Russia needs the Arctic for geopolitical dominance
Ksenia Vakhrusheva, Bellon Foundation, August 2025, Ekaterina Blokova, , Vsevolod Levchenko, Yuri Sergeev, HE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: Russia’s industrial and political expansion, its environmental costs, and Arctic shipping risks, https://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2025/08/The-Northern-Sea-Route.pdf
In 1932, the Soviet icebreaker Alexander Sibiryakov became the first vessel to complete the entire NSR in a single navigation season, marking the route’s modern birth. The first true transport operation took place two years later, in 1935. But it was only in the 1970s and 1980s—thanks to the creation of the Soviet nuclear icebreaker fleet—that the NSR began to see sustained use. The Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant, with its year-round cargo demands, helped drive this industrial build-out. Today, as climate change reshapes the Arctic, Moscow sees a chance to fulfill its centuries-old ambition of making the NSR not just a seasonal route but a permanent fixture of global trade. But at what cost? Russia’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine names the Arctic seas, the NSR, and the continental shelf as key national priorities—critical to the nation’s economy and security. Environmental and climate concerns are acknowledged, but always at the periphery. The priority is clear—open the Arctic, extract its resources, and cement Russia’s geopolitical dominance of the entire region.
Russia and China have the most icebreakers
Ksenia Vakhrusheva, Bellon Foundation, August 2025, Ekaterina Blokova, , Vsevolod Levchenko, Yuri Sergeev, HE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: Russia’s industrial and political expansion, its environmental costs, and Arctic shipping risks, https://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2025/08/The-Northern-Sea-Route.pdf
The icebreaker fleet The use of the Northern Sea Route is impossible without icebreakers, both at present and in the foreseeable future, even considering extreme climate warming projections. Since the Soviet era, Russia has had the largest icebreaker fleet of any Arctic country and China, which since the late 2010s has started building its own icebreakers for scientific research in the Arctic Ocean. Currently, only Russia operates nuclear-powered icebreakers As of today, Russia has 42 icebreaking vessels in operation, including 8 nuclear-powered icebreakers and 34 diesel-powered icebreakers, which assist vessels with no ice class or low ice class in navigating the Northern Sea Route, the mouths of Arctic rivers, and ports. The primary focus for intensifying the use of the Northern Sea Route, including year-round navigation, is on nuclear icebreakers. Rosatom, the owner of all of Russia’s nuclear fleet, has actively expanded the construction of new-generation nuclear icebreakers in the 2020s. Currently, two types of icebreakers are planned for construction: Project 22220 and Project 10510. Project 22220 icebreakers are universal, dual-draft vessels with a power of 60 MW, allowing them to operate both in deep and shallow waters. They are intended for servicing the Northern Sea Route and conducting various Arctic expeditions. This series of icebreakers is expected to replace the Soviet-built nuclear-powered icebreakers Vaigach, Taymyr, Yamal, and 50 Let Pobedy, which are nearing the end of their operational lifespan, despite having had their service life extended multiple times. Project 10510 is an icebreaker with an increased power of 120 MW. These icebreakers are planned for use in year-round navigation along the eastern part of the Northern Sea Route. The increased width of the icebreaker is designed to enable the escort of large-tonnage vessels. Three icebreakers of Project 22220 were delivered before or during 2022, the year Russia invaded Ukraine, and another icebreaker was delivered in 2024. The icebreakers Chukotka and Leningrad (previously planned under the name Kamchatka) are under construction, while construction of another icebreaker, Stalingrad (previously planned under the name Sakhalin), is expected to begin in 2025. However, it remains unclear how international sanctions will affect them and whether they will be delivered on time. It is likely that the construction costs of Leningrad and Stalingrad will increase by 30% compared to the original estimates70. The construction of the first ultra-powerful icebreaker Rossiya of Project 10510 has been significantly affected by the war, as some parts of the hull were originally planned to be cast at the Ukrainian plant Energomashspetsstal. Its commissioning deadline has already been postponed from 2027 to 203071, but this deadline is still not final. Initially, according to the Russian Arctic Zone development strategy of 2020, the plan was to build three such icebreakers, but in February 2023, the strategy was revised, and now only one icebreaker, Lider, remains in the plans72. Diesel icebreakers, except for the new-generation icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin, cannot ensure the passage of vessels across the entire expanse of the Northern Sea Route —they are only effective in the coastal zones of the Kara Sea and Arctic rivers
Russia will use nukes to defend its interests in the Arctic if the US undermines its interests
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
4.3.1. Scenario
In 2027 NATO conducts its BALTOPS 27 military exercise near Russia’s borders. Russia perceives this manoeuvre as particularly provocative as it fears that combat aircraft and long-range fires, particularly those stationed in Finland, could threaten Russia’s nuclear forces. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Alliance now has a longer border with Russia near the strategically important Kola peninsula, the so-called ‘bastion’ that is home to many of Russia’s second-strike capabilities such as the nucleararmed submarines of the Northern Fleet. This situation intensifies existing geopolitical tensions and heightens security concerns for Russia, which views NATO’s activities as a direct challenge to its sphere of influence. In response, the Russian leadership decides to execute a demonstrative nuclear test as a strategic message to NATO, aiming to display its nuclear prowess and resolve without engaging in direct military conflict. 27 The chosen site for this demonstration is a remote area of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean, a location selected for its minimal human impact and strategic isolation. Nevertheless, the decision to conduct the test in the atmosphere is intended to maximise both visibility and psychological impact, sending a clear signal of Russia’s capabilities. The nuclear demonstration is precisely planned and involves a low-yield detonation of a Novator 9M720 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missile. This action is carefully calibrated to avoid escalation into a broader conflict yet is designed to have a deep psychological impact on NATO countries. International monitoring systems quickly detect the test, prompting a wave of global attention and concern. Russia issues official statements emphasising its defensive stance, warning against further NATO activities near its borders, and reiterating its commitment to safeguarding national security. The intended message is clear: Russia is prepared to assert its power and defend its interests with all available means.
Undermining Russia’s nuclear posture/arsenal/ability to retaliate creates Russian insecurity
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
This study analyses Russian strategic culture and its influence on the country’s nuclear posture, particularly regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Through an examination of the cultural, historical and ideological factors that shape Russia’s strategic decision making, Russia’s strategic culture and potential nuclear strategies are examined. This improved comprehension of Russia’s strategic culture provides context for interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions, especially concerning its nuclear posture and signalling – for example in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Moreover, the study integrates insights into scenario planning, resulting in the strategic culture scenarios featured in the report. These consider not only geopolitical and military factors but also the strategic cultural mindset that influences Russia’s behaviour. The scenarios illustrate how Russia might employ NSNWs and elucidate the rationale behind such decisions, including the strategic cultural underpinnings that could drive nuclear escalations. Additionally, perspectives from subject matter experts, obtained through interview, illuminate Western perceptions of Russian strategic culture and its implications for nuclear posture. Such insights aid in shaping informed strategic planning and risk mitigation strategies for NATO Allies such as nuclear-armed France, the UK and the US. The study illustrates distinct ways in which Russian strategic culture significantly informs the country’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a central element of its national security policy. This reliance is characterised by a focus on deterrence through the threat of first use and on managing escalation in regional conflicts, offsetting Russia’s conventional weaknesses. Russia perceives itself as conventionally inferior to the US (and, to a lesser extent, other Allied militaries), particularly in the aerospace domain, influencing its nuclear posture. Acknowledging NATO’s superior combined military capabilities, Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a necessary insurance policy against Western threats – primarily, the fear of an overwhelming aerospace attack.
Russia could attack NATO
Elena Davlikanova, Atlantic Council, July 21, 2025, NATO is unprepared for the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/nato-is-unprepared-for-the-growing-threat-posed-by-putins-russia/
Ever since Russia began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, debate has raged over whether Vladimir Putin’s ambitions extend further. Could the Kremlin dictator actually attack NATO? Initially, many were skeptical, but as Russia’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, more and more security experts believe that some kind of Russian attack on the NATO alliance is now a realistic possibility. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte recently stated that Russia could mount a military operation against a NATO member state within the next five years. Numerous intelligence services and military officials within the alliance concur.
Zero-sum
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
In the Russian perception, the West has actively fostered Colour Revolutions across the former Soviet Union over the past three decades, notably in Ukraine and Georgia. Russia frequently characterises its confrontation with the West as a ‘civilisational contest’, seeing it as an effort to alter the Russian cultural code.25 Foreign influence is seen as an attempt to undermine the value system of Russia’s elite, with the goal being to manipulate the mentality of the population and impose false national interests. Such subversive efforts, they believe, would compel Russia to voluntarily make ideological concessions, resulting in geopolitical, military and economic submission to the West.26 This view is compounded by the Russian perception of the Western interventions in Iraq and Libya in 2003 and 2011 respectively, where the West, seemingly 23 Adamsky (2025). 24 German (2020). 25 Adamsky (2024). 26 Adamsky (2024). 27 Reach (2023). 28 Adamsky (2021). 29 Kerrane (2022). without an international legal mandate, deposed Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. These interventions showcased the West’s superiority in air, space and precision strike capabilities, with decapitation strikes swiftly dismantling the Soviet-equipped Iraqi and Libyan militaries. Such demonstrations of military prowess, dating back to the First Gulf War of 1991, have alarmed the Russian leadership, highlighting vulnerabilities in their own defence postures and underscoring Russian technological inferiority compared to the US.27 As long as these deficiencies in Russian strategic capabilities persist (including problems with C2 and an insufficient conventional arsenal), the Russian military will continue to fear aerospace attacks.28 2.1.2. Zero-sum worldview and great power status In the realm of international relations, Russia frequently perceives interactions as a zerosum game.29 Any gain by an adversarial external power is viewed as a loss for Russia, prompting the Russian state to employ a wide variety of means to achieve its objectives. However, it remains unclear whether the reverse holds true – whether a Russian victory necessarily equates to a loss for Moscow’s adversaries, such as the West. This ambiguity may represent a potential vulnerability for Russia. In addition, Russia is grappling with the challenge of maintaining its great power status while attempting to catch up with the 8 Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat West technologically and economically.30 This struggle to compete drives the Russian state to reassert its influence over former Soviet states or satellites, as projecting power in such regions is considered a fundamental aspect of Russia’s great power status, alongside the ability to challenge US hegemony. The fear of a loss of status and of influence has often been used by Russia as a justification for actions – often characterised by the leadership as ‘defensive’ – that contradict international norms as understood in the West.31 For instance, the Kremlin viewed its military operations in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 as defensive measures.32 This also underscores Russia’s zero-sum approach to international relations, the harsh logic being that if Russia cannot achieve its objectives in regions such as Georgia, then no other power should be permitted to succeed there either. In this context, preventing the loss of influence in its near abroad could be perceived as a victory for Russia. Additionally, Russian doctrine incorporates offensive and defensive measures within a concept known as ‘active defence’.33 This approach avoids a clear distinction between offensive and defensive operations, as opposed to the more linear approach to escalation adopted by the West. ‘Active defence’ encompasses pre-emptive measures designed to deter conflict, as well as wartime operations aimed at denying an opponent a decisive victory early in a conflict by degrading and disorganising their forces. Offensive 30 Borozna (2022). 31 Götz & Staun (2022). 32 Götz & Staun (2022); Osflaten (2020). 33 Kofman et al. (2021). 34 Kofman et al. (2021). 35 Adamsky (2024). 36 Adamsky (2024). 37 Adamsky (2024). actions are also framed as defensive measures to pre-emptively counter perceived threats.34 To external observers, however, such ‘defensive’ actions by Russia appear unreservedly aggressive. Ensuring that signals are absorbed and interpreted as intended is a critical yet often overlooked aspect of deterrence efforts and scholarship. There is a significant discrepancy between Moscow’s reputation in the West and the Kremlin’s self-perception – and vice versa. This is demonstrated primarily by the West’s view that NATO enlargement has brought stability to Central and Eastern Europe, with Russia misunderstanding such developments as unequivocally aggressive actions.35 While most Western strategists view Russia as an aggressive revisionist power, the Kremlin sees itself as signalling from the position of a defensive, status quo power. One contributing factor to the West’s ‘confusion’ may be the insufficient attention that Russian strategists have paid to the communication of signals. In many ways, Russia appears to have assumed that the West would naturally understand its coercive signalling, even though the context in which the signals are sent is often unclear to Western observers.36 It remains uncertain to what extent the evaluation of effectiveness has been institutionalised within Russian deterrence operations. Assessment of coercion efforts appears more intuitive than systematic, undermining the clarity and impact of Russia’s signalling.3
Russia will use nukes to defend its interests in the Arctic if the US undermines its interests
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
4.3.1. Scenario
In 2027 NATO conducts its BALTOPS 27 military exercise near Russia’s borders. Russia perceives this manoeuvre as particularly provocative as it fears that combat aircraft and long-range fires, particularly those stationed in Finland, could threaten Russia’s nuclear forces. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Alliance now has a longer border with Russia near the strategically important Kola peninsula, the so-called ‘bastion’ that is home to many of Russia’s second-strike capabilities such as the nucleararmed submarines of the Northern Fleet. This situation intensifies existing geopolitical tensions and heightens security concerns for Russia, which views NATO’s activities as a direct challenge to its sphere of influence. In response, the Russian leadership decides to execute a demonstrative nuclear test as a strategic message to NATO, aiming to display its nuclear prowess and resolve without engaging in direct military conflict. 27 The chosen site for this demonstration is a remote area of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean, a location selected for its minimal human impact and strategic isolation. Nevertheless, the decision to conduct the test in the atmosphere is intended to maximise both visibility and psychological impact, sending a clear signal of Russia’s capabilities. The nuclear demonstration is precisely planned and involves a low-yield detonation of a Novator 9M720 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missile. This action is carefully calibrated to avoid escalation into a broader conflict yet is designed to have a deep psychological impact on NATO countries. International monitoring systems quickly detect the test, prompting a wave of global attention and concern. Russia issues official statements emphasising its defensive stance, warning against further NATO activities near its borders, and reiterating its commitment to safeguarding national security. The intended message is clear: Russia is prepared to assert its power and defend its interests with all available means.
Undermining Russia’s nuclear posture/arsenal/ability to retaliate creates Russian insecurity
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
This study analyses Russian strategic culture and its influence on the country’s nuclear posture, particularly regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Through an examination of the cultural, historical and ideological factors that shape Russia’s strategic decision making, Russia’s strategic culture and potential nuclear strategies are examined. This improved comprehension of Russia’s strategic culture provides context for interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions, especially concerning its nuclear posture and signalling – for example in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Moreover, the study integrates insights into scenario planning, resulting in the strategic culture scenarios featured in the report. These consider not only geopolitical and military factors but also the strategic cultural mindset that influences Russia’s behaviour. The scenarios illustrate how Russia might employ NSNWs and elucidate the rationale behind such decisions, including the strategic cultural underpinnings that could drive nuclear escalations. Additionally, perspectives from subject matter experts, obtained through interview, illuminate Western perceptions of Russian strategic culture and its implications for nuclear posture. Such insights aid in shaping informed strategic planning and risk mitigation strategies for NATO Allies such as nuclear-armed France, the UK and the US. The study illustrates distinct ways in which Russian strategic culture significantly informs the country’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a central element of its national security policy. This reliance is characterised by a focus on deterrence through the threat of first use and on managing escalation in regional conflicts, offsetting Russia’s conventional weaknesses. Russia perceives itself as conventionally inferior to the US (and, to a lesser extent, other Allied militaries), particularly in the aerospace domain, influencing its nuclear posture. Acknowledging NATO’s superior combined military capabilities, Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a necessary insurance policy against Western threats – primarily, the fear of an overwhelming aerospace attack.
Russia could attack NATO
Elena Davlikanova, Atlantic Council, July 21, 2025, NATO is unprepared for the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/nato-is-unprepared-for-the-growing-threat-posed-by-putins-russia/
Ever since Russia began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, debate has raged over whether Vladimir Putin’s ambitions extend further. Could the Kremlin dictator actually attack NATO? Initially, many were skeptical, but as Russia’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, more and more security experts believe that some kind of Russian attack on the NATO alliance is now a realistic possibility. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte recently stated that Russia could mount a military operation against a NATO member state within the next five years. Numerous intelligence services and military officials within the alliance concur.
Pushing Russia into a corner causes nuclear use
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
The Russian military leadership therefore assumes that adversaries could exploit these weaknesses to defeat Russia militarily. As long as these deficiencies in SORASA remain unresolved, the Russian military will continue to fear the prospect of aerospace attacks. Contemporary sources reveal that the primary threat perceived by the Russian nuclear establishment today is still a US-led conventional, long-range prompt global strike designed to decapitate Russia’s supreme command and neutralise its nuclear retaliation capability.87 Consequently, Russia might be more likely to resort to nuclear use, including NSNWs, during the initial stages of a conflict for fear of losing its arsenal.88 Overall, the likelihood of nuclear use increases when, from the Russian perspective, it is considered the least undesirable option among a series of poor choices.89 The likelihood of the Kremlin resorting to a limited nuclear option would rise, for example, if Moscow perceives NATO’s increasing involvement in Ukraine as a threat to its existence or territorial integrity. The more dire the situation appears to the Kremlin, the 17 greater the probability of escalating through non-conventional means.90 This is a crucial conclusion and means that NATO Allies need to understand when this point is reached and how to change the Russian calculus beforehand.
Undermining Russia’s nuclear posture/arsenal/ability to retaliate creates Russian insecurity
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
This study analyses Russian strategic culture and its influence on the country’s nuclear posture, particularly regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Through an examination of the cultural, historical and ideological factors that shape Russia’s strategic decision making, Russia’s strategic culture and potential nuclear strategies are examined. This improved comprehension of Russia’s strategic culture provides context for interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions, especially concerning its nuclear posture and signalling – for example in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Moreover, the study integrates insights into scenario planning, resulting in the strategic culture scenarios featured in the report. These consider not only geopolitical and military factors but also the strategic cultural mindset that influences Russia’s behaviour. The scenarios illustrate how Russia might employ NSNWs and elucidate the rationale behind such decisions, including the strategic cultural underpinnings that could drive nuclear escalations. Additionally, perspectives from subject matter experts, obtained through interview, illuminate Western perceptions of Russian strategic culture and its implications for nuclear posture. Such insights aid in shaping informed strategic planning and risk mitigation strategies for NATO Allies such as nuclear-armed France, the UK and the US. The study illustrates distinct ways in which Russian strategic culture significantly informs the country’s reliance on nuclear weapons as a central element of its national security policy. This reliance is characterised by a focus on deterrence through the threat of first use and on managing escalation in regional conflicts, offsetting Russia’s conventional weaknesses. Russia perceives itself as conventionally inferior to the US (and, to a lesser extent, other Allied militaries), particularly in the aerospace domain, influencing its nuclear posture. Acknowledging NATO’s superior combined military capabilities, Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a necessary insurance policy against Western threats – primarily, the fear of an overwhelming aerospace attack.
Russia’s nuclear posture has not become aggressive
Matthias Eken et al, RAND, August 17, 2025, Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3859-1.html
Karaganov’s proposal sparked a robust debate, with some senior foreign policy commentators expressing cautious support for his vision.118 Critics, on the other hand, predominantly challenged his confidence in managing escalation risks. Several experts within the Russian nuclear community dismissed the notion that Russia’s existing nuclear doctrine was inadequate, highlighting the country’s non-nuclear capabilities and emphasising its nuclear modernisation plans. Staff from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) had already previously argued that Russian nuclear weapon use would be reciprocal rather than pre-emptive.119 They maintained that the Ukraine conflict did not align with the criteria for nuclear use, including NSNWs, nor did Ukraine contain targets that could not instead be targeted using Russia’s conventional long-range strike capabilities. 116 Karaganov (2023). 117 Karaganov (2023). 118 Fink et al. (2024). 119 IMEMO (2022). 120 Kremlin (2019). 121 Karaganov (2024). 122 Wachs (2023). 123 Boston & Massicot (2017). At the 2023 Valdai Conference, President Putin directly addressed Karaganov’s arguments in person, stating: ‘I understand all this and, take my word for it, we do respect your perspectives. That said, I do not see the need to change our conceptual approaches. The potential adversary knows everything and is aware of what we are capable of.’120 Nonetheless, even after Putin dismissed Karaganov’s suggestions directly, the latter continued arguing for the lowering of the nuclear threshold and altering Russia’s nuclear doctrine. In articles published in January and February 2024, Karaganov once again advocated for Moscow to enhance its reliance on nuclear deterrence, reiterating the necessity for ‘accelerated movement up the escalation ladder’ and arguing for the resumption of nuclear testing.121 These debates do not necessarily signal a change in Russian nuclear doctrine or a lowering of the nuclear threshold – despite the increase in nuclear rhetoric by Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin statements and military documents do not indicate a shift towards an even greater reliance on nuclear weapons, including NSNWs, or an inclination towards their early limited use.122
Russia will attack Europe and China will attack Taiwan
TARYN PEDLER and WILL STEWART, 7-6, 25, Daily Mail, World War III will start with simultaneous Xi and Putin invasions taking the globe to the brink of Armageddon, warns NATO chief Mark Rutte, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14879371/World-War-III-start-simultaneous-Xi-Putin-invasions-taking-globe-brink-Armageddon-warns-NATO-chief-Mark-Rutte.html
NATO chief Mark Rutte has chillingly warned that World War III will start with simultaneous invasions from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Secretary-general Rutte suggested the combined attacks from the Chinese and Russian leaders could trigger a World War nightmare and bring the planet to the brink of Armageddon. According to the NATO chief, China would start by seeking to grab Taiwan – while ensuring the Kremlin dictator simultaneously attacks NATO territory, amid fears Putin is anyway eyeing the Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, formerly part of the USSR. Russia today hit back at ex-Netherlands premier Rutte, claiming he had ‘gorged on too many of the magic mushrooms beloved by the Dutch’, while warning he should look forward to a future in a hellish Siberian labour camp. Stressing the urgent need to re-arm and boost military budgets, Rutte told the New York Times in a chilling vision of the future: ‘Let’s not be naïve about this. ‘If Xi Jinping would attack Taiwan, he would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, residing in Moscow, and telling him, “Hey, I’m going to do this, and I need you to to keep them busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory”. ‘That is most likely the way this will progress, and to deter them, we need to do two things’ he added. Continuing his terrifying account, Rutte said: ‘One is that NATO, collectively, being so strong that the Russians will never do this. Secretary-general Mark Rutte suggested combined attacks from the Chinese and Russian leaders could trigger a World War nightmare and bring the planet to the brink of Armageddon + 6 View gallery Secretary-general Mark Rutte suggested combined attacks from the Chinese and Russian leaders could trigger a World War nightmare and bring the planet to the brink of Armageddon According to the NATO chief, China would start by seeking to grab Taiwan – while ensuring the Kremlin dictator simultaneously attacks NATO territory, amid fears Putin is anyway eyeing the Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, formerly part of the USSR + 6 View gallery According to the NATO chief, China would start by seeking to grab Taiwan – while ensuring the Kremlin dictator simultaneously attacks NATO territory, amid fears Putin is anyway eyeing the Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, formerly part of the USSR Putin pummelled Ukraine with four S-300 missiles and 157 drones, with 127 of the UAVs shot down or suppressed by electronic warfare + 6 View gallery Putin pummelled Ukraine with four S-300 missiles and 157 drones, with 127 of the UAVs shot down or suppressed by electronic warfare TRENDING Kaylee Goncalves’ mom reveals Bryan Kohberger ‘beat’ her before murder 13.8k viewing now Forensic psychiatrist reveals Bryan Kohberger’s bombshell motive 133.7k viewing now ‘Wall of water’ and new evacuations as Texas flooding rages 5.3k viewing now ‘And second, working together with the Indo-Pacific – something President [Donald] Trump is very much promoting, because we have this close interconnectedness, working together on defence industry, innovation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific.’ Rutte warned that Putin is rearming at a fast pace, insisting that Western countries must increase defence spending. ‘We have an enormous geopolitical challenge on our hands,’ he said. Read More Russia is accused of ramping up its use of banned chemical weapons in Ukraine article image ‘And that is first of all Russia, which is reconstituting itself at a pace and a speed which is unparalleled in recent history. ‘They are now producing three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO is doing in a year. ‘This is unsustainable, but the Russians are working together with the North Koreans, with the Chinese and Iranians, the mullahs, in fighting this unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. ‘So here, the Indo-Pacific and your Atlantic are getting more and more interconnected. We know that China has its eye on Taiwan.’ Senior Putin security official Dmitry Medvedev – a former Russian president and ex-premier – lashed out on X: ‘Rutte has clearly gorged on too many of the magic mushrooms beloved by the Dutch. ‘He sees collusion between China & Russia over Taiwan, and then a Russian attack on Europe. ‘But he’s right about one thing: he should learn Russian. It might come in handy in a Siberian camp.’ The warnings came as Russia continued its onslaught on Ukraine – days after Putin informed Trump by telephone that he had no intention of halting his war of invasion. Senior Putin security official Dmitry Medvedev (pictured) – a former Russian president and ex-premier – lashed out on X: ‘Rutte has clearly gorged on too many of the magic mushrooms beloved by the Dutch + 6 View gallery Senior Putin security official Dmitry Medvedev (pictured) – a former Russian president and ex-premier – lashed out on X: ‘Rutte has clearly gorged on too many of the magic mushrooms beloved by the Dutch Explosions hit Kyiv and the surrounding region, with multiple people wounded and residential buildings damaged + 6 View gallery Explosions hit Kyiv and the surrounding region, with multiple people wounded and residential buildings damaged Two multi-story buildings were damaged in the Vyshhorod district, the fire destroyed four garage premises and a car, and three more cars were damaged + 6 View gallery Two multi-story buildings were damaged in the Vyshhorod district, the fire destroyed four garage premises and a car, and three more cars were damaged Putin pummelled Ukraine with four S-300 missiles and 157 drones, with 127 of the UAVs shot down or suppressed by electronic warfare. Explosions hit Kyiv and the surrounding region, with multiple people wounded and residential buildings damaged. In Ukraine’s second city Kharkiv, a two year old child and a woman, 46, were among those hurt as Putin continued to terrorise civilians, seeking to weaken the population’s resolve. The Russians also hit Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region. Read More Russia launches largest missile and drone attack on Kyiv after Trump call with Putin article image Apartment buildings were also hit in Kramatorsk in drone strikes. Ukraine hit back with an attack sea drone seen being destroyed by Russian defences in Novorossiysk Bay in the Black Sea. Moscow was forced to close its major international airport Sheremetyevo due to the threat of drones. Rutte praised Trump for seeking to make progress with Putin. ‘He is the one who broke the deadlock with Putin. When he became president in January, he started these discussions with Putin, and he was the only one who was able to do this,’ said the NATO chief. ‘This had to happen. A direct dialogue between the American president and the president of the Russian Federation.’ Yet this had not yet resulted in a peace deal. ‘We are not there yet, and that means that in the meantime you have to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to stay in the fight.’
Russia is using chemical weapons in the Ukraine
Ferdinand Karp, 7-4, 25, Politico, Russia ramps up chemical weapons use in Ukraine, European spies warn, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-chemicals-weapon-use-ukraine-germany-dutch-spy/
The German and Dutch intelligence services said Friday that Russia is increasing its use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. Moscow’s military is employing “a wide range of chemical weapons with increasing frequency and is not hesitating to employ more potent agents,” the spies said in a joint press release published Friday morning. “We have noticed a growing readiness to employ such weapons. The threat emanating from the Russian chemical weapons program is consequently increasing,” said Dutch military intelligence director Vice Admiral Peter Reesink in a statement. Advertisement Advertisement Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans called for tougher sanctions on Moscow in response to the alleged violations, during an interview with Reuters. He said the intensifying use of chemical weapons was “concerning,” and warned that Russia’s deployment of such weapons is becoming more “normalized and widespread.” According to the Reuters report, Russian troops have used drones to drop the choking agent into trenches, forcing Ukrainian soldiers out to make them easier targets. Russia has used chloropicrin, a toxic substance that can cause dyspnea which complicates breathing, the intelligence services said. The chemical weapon was originally deployed during World War I and can be deadly in higher concentrations. At least three Ukrainians have died because of Russian chemical weapons use, according to Ukrainian authorities cited in the joint press release. Chemical and biological weapons have been prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 after they were heavily used during brutal trench warfare in World War I. In 1992, the Chemical Weapons Convention expanded these restrictions to the development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In May of last year, the U.S. also accused Russia of violating the convention by deploying chemical weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine.