An Annotated Bibliography on the Morality of Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament, 2015–2025

Introduction: A Decade of Normative Conflict in the Nuclear Age

The decade from 2015 to 2025 was marked by a profound and escalating clash between two fundamentally opposed moral-legal frameworks concerning nuclear weapons. This period witnessed the dangerous erosion of Cold War-era arms control agreements, the unabated modernization of nuclear arsenals, and a return to great power competition, all of which sharpened the ethical stakes of the nuclear age. The central tension of this era is not merely a policy disagreement but a deep normative conflict between a humanitarian-driven abolitionist movement and the persistent strategic logic of nuclear deterrence.

The first framework, the Humanitarian-Abolitionist Norm, defines nuclear weapons as inherently immoral instruments of terror. Championed by a powerful coalition of non-nuclear-weapon states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and global civil society, this perspective argues that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic and indiscriminate humanitarian consequences that are irreconcilable with the principles of international humanitarian law, morality, and the dictates of public conscience. This view holds that the blast, heat, and radiation from even a single detonation would overwhelm any possible humanitarian response, causing widespread death, long-term health crises, and environmental devastation on a global scale. From this standpoint, the only moral and rational course of action is the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, a conviction that culminated in the landmark 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).  

In direct opposition stands the Strategic-Deterrence Norm, the governing framework for the nine nuclear-armed states and their allies. This view presents a starkly different moral calculus, rooted in consequentialism and the perceived realities of international security. Proponents argue that while nuclear weapons are terrifying, they serve a vital moral purpose: deterring aggression and preventing catastrophic conventional wars between major powers, an outcome considered a greater evil. Within this framework, deterrence is viewed as a moral obligation of the state to protect its citizens in an anarchic world where existential threats persist. This logic justifies the continued possession and modernization of nuclear arsenals as essential for maintaining strategic stability. For practitioners within this system—policymakers, military officers, and scientists—the moral challenge is not abolition but the responsible stewardship of a dangerous capability, a concept often termed “just deterrence”.  

This report provides a comprehensive bibliography of the key academic and policy literature from 2015 to 2025 that explores this normative conflict. The sources are organized thematically to illuminate the core tenets of each moral framework, the evidence marshaled in their support, and the real-world consequences of their collision. The following timeline provides a contextual anchor, linking the intellectual output of this decade to the pivotal geopolitical events that shaped the debate.

Table 1: A Timeline of Key Events and Seminal Publications in Nuclear Ethics and Disarmament (2015-2025)

Thematic Bibliography

Section 1: Foundational Ethical and Moral Frameworks

The literature in this section grapples with the fundamental moral questions posed by nuclear weapons, applying established ethical theories to the nuclear dilemma. The debate is often framed as a clash between deontological or rule-based ethics, which may condemn nuclear weapons as inherently evil, and consequentialist ethics, which judges them by their outcomes, such as the prevention of major war.

A core tension exists between abstract moral condemnations and the concrete dilemmas faced by those who operate the nuclear deterrent. For many, the indiscriminate and catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons makes them “inherently immoral”. Yet, for practitioners, the moral context is far more complex. They must reconcile the duty to protect their nation with their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which demands adherence to principles like distinction and proportionality. This creates a “practitioner’s dilemma”: how to ethically manage and plan for the use of a weapon system whose deterrent effect often relies on the implicit threat of inflicting “monstrous immorality” on civilian populations.  

This dilemma exposes a deeper philosophical challenge: the irresolvable nature of the central debate. Both sides rely on unverifiable counterfactuals. Deterrence advocates claim nuclear weapons have kept the peace since 1945, a consequentialist argument about a war that did not happen. Abolitionists counter with a different consequentialist claim, arguing the probabilistic risks of accident, miscalculation, or terrorist use are too high to justify possession. As one UNIDIR analysis points out, since these competing claims about alternative histories and futures are ultimately “unverifiable,” the choice between them often rests on prior beliefs about risk, rationality, and the nature of international politics, explaining the debate’s intractable polarization.  

1. Acheson, R. (Ed.). (2015). Assuring destruction forever: Nuclear weapon modernization around the world. Reaching Critical Will. https://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/IMG/pdf/reachingcriticalwill-2015-assuring_destruction_forever-nuclear_weapon_modernization_around_the_world.pdf
2. Becker, J. D. (2020). Strategy in the new era of tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 14(1), 117–140. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-1/Becker.pdf
3. Bell, M. S. (2015). Beyond emboldenment: How acquiring nuclear weapons can change foreign policy. International Security, 40(1), 87–119. https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/40/1/87/12107/Beyond-Emboldenment-How-Acquiring-Nuclear-Weapons?redirectedFrom=fulltext
4. Braun, C. N. (2024). Francis and the Bomb: On the Immorality of Nuclear Deterrence. Journal of Military Ethics, 23(1), 2–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2024.2318050
5. Doyle, T. E., II. (2015). Moral and political necessities for nuclear disarmament: An applied ethical analysis. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 9(2), 19–49. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-09_Issue-2/doyle.pdf
6. Doyle, T. E., II. (2015). The ethics of nuclear weapons dissemination: Moral dilemmas of aspiration, avoidance, and prevention. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Ethics-of-Nuclear-Weapons-Dissemination-Moral-Dilemmas-of-Aspiration-Avoidance-and-Prevention/Doyle/p/book/9780367599775?srsltid=AfmBOopfY0m6EQvWBtRRj4ozoSAJ5sy7lP07xixJE20LVjMKNA1YROPA
7. Ford, C. A. (2023). Morality and Nuclear Weapons: A Practitioner’s Perspective. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/CGSR-Occasional_Paper_MoralityandNuclearWeapons_06302023.pdf
8. Gill, B., & Hänggi, H. (Eds.). (2015). Governing the bomb: Civilian control and democratic accountability of nuclear weapons. Oxford University Press for SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/sipri10gtb.pdf
9. Glaser, C. L. (2019). The flawed case for nuclear disarmament. The Washington Quarterly, 42(2), 115-139. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiZw67TjbiOAxUbMlkFHd0VA2MQFnoECBYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdl1.cuni.cz%2Fpluginfile.php%2F536835%2Fmod_folder%2Fcontent%2F0%2FGlaser%2520-%25201998%2520-%2520The%2520Flawed%2520Case%2520for%2520Nuclear%2520Disarmament.pdf%3Fforcedownload%3D1&usg=AOvVaw1QKwuXN3DN_KPlDP671mru&opi=89978449
10. Hayashi, 2015. On the Ethics of Nuclear Weapons. https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/on-the-ethics-of-nuclear-weapons-en-627.pdf
11. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2022). Nuclear ethics revisited. Ethics & International Affairs, 36(4), 415-427. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/nuclear-ethics-revisited/488E99BA27799040A3D1FC2904A3BE16
12. Roberts, B. (2015). The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Stanford University Press. https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=24950
13. Roberts, B. (2023). Morality and Nuclear Weapons: A Practitioner Perspective. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/CGSR-Occasional_Paper_MoralityandNuclearWeapons_06302023.pdf
14. Sagan, S. D., & Weiner, A. M. (2016). The nuclear necessity principle: Making U.S. targeting policy conform with ethics & the laws of war. Daedalus, 145(4), 62–75. hhttps://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/145/4/62/27110/The-Nuclear-Necessity-Principle-Making-U-Sdocid=alma991026117559704701&context=L&vid=01CDL_IRV_INST:UCI&lang=en&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=LibraryCatalog
15. Tannenwald, N. (2018). The great unraveling: The future of the nuclear normative order. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/publication/emerging-risks-declining-norms/section/3
16. Tuang Nah, L. (2018). Security, economics and nuclear non-proliferation morality: Keeping or surrendering the bomb. Palgrave Macmillan.
17. Van der Lijn, J. (2015). On the ethics of nuclear weapons. UNIDIR. https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/on-the-ethics-of-nuclear-weapons-en-627.pdf
18. Walzer, M. (2015). Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations (5th ed.). Basic Books.
19. Williams, H., & Aghassi, D. (2023). Reducing nuclear weapons risk: Applying behavioural science to nuclear decision-making. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/reducing-nuclear-weapons-risk

Section 2: The Humanitarian Imperative and its Consequences

The literature in this section provides the evidentiary foundation for the abolitionist movement. It documents the shift in the global discourse from a focus on state-centric security to a focus on human security. This was a deliberate and highly effective strategy by non-nuclear states and civil society to reframe the nuclear problem. By moving the conversation away from abstract theories of deterrence, where they had little standing, to the universal and catastrophic consequences of nuclear use, they created a moral and political platform accessible to all nations as potential victims.  

This “humanitarian initiative” was built on a series of international conferences, most notably in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna, which systematically gathered evidence on the effects of nuclear detonations. The resulting reports and analyses paint a devastating picture. Sources detail the immediate effects—blast, thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation—and the long-term consequences, including radioactive fallout, the collapse of healthcare systems, and intergenerational health impacts. Crucially, this body of work also highlighted the global secondary effects, such as severe climate disruption (“nuclear winter”), which would trigger worldwide famine and mass displacement, demonstrating that the consequences of even a “limited” regional nuclear war could not be contained. The inescapable conclusion drawn from this evidence is that no state or international organization possesses the capacity to adequately respond to such a disaster, rendering any use of nuclear weapons a humanitarian catastrophe of unacceptable proportions.  

21. 21. Acheson, R. (2015). The humanitarian initiative. Reaching Critical Will. https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/the-humanitarian-initiative-in-2015-en-626.pdf
    22. Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. (2015). Report of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_Chair_s_Summary.pdf

21. Datan, M., & Rietiker, D. (Eds.). (2017). The humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament. Brill | Nijhoff.
22. Gibbons, S. (2018). The humanitarian turn in nuclear disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The International Spectator, 53(2), 100-117. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326210337_The_humanitarian_turn_in_nuclear_disarmament_and_the_Treaty_on_the_Prohibition_of_Nuclear_Weapons
23. International Committee of the Red Cross. (2020). Humanitarian impacts and risks of the use of nuclear weapons. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/humanitarian-impacts-and-risks-use-nuclear-weapons
24. International Committee of the Red Cross. (2022). Nuclear weapons: 10 questions and answers on the TPNW. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-10-questions-and-answers-tpnw
25. Magnusson, R. (2018). The humanitarian initiative and the TPNW: A transformative approach to nuclear disarmament? Global Change, Peace & Security, 30(3), 311-327. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2018.1528698
26. Moyes, R. (2016). A prohibition on nuclear weapons: A guide to the issues. Article 36. https://article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Prohibition-on-nuclear-weapons.pdf
27. Ritchie, N. (2015). The humanitarian initiative in 2015: Expectations are building for the need for nuclear disarmament progress. UNIDIR. https://unidir.org/publication/the-humanitarian-initiative-in-2015-expectations-are-building-for-the-need-for-nuclear-disarmament-progress/
28. Sauer, T., & van der Graaf, P. (2016). The humanitarian track in nuclear disarmament: A revolution in the making? Global Policy, 7(4), 473-482. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12361
29. Scoles, S. (2022). Counting the dead: The long, politicized effort to calculate the human cost of nuclear weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2022/08/counting-the-dead-the-long-politicized-effort-to-calculate-the-human-cost-of-nuclear-weapons/
30. United Nations. (2021). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2021 [on the report of the First Committee (A/76/443)] 76/231. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956448/files/A_76_49_%28Vol._I%29-EN.pdf
31. Ware, A. (2016). Humanitarian law or the nuclear gamble: The humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and the case for a prohibition. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. http://www.pnnd.org/files/uploads/Humanitarian_Law_or_the_Nuclear_Gamble.pdf

Section 3: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

This section focuses on the TPNW, the central legal and normative achievement of the humanitarian initiative. The literature here details the treaty’s negotiation, its core prohibitions, and its contentious place within the global nuclear order. The TPNW is the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons, making their development, possession, use, and threat of use illegal for states parties.

A key theme is the TPNW’s function as a “norm-shifting” instrument. Proponents recognize that the treaty does not legally bind the nuclear-armed states, which have universally rejected it. Instead, its primary power lies in its capacity to stigmatize nuclear weapons and challenge the legitimacy of deterrence doctrine. The strategy is to create a powerful international norm, similar to those against chemical and biological weapons, that increases political, social, and even economic pressure on nuclear-armed states and their allies over time. This approach is evident in the strong support from moral authorities like the Holy See, which condemns not only the use but the very possession of nuclear weapons as a moral failure and views the TPNW as an essential step toward a more just international order. The sources reflect the deep divide the treaty has created: a hopeful path toward abolition for its supporters, and a dangerous distraction that undermines the stability of deterrence for its opponents.  

35. Bugos, S. (2021). Nuclear ban treaty enters into force. Arms Control Today, 51(2), 26-28. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/nuclear-ban-treaty-enters-force
36. Caccia, G. (2025, March 4). Statement at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations. https://holyseemission.org/contents//statements/65e61a6c4b2b2.php
37. Egeland, K. (2019). A ‘humanitarian ban’: The TPNW and the socio-political dynamics of nuclear disarmament. Global Change, Peace & Security, 31(3), 251-270. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2019.1659556
38. Fihn, B. (2017). The logic of banning nuclear weapons. Survival, 59(1), 43-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282470
39. Francis, P. (2017, November 10). Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to participants in the International Symposium “Prospects for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons and for Integral Disarmament.” The Holy See. https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/november/documents/papa-francesco_20171110_convegno-disarmo-integrale.html
40. Johnson, R. (2018). The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A feminist perspective on the new law. Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. https://www.acronym.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/TPNW-a-feminist-perspective_FINAL_for-web.pdf
41. Kmentt, A. (2021). The Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons: How it was achieved and why it matters. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/The-Treaty-Prohibiting-Nuclear-Weapons-How-It-Was-Achieved-and-Why/Kmentt/p/book/9780367531942
42. Minor, E. (2019). The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty: What It Is and What It Means. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2(2), 407-428. https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1678984
43. Ogilvie-White, T., & Abbasi, R. (2018). The challenges of the nuclear ban treaty. The Washington Quarterly, 41(3), 163-186. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1522067
44. Ploughshares Fund. (2023). The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). https://ploughshares.ca/a-note-of-gratitude/
45. Reaching Critical Will. (2021). TPNW entry into force: A new era for nuclear disarmament. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/15118-tpnw-entry-into-force-a-new-era-for-nuclear-disarmament
46. United Nations. (2017). Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en
47. United Nations General Assembly. (2021). Resolution 76/46: Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956448/files/A_76_49_%28Vol._I%29-EN.pdf
48. Wan, W. (2020). The nuclear ban treaty and the non-proliferation regime. The Nonproliferation Review, 27(1-3), 21-40. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1846430

Section 4: Nuclear Deterrence: Theory, Practice, and Moral Critique

This section examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence, the central security doctrine of the nuclear-armed states, and the profound moral critiques it faces. The core logic of deterrence is to prevent attack by threatening retaliation so devastating that no aggressor would rationally initiate conflict. However, this logic is fraught with ethical and practical problems.  

One of the most significant developments of the 2015-2025 period is the strategic shift toward making nuclear weapons more “usable.” This “conventionalization” involves developing lower-yield, precision-guided weapons intended to make deterrent threats more credible by enabling “limited” strikes against military targets. This is often justified as a more moral approach that adheres to the laws of war. However, this creates a dangerous paradox: by lowering the threshold for nuclear use, strategists may be making the ultimate ethical failure—the outbreak of nuclear war—more likely. This approach fosters a dangerous illusion that a nuclear conflict could be controlled and contained, a belief challenged by historical near-misses and analyses of crisis decision-making. Furthermore, the credibility of extended deterrence—the “nuclear umbrella” protecting allies—has come under increasing strain, raising fears that allies like South Korea or Japan might pursue their own arsenals, triggering a new wave of proliferation.  

49. Acton, J. M. (2018). Escalation through entanglement: How the vulnerability of command-and-control systems raises the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war. International Security, 43(1), 56-99. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320
50. Colby, E. A. (2017). If you want peace, prepare for nuclear war. Foreign Affairs, 96(6), 25-32. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war
51. Fuhrmann, M., & Sechser, T. S. (2017). Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nuclear-weapons-and-coercive-diplomacy/479C1445D90F1225D9D60B3C7C075B3E
52. Harvey, F. P. (2016). Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual theory, logic and evidence. Cambridge University Press.
53. Jervis, R. (2017). The nuclear revolution and the common defense. Annual Review of Political Science, 20, 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060215-022022
54. Kahl, C. H. (2018). The end of the American century? The Trump administration and the erosion of U.S. power. Texas National Security Review, 1(2), 7-29. https://tnsr.org/2018/02/end-american-century-trump-administration-erosion-u-s-power/
55. Kroenig, M. (2018). The logic of American nuclear strategy: Why strategic superiority matters. Oxford University Press.
56. Lewis, P. (2023). Russian nuclear intimidation: How to deter and not to detonate. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/russian-nuclear-intimidation
57. Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2017). The new era of counterforce: Technological change and the future of nuclear deterrence. International Security, 41(4), 9–49. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00273
58. Panda, A. (2020). Fire on the horizon: The future of nuclear arms control in the new cold war. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-10-13/fire-horizon
59. Paul, T. V. (2018). Restraining great powers: Soft balancing from empires to the global era. Yale University Press.
60. Rauch, J. (2018). The constitution of knowledge: A defense of truth. Brookings Institution Press.
61. Roberts, B. (2016). A new nuclear age? The Washington Quarterly, 39(3), 7-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1231575
62. Sagan, S. D. (2015). The nuclear taboo and the nuclear revolution. Ethics & International Affairs, 29(1), 17-23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S089267941400067X
63. Sechser, T. S., & Fuhrmann, M. (2017). The limited logic of nuclear coercion. International Security, 42(2), 44-80. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00295
64. Tertrais, B. (2017). The logic of deterrence and the irrational. Survival, 59(4), 95-110. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1354044

Section 5: Modernization, New Technologies, and the Evolving Threat Landscape

The moral and strategic landscape of the nuclear age is being rapidly reshaped by technological change. This section gathers sources that document two critical trends: the comprehensive modernization of existing nuclear arsenals and the introduction of disruptive new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons. Reports from SIPRI and Reaching Critical Will show that all nine nuclear-armed states are engaged in massive, multi-decade modernization programs. These are not mere life-extension projects; they involve developing new warheads, delivery systems, and command-and-control infrastructure, effectively fueling a qualitative arms race and entrenching nuclear weapons in national security policies for the indefinite future.   

This modernization is complicated by the rise of new technologies that create novel pathways to catastrophe. A central concern is “escalation through entanglement”. As military operations become more integrated, the lines between conventional and nuclear command, control, and communications (C3) systems are blurring. A conventional attack on a dual-use satellite or command node could be misinterpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first strike, pressuring a leader to “use or lose” their own nuclear forces. AI introduces further risks of unreliability, algorithmic bias, and compressed decision-making timelines, removing human moral judgment from the most consequential decision a state can make. Together, these trends are making the nuclear system more complex, opaque, and prone to catastrophic failure born not of malice, but of technological complexity.  

65. Baklitskiy, A., & Opatowski, S. R. (2024). Nuclear risks: Perceptions and pathways. UNIDIR. https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risks-perceptions-pathways/
66. Boulanin, V., et al. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-reports/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk
67. Brown, L. R. (2023). Feminist foreign policy and nuclear weapons: Contributions and implications. EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/feminist-foreign-policy-and-nuclear-weapons-contributions-and-implications
68. Chernavskikh, V., & Palayer, J. (2025). Impact of military artificial intelligence on nuclear escalation risk. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/weapons-mass-destruction/recent-pubs
69. Erästö, T. (2022). Revisiting ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’: Laying the ground for multilateral nuclear disarmament. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/sipri-essays/revisiting-minimal-nuclear-deterrence-laying-ground-multilateral-nuclear-disarmament
70. Futter, A. (2021). Hacking the bomb: Cyber threats and nuclear weapons. Georgetown University Press.
71. Lindsay, J. R. (2020). Information technology and military power. Cornell University Press.
72. Panda, A. (2025). The new nuclear age: At the precipice of Armageddon. PublicAffairs.
73. Reinhold, T., Hoffberger-Pippan, E., Blanchard, A., Blum, M. M., Lentzos, F., & Saltini, A. (2025). Artificial intelligence, non-proliferation and disarmament: A compendium on the state of the art. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/artificial-intelligence-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-compendium-state-art
74. Sauer, T. (2024). The potentially revolutionary impact of emerging and disruptive technologies and strategic conventional weapons on the nuclear deterrence debate. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/weapons-mass-destruction/recent-pubs
75. Su, F., Chernavskikh, V., & Wan, W. (2025). Advancing governance at the nexus of artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/weapons-mass-destruction/recent-pubs
76. UNIDIR. (2017). The weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies: Considering ethics and social values. https://unidir.org/publication/the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous-technologies-considering-ethics-and-social-values/

Section 6: International Law, Regimes, and State Obligations

The literature in this section analyzes the legal and institutional architecture designed to manage nuclear risks, focusing primarily on the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT is founded on a “grand bargain”: non-nuclear-weapon states pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons, and in exchange, the five recognized nuclear-weapon states committed to pursuing good-faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament under Article VI.  

A dominant theme throughout the 2015-2025 period is the NPT’s profound crisis of legitimacy. This crisis stems from the perception among many non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers have failed to uphold their end of the bargain. While rigorously enforcing non-proliferation on others, they have simultaneously engaged in massive modernization programs that seem to contradict their disarmament obligations. This perceived hypocrisy has eroded the treaty’s moral authority and was a primary driver behind the TPNW, which can be understood as an attempt by non-nuclear states to create a legal instrument that takes the disarmament obligation seriously. The repeated failure of NPT Review Conferences to produce consensus outcome documents underscores the deep and widening chasm between the two normative camps, leaving the future of the entire non-proliferation regime in a precarious state.  

77. Carlson, J. (2017). The NPT and the TPNW: A clash of treaties? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/npt-and-tpnw-clash-treaties
78. Dhanapala, J. (2017). Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/sipri-essays/reflections-treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons
79. Jenkins, B. (2018). The NPT at fifty: A midlife crisis. The Nonproliferation Review, 25(5-6), 467-478. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1561725
80. Johnson, R. (2019). Nuclear-weapon-free zones: The treaties, protocols and their value. Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. https://www.acronym.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/NWFZ-report_2019_final.pdf
81. Perkovich, G. (2020). The logic of nuclear disarmament. UNIDIR. https://unidir.org/files/2020-11/Paper%202%20-%20Nuclear%20Disarmament.pdf
82. Potter, W. C., & Bidgood, S. (Eds.). (2018). Once and future partners: The United States, Russia, and nuclear non-proliferation. Routledge.
83. Rauf, T. (2017). Engagement on nuclear disarmament between nuclear weapon-possessing states and non-nuclear weapon states. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/sipri-essays/engagement-nuclear-disarmament-between-nuclear-weapon-possessing-states-and-non-nuclear-weapon-states
84. Robock, A. (2019). Nuclear winter: The current science. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75(4), 143-149. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1629546
85. Smetana, M. (2020). Nuclear deviance: Stigma politics and the rules of the nonproliferation game. Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-24226-8
86. Tannenwald, N. (2015). Justice and fairness in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Ethics & International Affairs, 27(3), 299-317. https://doi.org/10.1017/S089267941300021X
87. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2018). Securing our common future: An agenda for disarmament. https://www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda/
88. Zarka, M., & Kirsten, I. (2022). Balancing the three pillars of the NPT: How can promoting peaceful uses help? SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/balancing-three-pillars-npt-how-can-promoting-peaceful-uses-help

Section 7: Key Institutional and State Perspectives

This final section gathers flagship publications from the world’s leading research institutions and think tanks dedicated to nuclear policy, alongside key books from academic presses. These sources provide the essential data, in-depth analysis, and diverse perspectives that underpin the entire field. They serve as foundational texts for any serious researcher, offering authoritative assessments of global nuclear forces, arms control developments, and regional security challenges. Publications from organizations like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists offer indispensable data on arsenal sizes and modernization trends , while reports from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Chatham House provide nuanced analyses of deterrence, risk reduction, and the legal regimes governing nuclear weapons.   

90. Abbasi, R. (2021). Building a road to nuclear disarmament: Bridging the gap between competing approaches. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Building-a-Road-to-Nuclear-Disarmament-Bridging-the-Gap-Between-Competing/Abbasi/p/book/9780367673963
91. Budjeryn, M. (2023). Inheriting the bomb: The collapse of the USSR and the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Johns Hopkins University Press. https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/12715/inheriting-bomb
92. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023). The future of arms control. https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/futureofarmscontrol
93. Futter, A. (2018). The politics of nuclear weapons. SAGE Publications.
94. Gottemoeller, R. (2020). Negotiating the New START Treaty. Cambria Press.
95. Griffith, L. (2023). Unraveling the gray area problem: The United States and the INF Treaty. Cornell University Press. https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501773068/unraveling-the-gray-area-problem/
96. Korda, M., & Kristensen, H. M. (2024). Nuclear notebook: World nuclear forces, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 80(1), 43-53. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2293923
97. Krepon, M. (2021). Winning and losing the nuclear peace: The rise, demise, and revival of arms control. Stanford University Press.
98. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2023). SIPRI yearbook 2023: Armaments, disarmament and international security. Oxford University Press. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2023
99. Vicente, A. (2023). The future of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. In P. Sinovets (Ed.), Russia’s war on Ukraine: The implications for the global security architecture. Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-32221-1_11
100. Williams, H., & Lunn, S. (2019). NATO and the challenges of nuclear deterrence. Palgrave Macmillan.

Conclusion: Trajectories and Future Inquiries

The body of literature produced between 2015 and 2025 documents a decade of escalating normative conflict and growing existential risk. The chasm between the humanitarian-abolitionist framework, which culminated in the TPNW, and the strategic-deterrence framework, which underpins the modernization of all nuclear arsenals, has widened to a dangerous degree. The collapse of key arms control treaties and the return of explicit nuclear threats have moved the world from an era of post-Cold War optimism to one of renewed and complex nuclear danger.

The scholarship of this period raises urgent questions for future research and policy. First, can the NPT and the TPNW coexist, or is the global nuclear order destined to fracture completely? The tension between the two treaties—one based on conditional possession and the other on absolute prohibition—is a central, unresolved challenge. Second, how can arms control be rebuilt for a new era? The old bilateral models are insufficient for a multipolar world that includes a rapidly expanding Chinese arsenal and a host of disruptive new technologies, from AI to hypersonic weapons, that defy traditional verification methods. Finally, can a new ethical consensus be forged? Such a consensus would need to bridge the “practitioner’s dilemma” by finding a way to manage nuclear risk that is both strategically credible and morally defensible, acknowledging the catastrophic consequences of use while addressing the security concerns that drive states to possess these weapons. The moral responsibilities of the scientists, engineers, and policymakers shaping this new technological and strategic landscape will be a critical area of inquiry as the world navigates the perils of a third nuclear age.