Relations non-unique: oil production cut
Cause, January/February 2023, F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Faculty Affiliate at the Bush School’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom and the Power: How to Salvage the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship
In October 2022, Saudi Arabia announced that OPEC+, a group of oil-exporting countries, would cut oil production targets substantially: by two million barrels per day. As the world’s top exporter of oil, the Saudis have always taken the lead in the group’s efforts to manage the world oil market. The move had an immediate if relatively modest impact on oil prices, which rose from a low for the year of around $76 per barrel before the announcement to a range of about $82 to $91 by mid-November. The shock felt by Americans was more geopolitical than economic: the Biden administration had asked Saudi Arabia to delay the cut. But Riyadh went ahead with it anyway, snubbing Washington.
The resulting recriminations between Washington and Riyadh have called into question the future of the bilateral relationship. In response to the OPEC+ decision, the Biden administration announced that it would reevaluate its relationship with Saudi Arabia and said the cuts “would increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions” introduced in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Robert Menendez, a Democratic senator from New Jersey, vowed to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Several members of Congress introduced a bill mandating the removal of U.S. troops from the kingdom. Riyadh refused to backtrack, saying the OPEC+ decision was unanimous and based “purely on economic reasons.”
Biden’s visit made relations with Saudi Arabia worse
Cause, January/February 2023, F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Faculty Affiliate at the Bush School’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom and the Power: How to Salvage the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship
The war in Ukraine and the subsequent surge in oil prices caused the administration to reconsider. Isolating the Saudis was feasible during the drop in world oil demand during the COVID-19 pandemic. But when the United States tried to cut off Russian oil exports as the world economy and oil demand began to recover, Washington needed Saudi Arabia. Riyadh was one of the few actors that could pump more oil immediately. Yet Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia accomplished little and generated even more bad feelings. The Saudis resented the U.S. contention that Biden had come not to meet the crown prince but rather to attend a multilateral meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The two sides feuded in public over whether Biden brought up the Khashoggi case during a private conversation with MBS; Biden said he had, and the Saudis said he had not. A meeting meant to smooth relations only ruffled them further.
Despite differences, the US and Saudi Arabia have a mutual interest in continuing to cooperate
Cause, January/February 2023, F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Faculty Affiliate at the Bush School’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom and the Power: How to Salvage the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship
Despite their differences over oil prices, the two countries’ economic interests still overlap in important ways. They share an interest in maintaining the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Riyadh prices its oil in dollars, which buttresses the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency because oil consumers must have dollars on hand to fund their energy needs. Unfriendly oil producers such as Iran, Venezuela, and Russia occasionally push to conduct transactions in alternative currencies. Saudi Arabia has always resisted such overtures, because anything that damages the dollar’s centrality reduces the value of Saudi Arabia’s dollar-denominated assets, which is significant given the volume of Saudi financial assets in U.S. markets, including substantial holdings of U.S. government debt, and investments in U.S. companies. Finally, it is in the interest of both the United States and Saudi Arabia to continue to cooperate on military and intelligence issues. For Saudi Arabia, neither China nor Russia can provide the level of security cooperation that the United States can. Only Washington can project substantial military power into the Persian Gulf region, as demonstrated during the Gulf War of 1990–91. And the United States benefits from cooperation, too. Saudi arms purchases reduce the unit costs of U.S. arms production and link the two states’ militaries, fostering long-term partnership. With the likely failure of the nuclear talks with Tehran, the chance of a confrontation between the United States and Iran grows. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia on military contingencies increases the military efficiency of the United States in the region, thereby deterring Iran.
Saudi Arabia will inevitably cooperate with the US on Iran – It’s in their own interest
Cause, January/February 2023, F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a Faculty Affiliate at the Bush School’s Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, The Kingdom and the Power: How to Salvage the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/gregory-gause-kingdom-and-power-us-saudi-relationship
Another point of tension with Riyadh that suddenly seems less salient is Washington’s effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear activities through diplomacy, which the Saudis worried would entail concessions to Iran that would solidify Tehran’s regional influence. It seems likely that efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump pulled out of in 2018, will fail. Washington will inevitably have to find a new policy to deter or prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons while also limiting or rolling back Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia has the same interest.No Saudi prolif—even if it happened, it would take decades
Dina ESFANDIARY, MacArthur Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London AND Ariane TABATABAI, visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and an associate in the Belfer Center's International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, 15 [“Why nuclear dominoes won't fall in the Middle East,” April 22, 2015, https://thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-middle-east8236]
Saudi Arabia: The human and technical impediments to a nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia is viewed as the Middle East's most likely nuclear proliferator. Riyadh has been the loudest voice in the region, claiming it'll "go nuclear" should Iran do so. It also wants an enrichment capability to mirror Iran’s. An assessment of the nascent Saudi nuclear power program shows that for all of Riyadh's foot-stomping, it doesn't have the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. Even if this technical deficit could be overcome, its its allies could influence its intentions.
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