships with key countries like Japan, Australia, and South Korea. This could reinforce the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific and counter China’s efforts to undermine U.S. influence21.
• Regional Stability: By deterring Chinese aggression and promoting cooperation among its members, the TSO could contribute to greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This could create a more predictable security environment and reduce the risk of conflict22.
• Economic Integration: The TSO could potentially facilitate greater economic integration and trade among its members, leading to increased prosperity and interdependence23.

However, the TSO also presents potential drawbacks:

• Escalation Risk: The creation of a new security alliance could provoke a negative reaction from China, potentially leading to an escalation of tensions and an arms race in the region24.
• Regional Divisions: The TSO could exacerbate existing divisions in the region, potentially alienating countries that are not members and pushing them closer to China25.
• Overlapping Architectures: The TSO could create another layer of security architecture in an already complex regional environment, potentially leading to confusion and inefficiency26.
• U.S. Burden: The United States could be drawn into regional conflicts due to its TSO commitments, potentially increasing its military and financial burdens27.

Legal and Logistical Challenges of Implementing the TSO

Implementing the TSO would present several legal and logistical challenges:

• Treaty Negotiations: Establishing a collective defense treaty would require complex negotiations among the member states, potentially involving issues of burden-sharing, command structures, and rules of engagement28.
• Legal Framework: The TSO would need a clear legal framework to define its scope, authority, and decision-making processes. This could involve addressing issues of international law, domestic legislation, and the relationship between the TSO and national governments29.
• Logistical Coordination: Coordinating military activities among the TSO members would require significant logistical planning and coordination, including the establishment of communication channels, joint training programs, and interoperable equipment30. This is further complicated by the vast distances involved in the Asia-Pacific region, which pose challenges for transportation, communication, and the maintenance of supply lines31.
• Resource Allocation: The TSO would require substantial resources, including funding, personnel, and equipment, to effectively fulfill its mission. This could involve difficult decisions about burden-sharing among the member states32.
• Contested Logistics: The TSO would need to operate in a contested logistics environment, where adversaries could target supply chains, transportation hubs, and communication networks31.
• Modernization of Equipment: Ensuring interoperability and the modernization of equipment among TSO members would be crucial for effective collective defense31.
• Corruption: Corruption in some Pacific Island countries could pose challenges for the implementation and operation of the TSO30.
• Cybersecurity: Robust cyber defenses and resilient C4ISR architectures would be essential to protect against cyberattacks and ensure effective communication and coordination among TSO members33.

Potential Impact on Regional Stability and U.S. Foreign Policy

The TSO could have a significant impact on regional stability and U.S. foreign policy:

• Deterrence and Stability: If successful in deterring Chinese aggression, the TSO could contribute to greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it could also increase tensions and the risk of conflict if not carefully managed34.
• Shifting Balances: The TSO could shift the balance of power in the region, potentially altering alliances and partnerships. This could have unintended consequences for regional stability and U.S. interests35.
• U.S. Role: The TSO could reinforce the U.S. role as a security provider in the region, but it could also increase U.S. military commitments and the risk of entanglement in regional conflicts34.
• Foreign Policy Implications: The TSO could have broader implications for U.S. foreign policy, potentially signaling a shift towards a more assertive and confrontational approach to China24. This shift could be reflected in a greater emphasis on security competition, increased military deployments, and a more proactive approach to countering Chinese influence in the region.

Conclusion

The proposed bill to create the Transpacific Security Organization presents a complex set of potential benefits and drawbacks. While it could deter Chinese aggression and enhance security cooperation among its members, it also carries the risk of escalating tensions, exacerbating regional divisions, and increasing U.S. burdens. The TSO’s success would depend on several factors, including the ability to effectively address legal and logistical challenges, manage relations with China, and interact with existing security organizations.

The TSO would need to be carefully designed and implemented to avoid unintended consequences. It should be structured in a way that complements existing security mechanisms, particularly ASEAN, and avoids undermining regional stability. Furthermore, the U.S. should carefully consider the potential costs and risks of its TSO commitments, ensuring that it does not overextend its military and financial resources.

Ultimately, the decision to create the TSO would have significant implications for regional stability and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. It represents a potential turning point in the regional security architecture, with the potential to either enhance stability or exacerbate tensions. The TSO’s success would depend on a nuanced understanding of the complex geopolitical dynamics in the region and a commitment to responsible and cooperative security practices.

Works cited

1. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – State.gov, accessed February 9, 2025, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/regional/asean/
2. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – (Taiwan)Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed February 9, 2025, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1575&s=95694
3. What Is ASEAN? | Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean
4. The Quad | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad
5. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – Wikipedia, accessed February 9, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue
6. Simply another practice among others? Analysing the rise of strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2024.2362143
7. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024: Introduction, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2024/introduction/
8. FACT SHEET: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific – Obama White House, accessed February 9, 2025, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific
9. China’s Activities in the South China Sea, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ch_d-act_b.pdf
10. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea | Global Conflict Tracker, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
11. Some of China’s actions in the South China Sea contravene international law, study argues – News – University of Exeter, accessed February 9, 2025, https://news.exeter.ac.uk/faculty-of-humanities-arts-and-social-sciences/some-of-chinas-actions-in-the-south-china-sea-contravene-international-law-study-argues/
12. Let’s Call China’s Actions in the South China Sea What They Really Are, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/lets-call-chinas-actions-south-china-sea-what-they-really-are
13. The unlikelihood of an Asian NATO – POLITICO.eu, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/asia-nato-nations-military-alliance-eu-diplomats-ap4-japan-south-korea-australia-new-zealand/
14. The State—and Fate—of America’s Indo-Pacific Alliances – RAND Corporation, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/the-state-and-fate-of-americas-indo-pacific-alliances.html
15. Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump
16. CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS – Taiwan.gov.tw – Government Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan), accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_6.php
17. China–South Korea relations – Wikipedia, accessed February 9, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93South_Korea_relations
18. The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32882.html
19. FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership’s High-Standard Rules Promote U.S. Interests and Values – USTR, accessed February 9, 2025, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/may/fact-sheet-trans-pacific-partnership%E2%80%99s
20. Five Ways the Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Benefit Agriculture and Rural America – USDA, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.usda.gov/about-usda/news/blog/five-ways-trans-pacific-partnership-will-benefit-agriculture-and-rural-america
21. FACT SHEET: How the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Boosts Made in America Exports, Supports Higher-Paying American Jobs, and Protects American Workers, accessed February 9, 2025, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/fact-sheet-how-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-boosts-made-america-exports
22. USTR Fact Sheet: Economic Benefits of TPP | Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, accessed February 9, 2025, https://lofgren.house.gov/ustr-fact-sheet-economic-benefits-tpp
23. Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement | United States Trade Representative, accessed February 9, 2025, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership
24. Trans Pacific Partnership: Corporations Before People and Democracy, accessed February 9, 2025, https://belonging.berkeley.edu/TPP-report
25. Trans-Pacific Partnership | Economic Policy Institute, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.epi.org/research/trans-pacific-partnership/
26. U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin: Trans-Pacific Partnership is a Bad Deal for American Workers, Shouldn’t Be Considered Until Renegotiated, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/news/press-releases/tpp-bad-deal
27. The pros and cons of the TTP – DW – 02/04/2016, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/the-pros-and-cons-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-pact/a-18597149
28. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress – EveryCRSReport.com, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44489.html
29. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress – FAS Project on Government Secrecy, accessed February 9, 2025, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44489.pdf
30. Transnational Organized Crime in the Pacific: Expansion, Challenges and Impact, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/2024/TOCTA_Pacific_2024.pdf
31. Army Logistics in the Pacific: Scoping the Problem – New America, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/army-logistics-in-the-pacific/scoping-the-problem/
32. Supply Chain Challenges in 2025 & How to Overcome Them – Extensiv, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.extensiv.com/blog/supply-chain-management/challenges
33. Rising to the China Challenge – CNAS, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge
34. U.S. Influence in the Wake of the Trans-Pacific Partnership | CSIS Journalism Bootcamp, accessed February 9, 2025, https://journalism.csis.org/u-s-influence-in-the-wake-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership/
35. China-Taiwan Reunification and Potential Impacts to the Asia-Pacific Region – Air University, accessed February 9, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/3813537/china-taiwan-reunification-and-potential-impacts-to-the-asia-pacific-region/
36. U.S. Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: Don’t Trade Away Trade, accessed February 9, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/us-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific-dont-trade-away-trade