Resolved: The European Union should establish a nuclear sharing agreement with France to create an independent nuclear capability

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Introduction

The evolving geopolitical landscape, marked by heightened security concerns and shifting international alliances, has reignited discussions within Europe regarding its defense posture. Central to this discourse is the proposition that the European Union (EU) should establish a nuclear sharing agreement with France to forge an independent deterrent capability. This report aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of this complex issue, beginning with an explanation of the European Union’s foundational elements, the concept of an independent deterrent capability, and France’s prospective role. Subsequently, it will meticulously examine the arguments both in favor of and against such a resolution, drawing upon thorough research and citing relevant sources. Finally, the report will delve into the theoretical underpinnings of nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation, offering a holistic perspective on the strategic implications of this proposed shift in European security architecture.

Understanding the Core Concepts

The European Union (EU)

The European Union is a unique political and economic union of 27 member states, built upon a series of foundational treaties that have progressively deepened integration across the continent. Its origins trace back to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty signed in 1951, which aimed to create interdependence in vital industries to prevent future conflicts . This was followed by the Treaties of Rome in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), extending integration to general economic cooperation . Subsequent treaties, such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), formally established the European Union and introduced elements of political union, including citizenship and a common foreign and internal affairs policy . The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) further refined the EU’s structure, enhancing the European Parliament’s power, modifying voting procedures in the Council, and creating a permanent President of the European Council and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs . These treaties collectively define the EU’s objectives, institutional rules, decision-making processes, and its relationship with member countries .

The EU’s political structure is composed of seven principal decision-making bodies: the European Parliament, the European Council (of heads of state or government), the Council of the European Union (of member state ministers), the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors . These institutions collectively hold the executive and legislative power, with the Council representing governments, the Parliament representing citizens, and the Commission representing the broader European interest .

A critical component of the EU’s international role is its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP enables the Union to play a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security, integrating both civilian and military assets for crisis management . The idea of a common defense policy for Europe dates back to 1948 with the Treaty of Brussels . Under the Treaty on European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) encompasses all areas of foreign and security policy, utilizing the CSDP’s civilian and military capabilities . The CFSP is notably “intergovernmental,” meaning that, with few exceptions, member states decide unanimously on foreign and security policy issues . This intergovernmental character means the European Commission plays a limited role, lacking the right of initiative or significant executive powers in this domain . Member states are obligated to support the CFSP and refrain from actions contrary to its interests, though it exists alongside their individual foreign policies . The CFSP’s objectives include preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, and fostering sustainable development, among others .

Independent Deterrent Capability

An independent deterrent capability refers to a nation’s ability to deter aggression through its own military power, particularly nuclear weapons, without reliance on external authorization or support. At its core, deterrence is the strategic concept where the threat of inflicting unacceptable costs or risks persuades an adversary to refrain from a particular action.1 For nuclear deterrence, this implies that the retaliatory potential and destructive force of nuclear weapons prevent nations from initiating an attack, especially a nuclear one .

Crucially, an independent deterrent capability signifies that a nation maintains full, sovereign control over the decision-making process regarding the use of its armed forces, including nuclear weapons . This means no permission, authorization, or direct intervention is required from another country . It encompasses both the practical capability to respond decisively to any threat and the sovereign authority to launch or not launch these weapons independently . A successful nuclear deterrent, in this context, necessitates the country’s ability to preserve its capacity to retaliate, often through a “second-strike” capability, ensuring that even a preemptive attack cannot neutralize its deterrent force.1 This is distinct from concepts like “extended deterrence,” where a powerful state, such as the United States, assures its allies of its nuclear backing to deter threats, thereby reducing the incentive for those allies to develop their own nuclear weapons . The pursuit of an independent deterrent capability often arises when allied governments begin to question the credibility of such extended deterrence commitments .

France’s Likely Role in an EU Nuclear Sharing Agreement

France’s nuclear doctrine is deeply rooted in the concept of Force de Frappe, an independent nuclear deterrent designed to ensure strategic autonomy . This doctrine has been a cornerstone of French foreign policy for over four decades, emphasizing France’s full control over its military decisions, particularly the use of its nuclear arsenal . France maintains sovereign control over the design, manufacturing, deployment, and operation of its nuclear forces, including nuclear components, missiles, aircraft, and submarines . This independence extends to the planning of nuclear missions, target selection, and the ultimate decision to use nuclear weapons, which rests solely with the French President .

While France’s nuclear deterrent is fundamentally sovereign, successive French presidents have indicated that France’s “vital interests” could extend beyond strictly national borders to include allied European countries . President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly asserted that France’s nuclear deterrence “plays a role in the preservation of peace and security in Europe,” signifying that the appreciation of vital interests would not be made on a strictly national basis . This is a political declaration, however, and does not imply a shift in the operational doctrine or a willingness to share command authority.4

In the context of a potential EU nuclear sharing agreement, France’s stance is clear: it intends to preserve full sovereign control over its nuclear capabilities . Paris is not willing to accept joint work with partners on nuclear systems, co-funding, or industrial assistance for its nuclear mission . The French President remains the sole authority for deciding on the employment of nuclear weapons or assessing vital interest violations, precluding any consultation, co-decision, or involvement of allies in these aspects .

Macron has, however, called for a “strategic dialogue” on French deterrence and invited partners to observe nuclear forces exercises.5 This initiative aims to foster a shared assessment of the strategic situation and the role of nuclear deterrence, rather than proposing major reforms or a recreation of an extended deterrence model inspired by NATO.4 Practical propositions include the participation of partners as observers in French nuclear exercises, such as an Italian refueling plane taking part in a strategic air force exercise.4 This approach suggests a complementary role for French nuclear capabilities within a broader European defense framework, potentially involving specialization where other countries invest in areas like anti-missile defense or deep strike assets to support and reinforce the French nuclear strike force.4 Nevertheless, the limited size of the French arsenal (fewer than 300 weapons) means it cannot substitute existing NATO mechanisms or adopt a strategy requiring a larger arsenal.4

Arguments in Favor of the Resolution

The proposition for the EU to establish a nuclear sharing agreement with France to create an independent deterrent capability is underpinned by several compelling arguments, largely driven by a shifting geopolitical landscape and evolving perceptions of security guarantees.

Firstly, a significant impetus for this resolution is the decreased trust in U.S. extended deterrence.8 European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have openly expressed anxieties that the United States might not uphold its mutual defense commitments unconditionally, particularly under a potential future U.S. President Donald Trump.8 This concern revives the historical “New York-for-Paris dilemma,” where European allies question whether the U.S. would risk its own cities in response to an attack on Europe.9 Such doubts about U.S. resolve inherently weaken the credibility of European deterrence, prompting a search for alternative security assurances.22 The perception that the U.S. might not only withdraw but potentially turn against Europe further fuels this urgency.8

Secondly, the heightened geopolitical threat environment, particularly stemming from Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine, underscores the need for Europe to bolster its security.1 This conflict, described as the “bloodiest land war on European soil since World War II,” has created an acute sense of vulnerability across the continent.8 Proponents argue that a European nuclear deterrent could prevent a “land-grab” scenario in Eastern Europe, such as an invasion of the Baltic states, by deterring Russian conventional forces.8 The observation that Russia has respected NATO territory during the conflict suggests that nuclear deterrence remains a potent force, leading to the conclusion that Europe might require its own nuclear weapons to deter future contingencies.8

Thirdly, establishing an independent deterrent aligns with the long-standing aspiration for European strategic autonomy . This concept implies Europe’s ability to act independently when necessary, even while cooperating with external allies when interests align . A shared nuclear capability would represent a significant step towards reducing Europe’s reliance on external powers for its ultimate security, enabling it to project its own influence and protect its interests more effectively on the global stage .

Fourthly, Germany’s shifting stance and newfound resources make the prospect of a European nuclear deterrent more tangible than in previous decades . Germany’s willingness to invest significantly in defense, coupled with hints of potential German co-sponsorship of the French arsenal, signals a crucial change in the political and financial landscape that could support such an initiative.22 This financial commitment could address some of the cost concerns associated with developing and maintaining a credible deterrent.

Finally, while an independent European deterrent would operate outside the direct U.S. nuclear umbrella, it could still be seen as complementary to NATO’s overall deterrence architecture.22 France’s independent nuclear capacity already contributes to the Alliance’s overall deterrence.4 A more formalized, albeit independent, European nuclear pillar could strengthen the collective security of the continent, providing additional layers of deterrence and potentially allowing for a more specialized division of defense responsibilities among European partners.22 Some proposals even suggest replicating the US model of nuclear sharing, where French nuclear-capable systems could be stationed in countries like Poland or Germany, and potentially launched from suitable partner aircraft.22

Arguments Against the Resolution

Despite the strategic appeal of an independent European deterrent, significant arguments stand against the establishment of a nuclear sharing agreement with France, encompassing issues of credibility, legality, practicality, and political will.

Foremost among these are credibility and decision-making challenges. The fundamental “New York-for-Paris dilemma”—whether a nuclear power would risk its own cities for an ally—is an inherent feature of extended deterrence that would persist even if the guarantor shifted from Washington to Paris or London.9 France, with its smaller arsenal and geographic proximity, would face an even more difficult task in convincing its European partners that it is willing to risk its own complete annihilation on their behalf.10 France’s nuclear doctrine explicitly maintains

sole presidential authority for nuclear use, precluding any co-decision or consultation with allies . This unilateral control means that even if a “sharing” agreement were conceived, allies would have no ultimate say over decisions, potentially undermining the very trust it seeks to build . Furthermore, France’s limited arsenal size (fewer than 300 warheads) is designed for its national vital interests, not to substitute the vast U.S. extended deterrence or provide a large-scale European umbrella . The French doctrine also features a steep escalation curve, which can lead to a credibility deficit in the eyes of European allies, leaving them uncertain about France’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons in their defense without risking full nuclear escalation.5

The legal and treaty implications present formidable obstacles. A nuclear sharing agreement, particularly one involving the transfer of control or direct financial support, could violate Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) . The NPT prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons or control over them to any recipient, including supranational organizations like the EU . While NATO’s existing nuclear sharing arrangements predate the NPT and are interpreted as compatible given that the U.S. retains final control, this interpretation is subject to ongoing criticism.11 Moreover, several EU member states, including Ireland, Austria, and Malta, are parties to the

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) . Under TPNW Article I, these states are prohibited from any support, stationing, or financial contribution to nuclear weapons, making a unanimous EU decision for such an agreement legally impossible . The EU itself is committed to promoting universal adherence to the NPT and its non-proliferation objectives, which would be fundamentally contradicted by the development of its own nuclear weapons .

Practical and financial hurdles are also substantial. Developing and maintaining a new nuclear program is extraordinarily expensive, potentially absorbing funding and technical capacity that could otherwise strengthen conventional forces, which Europe urgently needs to modernize.11 Replicating the U.S. extended deterrence model would likely overwhelm European financial resources . Furthermore, a multinational European force would necessitate a new command-and-control system that reconciles national sovereignty with collective credibility for launch authorization . Achieving rapid decision-making and political legitimacy in a crisis within a multinational framework presents significant challenges .

Finally, the resolution carries substantial proliferation risks. Establishing a European deterrent could severely undermine the global non-proliferation regime, potentially encouraging other countries to pursue nuclear weapons and increasing the risk of accidents, miscalculations, and an arms race . Historical precedents, such as the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s, highlight persistent institutional obstacles stemming from a widespread reluctance to relinquish national sovereignty in defense matters.12 France’s historical pursuit of a national-centered agenda and domestic political uncertainties within France itself also raise doubts among partners about the solidity and long-term commitment of French proposals.10 The prevailing norm of equality among EU members further complicates the acceptance of unilateral French leadership in such a critical domain.5

Theories of Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence theory is a cornerstone concept in international relations, particularly within security and conflict studies, positing that threats of using force can prevent adversaries from taking undesirable actions.1 At its core, deterrence is the persuasion of an opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action outweigh its benefits, typically through the threat of military retaliation.1 Glenn Snyder defines deterrence as “the power to dissuade,” while Alexander George and Richard Smoke describe it as “the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action outweigh its benefits”.2 Thomas Schelling calls deterrence “a threat intended to keep an adversary from doing something”.2 For deterrence to be effective, it relies on three key principles: credibility, capability, and communication.1 Credibility means the deterring party must convincingly demonstrate both the ability and the willingness to retaliate.1 Peter Huth emphasizes that without credibility, an adversary might assume they can act without consequence.1 Capability requires possessing sufficient military power to respond decisively, often through a “second-strike” capability in the nuclear context, ensuring that even a preemptive attack cannot neutralize the deterrent.1 Communication involves clearly conveying the intent to deter to potential aggressors through public declarations, military exercises, or alliance commitments.1

A prominent concept within nuclear deterrence is Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which posits that a nuclear attack by one state would lead to guaranteed, devastating retaliation by the victim state, thereby deterring first strikes.1 This theory is based on the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage, making the prospect of a nuclear exchange too terrible to contemplate.15 The underlying assumption is that leaders are influenced by the deaths of noncombatants in decisions about war and surrender.15

However, nuclear deterrence theory faces significant criticisms. From an ethical and legal standpoint, critics argue that it is a deeply flawed attempt to justify the existence of the world’s most destructive weapons, relying inherently on the threat of terror.16 The International Court of Justice, in 1996, ruled that the use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal.16 Professor Francis Boyle suggests that nuclear deterrence is not only illegal but criminal.16 Furthermore, there is a growing view that the theory is fundamentally flawed in its practical efficacy. The 2010 Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs study, “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the validity of nuclear deterrence,” concluded that the evidence for nuclear deterrence is “paltry, if it exists at all”.16 Studies suggest that nuclear weapons may not reliably deter nuclear attacks, do not deter conventional attacks, and do not consistently provide diplomatic leverage.2 For instance, some analyses contend that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not end the Pacific War, and there is no clear evidence that nuclear weapons “kept the peace” during the Cold War.16 The core assumption that city destruction is militarily decisive is also questioned, as historical examination shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars.2 Ultimately, critics warn that far from guaranteeing security, nuclear deterrence brings unparalleled risk, constantly bringing humanity to the brink of catastrophe due to the potential for miscalculation or accidental use.16

Theories of Nuclear Proliferation

The study of nuclear proliferation, defined as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear state, has been dominated by several theoretical perspectives, each attempting to explain why states pursue or forgo nuclear capabilities.17

Traditionally, the realist camp has shaped American thinking on proliferation.20 This view posits that nuclear weapons are highly valuable to states, offering significant security advantages.20 Consequently, realists believe there is a natural tendency towards widespread proliferation, and only strong supply-side control measures can effectively halt this trend.20 Proponents of security explanations include William Epstein, Richard K. Betts, Stephen M. Meyer, John J. Mearsheimer, Benjamin Frankel, Bradley A. Thayer, and Scott D. Sagan.17 However, historical realities have often contradicted these intuitions, as the number of nuclear-armed states remains relatively low compared to early pessimistic predictions.17 This suggests that security alone is not always a sufficient cause for proliferation.17

Due to the limitations of the realist perspective, the idealist camp has gained prominence, focusing on the “demand side” of the proliferation equation.20 Idealists explore the motivations for acquiring the bomb at three levels of analysis: international, domestic, and individual.20 This includes examining factors such as the political economy (e.g., Etel Solingen’s work suggests ruling elites seeking global economic integration are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons), the influence of a “nuclear taboo” or nonproliferation norms (explored by T.V. Paul and Nina Tannenwald), the psychology of leaders (e.g., Jacques E.C. Hymans’s work on how perceptions of threat can inflate willingness to build the bomb), and domestic political structures (e.g., Christopher Way and Jessica L.P. Weeks’s work on regime type).17 Separately,

supply-side arguments contend that states’ demand for nuclear weapons is largely irrelevant, and that nuclear acquisition primarily depends on the availability of international nuclear assistance.17 Matthew Fuhrmann and Matthew Kroenig are key figures in this area.17 However, this view is criticized for not fully accounting for the strategic context, as states might pursue the bomb even without foreign assistance if the perceived benefit is great enough.17

More recently, the strategic-interaction theory advanced by Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs offers a refined security-based approach.17 This theory views nuclear proliferation as a dynamic process shaped by the interplay of interests among the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and its allies.17 It emphasizes the security environment a state faces

while developing nuclear weapons, rather than solely focusing on the consequences of acquisition.17 The likelihood of proliferation is determined by a state’s “willingness” and “opportunity” to acquire nuclear weapons.17 “Willingness” depends on whether nuclear weapons would yield a security benefit that outweighs the cost of the program, influenced by the level of security threat and the proliferator’s relative power.17 “Opportunity” refers to a state’s ability to acquire the bomb without being thwarted by a preventive strike from adversaries, which depends on the credibility of those threats and the cost of such a preventive war.17

In this framework, alliances play a crucial role.17 Alliances can mitigate security threats, thereby reducing a state’s willingness to proliferate.17 Conversely, they can also raise the costs of a preventive war for adversaries, thereby increasing a state’s opportunity to proliferate.17 For example, the U.S. policy of extended deterrence aims to reduce the incentive for allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons by assuring them of U.S. nuclear protection . The strategic-interaction theory suggests that a weak state is likely to acquire nuclear weapons only when it has a powerful ally that is neither willing to offer reliable future protection nor able to issue consequential threats of immediate abandonment.17 This theory also predicts that states not facing high-level security threats, weak states without powerful allied protection, or states whose security goals are fully subsumed by allies’ aims, have generally not acquired nuclear weapons.17 Kenneth N. Waltz also ascertains that nuclear deterrent thwarts external threats and preserves strategic stability.20 Hans Blix and Sverre Lodgaard have highlighted global community efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.20

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the European Union’s establishment of a nuclear sharing agreement with France to create an independent deterrent capability is a multifaceted issue driven by profound shifts in the global security environment. The analysis reveals a growing European desire for greater strategic autonomy, fueled by anxieties over the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence and the re-emergence of significant geopolitical threats, particularly from Russia. Proponents argue that an independent European deterrent could provide a credible security guarantee, complement existing NATO structures, and leverage Germany’s increasing willingness to invest in defense.

However, the path to such an agreement is fraught with substantial challenges. France’s unwavering commitment to sovereign control over its nuclear arsenal, rejecting any form of co-decision or joint funding, fundamentally limits the scope of a true “sharing” agreement. The legal implications are particularly complex, with potential violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and explicit prohibitions under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) for several EU member states. These legal constraints, coupled with the EU’s own commitment to non-proliferation, present significant barriers to a formalized nuclear sharing arrangement.

Furthermore, the practical and financial hurdles are immense. Developing and maintaining a credible independent deterrent would require enormous investment, potentially diverting resources from critical conventional defense needs. The challenge of establishing a politically legitimate and operationally effective multinational command-and-control system for nuclear weapons, reconciling national sovereignty with collective action, remains unresolved. Historical precedents, such as the failed European Defence Community, underscore the persistent difficulty in ceding national defense prerogatives to a supranational entity.

In essence, while the aspiration for an independent European deterrent is gaining momentum, a formal “nuclear sharing agreement” as typically understood (implying shared control or deployment) appears largely unfeasible under current conditions. France’s approach suggests a more limited “strategic dialogue” and a complementary role for its deterrent, where it offers a “European dimension” to its vital interests and invites partners to observe exercises, rather than a substitution for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The debate reflects a deeper, ongoing tension within Europe between the desire for collective security and the enduring importance of national sovereignty in matters of ultimate defense. The theories of nuclear deterrence highlight the inherent credibility challenges of extended deterrence, while proliferation theories underscore the complex interplay of security threats, national interests, and international norms that shape states’ nuclear decisions. Any future evolution of Europe’s nuclear posture will undoubtedly require navigating these intricate strategic, legal, and political landscapes.

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