Extemp Practice Bank — Asia (IX)

Prepared August 22, 2026 · 10 questions · Window: the 2026 cycle, with recent anchors on every question Forms: 2 What · 2 Should · 2 Will/Can · 2 Is/Are · 2 How/Did

The questions

1. Can Taiwan fund the defense buildup its own government says it needs? — Will/Can
2. Will Lee Jae-myung's end-of-war initiative produce talks with North Korea? — Will/Can
3. Is China's growth model running out of room? — Is/Are
4. Is the India–China thaw more than a supply-chain truce? — Is/Are
5. Should ASEAN normalize relations with Myanmar's post-election government? — Should
6. Should Southeast Asian claimants confront China more directly in the South China Sea? — Should
7. What has Takaichi's supermajority changed about Japan's foreign policy? — What
8. What does the change of government in Dhaka mean for India's position in South Asia? — What
9. How has the Iran war reshaped Asia's energy strategy? — How/Did
10. How did February's trade deal change India's relationship with Washington? — How/Did

How to use this bank

Draw an envelope of three, prep thirty minutes, speak seven. Read and file the sources under a question before draw day — they are the prep, not the speech.

Two things specific to this area. Asia is really four regions, and a bank this wide buys breadth at the cost of depth: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the maritime disputes that cut across them each generate their own news cycle. The questions below are spread deliberately so a student drilling all ten covers the map rather than three variations on China. The reporting clusters seasonally. Regional analysis lands in January and February — after elections, party congresses, and budget releases — and again around mid-year summits. Every question here carries recent anchors, but several rest on foundational reporting from earlier in the cycle, which is noted in the dates.

Dates marked ~ are approximate because the outlet showed no precise publication date.

Storylines in play

• Taiwan's record defense budget meets a hostile legislature. The government proposed NT$1.12 trillion ($35bn) for 2027 (Washington Times/AP, Aug 20), months after the opposition cut the special budget by 40% and stripped domestic drone funding.
• Seoul proposed formally ending the Korean War on Liberation Day, and Trump says Kim has responded (Al Jazeera, Aug 18) — against a Party Congress line that hardened toward the South.
• China's July data disappointed across the board — retail sales up 0.6%, industrial output 4.5%, fixed-asset investment down 6.7% for the year, urban unemployment 5.2% (CNBC, Aug 17) — while monthly trade surpluses stayed above $100bn.
• The India–China thaw kept widening through Foreign Secretary Misri's late-July Beijing visit, even as New Delhi flagged $51bn of imports for domestic substitution (Asia Times, ~Aug 14).
• Myanmar's junta completed its transition on paper. The USDP swept the multi-phase election and Min Aung Hlaing took the presidency in April; ASEAN is now debating engagement (The Diplomat, ~Aug 8).
• The South China Sea saw three clashes in a single week in July, and two deaths in an August collision during a Philippine ship chase (CFR, ~Aug 18).
• Beijing is squeezing Japan through minerals, not diplomacy — dual-use export bans from January, 80 Japanese firms blacklisted or watchlisted by June, with Daiwa estimating a year-long disruption could cost 1.3% of GDP (ORF, ~Jul 22).
• Bangladesh changed governments. The BNP won a landslide on February 12 under Tarique Rahman, ending the interim period and reopening the question of Dhaka's alignment.
• The Iran war turned Asia's energy dependence into an emergency — roughly 80% of Asia's oil transits Hormuz, and Japan alone relies on the route for about 93% of its crude.
• The US–India trade deal cut reciprocal tariffs to 18% in February in exchange for reduced Russian oil purchases, though the two governments described the terms differently.

Questions

1. Can Taiwan fund the defense buildup its own government says it needs?

Form: Will/Can · Positions: A — yes, the legislature passed a $25bn package in May and the 2027 request crosses NT$1 trillion, so the money is moving even if slowly; B — no, the opposition controls the chamber until 2028, cut the special budget 40%, and stripped exactly the programs Washington considers essential

1. Taiwan proposes a record $35B defense budget for 2027 — AP via Washington Times, 2026-08-20 · [A] The NT$1.12 trillion request and Lai's 5%-of-GDP-by-2030 pledge — plus the warning sign that the 2026 budget took 266 days.
2. Taiwan Tops NT$1 Trillion Defense Budget as Drone Funding Remains Stripped — TechTimes, 2026-08-10 · [B] The headline figure against the record: a 40% cut in May and a drone procurement bill still deadlocked in August.
3. Taiwan's Special Defense Budget Bill Passes with Drastic Cuts — Jamestown Foundation, 2026-05-29 · [B] What survived and what didn't: US arms purchases funded, domestic drone industry defunded, and why KMT chair Cheng Li-wun wanted it that way.
4. Between Beijing and the Budget: The Domestic Realities of Taiwan's Defense Spending Drama — War on the Rocks, 2026-06-04 · [A] The case that the May 8 passage was a real breakthrough — eight blocks, then a "middle ground" both opposition parties could sign.
5. The Taiwanese president's proposal to hike defense spending faces gridlock at home — NPR, 2026-01-22 · [Background] The original $40bn eight-year plan and the American Institute in Taiwan's public backing.
6. The Contents and Controversies of Taiwan's Special Defense Budget — Global Taiwan Institute, 2026-03-25 · [Background] How the special budget works alongside the regular one, and what T-Dome is meant to be.
7. Taiwan's 2026 Defence Budget — Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 2026-05-12 · [Both] Above 3% of GDP on paper but inactive in practice — and the KMT chair's Beijing visit as the political context.
8. Taiwan's NT$1.25 Trillion Defense Bill Stalls Amid Legislature Deadlock — Vision Times, 2026-04-30 · [B] The fight inside the KMT, including Hou You-yi arguing the budget should pass and not fall below 3%.
9. Confrontation Over Taiwan — Council on Foreign Relations, ~2026-08-15 · [Data] The pressure the budget is meant to answer: air-defense incursions, coast guard operations, live-fire drills.
10. Taiwan Begins Military Drills as China Pressure Grows — Asharq Al-Awsat, ~2026-08-08 · [Background] Han Kuang 2026, including deliberate mobile-internet slowdowns to test civilian resilience.

2. Will Lee Jae-myung's end-of-war initiative produce talks with North Korea?

Form: Will/Can · Positions: A — yes, Seoul has dropped preconditions, Washington is signaling interest, and Kim has an incentive to bank sanctions relief; B — no, the Party Congress institutionalized non-recognition of Seoul, and Pyongyang's price is recognition as a nuclear state

1. South Korea president proposes talks with Pyongyang to formally end Korean War — France 24, 2026-08-15 · [A] The Liberation Day proposal in Lee's own words, framed around halting rather than reversing the nuclear program.
2. 'Very positive': Trump says Kim Jong Un has responded to his overtures — Al Jazeera, 2026-08-18 · [A] The American channel reopening — and Trump criticizing Seoul for staying out of the Iran war, a complication for the alliance.
3. North Korea's nuclear ambitions are here to stay — Lowy Institute, ~2026-03 · [B] The 9th Party Congress hardened policy toward Seoul while leaving a narrow opening for Washington only.
4. North Korea in 2026: Will the US and South Korean push for talks succeed? — Chatham House, 2026-01-08 · [B] What Kim would demand to show up — sanctions relief, an end to joint exercises, or nuclear recognition.
5. Previewing North Korea's Grand Strategy for 2026 — The Diplomat, 2025-12-30 · [B] "Institutionalized indifference and non-recognition" toward the South, paired with opportunistic diplomacy toward the US.
6. South Korea would accept a Trump-Kim deal to freeze nuclear programme — BBC, ~2025-09 · [A] Lee accepting a freeze as an interim step, and his estimate that the North adds 15–20 weapons a year.
7. Will South Korea's new president restart dialogue with North Korea? — RFA via GlobalSecurity, 2025-06-04 · [Background] The 2018 precedent and why the last round of summitry failed to slow the program.