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Human rights violations mean Somaliland doesn’t meet the criteria for independence
Jamya Case, 1-13, 25, Opinion – Human Rights Concerns as Somaliland Seeks International Recognition, https://www.e-ir.info/2025/01/13/opinion-human-rights-concerns-as-somaliland-seeks-international-recognition/
Somaliland, a self-declared nation in the Horn of Africa, prides itself on being a democratic state that holds regular elections and maintains stability in a tumultuous region. Subsequent governments in Somaliland intensified attempts to attain global recognition by persistently showcasing the region’s beneficial attributes and its unique position. However, human rights violations in Somaliland may undermine the region’s plea for legitimacy, perhaps hindering its ambitions to gain recognition from Western liberal democracies. This article highlights human rights abuses in Somaliland, particularly the restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and the protracted jail terms inflicted on gay men, which could potentially impede the nation’s long-awaited recognition. PlayUnmute Fullscreen Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence following the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been seeking global recognition, contending that it meets all statehood criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, including a permanent population, defined territory, and a functioning government, in addition to maintaining peace and conducting regular democratic elections effectively. Despite its compelling arguments, the international community has not yet endorsed Somaliland’s request for international recognition. In recent weeks, however, reports have emerged suggesting that the upcoming Trump administration may recognize Somaliland as an independent nation due to its strategic location along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. In 2023, McPherson-Smith and Jendayi Frazer coauthored a paper arguing that Somaliland satisfies the four Kosovo conditions that resulted in U.S. recognition of Kosovo. Their analysis concluded that the similarities between Somaliland and Kosovo justify United States acknowledgment of Somaliland’s independence. Additionally, Representative Scott Perry recently introduced a bill in the US House of Representatives for the recognition of Somaliland as a state. These speculations provoke a debate among Somalis, dividing separatists and unionists about the issue of Somaliland’s potential international recognition. Proponents of unity argue that Somaliland is an essential part of Somalia, thereby opposing any likelihood of independence. Particularly since the signing of the contentious Memorandum of Understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia in January 2024, the Federal Government of Somalia views separatism as an existential threat to its sovereignty and security. Furthermore, different clans residing in Somaliland possess differing perspectives on separatism and statehood. The predominant Isaaq clan favors Somaliland’s independence, although other notable clans, including the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, and certain segments of Dir, have demonstrated considerable hesitation. While the supporters of Somaliland’s independence remain optimistic regarding its potential recognition, it seems that any efforts to promote it may encounter obstacles. Violations of human rights and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, including freedom of opinion, speech, and religion, might pose major barriers to Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition from Western liberal democracies. As an individual who underwent arrest on charges of apostasy, I intend in this article to draw attention to the injustices perpetrated by the former Somaliland administration, particularly the violations of the freedom of religion or belief and the prolonged prison terms for homosexuals, which remain unaddressed locally. The International Bill of Human Rights documents collectively form the core international legal framework protecting freedom of religion or belief, guaranteeing the right to choose, change, and manifest one’s beliefs without coercion or discrimination, urging nations to resist such intolerance and to foster understanding and respect for FoRB. Somaliland disregards this essential human right. The Somaliland Constitution is based on Islamic shariah and does not safeguard the rights of religious minorities. Article Five of the Somaliland Constitution declares Islam as the sole recognized religion in the country and prohibits the promotion or practice of any other faith. Although the constitution acknowledges the provision of religious freedom in Article 33, it clearly references Sharia law, which categorically prohibits conversion to another faith, thereby signifying the country’s prohibition of such conversion! The lack of official statistics makes it challenging to determine the number of religious minorities in Somaliland. The majority of Sunni Muslims in Somaliland disregard religious minority groups and beliefs, including Christians, atheists, and even Shi’a Muslims. In recent years, the number of atheists and individuals with secular beliefs has increased among Somalis, with Somaliland potentially holding a significant share of this population. One source estimates the existence of approximately 1.2 million Somali atheists engaged on social media. In 2019, a university lecturer in Somaliland faced arrest for questioning the effectiveness of prayer to God as a drought remedy in a Facebook post. Concerning Christians, their precise number in Somaliland is also currently unknown. Somali Bible Society claims that there are several thousand Christian adherents in Somaliland. Since 2020, the former Muse Bihi administration in Somaliland has carried out anti-Christian operations and detained individuals accused of converting to Christianity. Authorities apprehended a countless number of Christians, including nationals from Somaliland and Ethiopia. In February 2021, officials detained me and others on allegations of apostasy and promoting Christianity without providing evidence or due process, resulting in a six-month imprisonment. In 2022, courts in Somaliland, located in Hargeisa, Gabiley, and Berbera, convicted three individuals (two women and one man) and imposed jail sentences ranging from three to seven years for leaving Islam. Even though the government of Somaliland released all individuals detained and charged with religious offenses because of international advocacy pressure, it has not amended its laws on freedom of religion or belief, thereby exposing those who choose to renounce Islam to potential imprisonment and punishment. Likewise, Somaliland forbids expatriates from publicly practicing their religion and constructing churches and places of worship. This does not imply that the government opposes the reopening of churches, as Somaliland allowed the Catholic Church in Hargeisa to resume operations in 2017 but closed its doors shortly after protests against its reopening emerged. Prominent Islamists, like Sh. Mohamed Omer Dirir, justified their position on the church’s closure by referencing Muslim jurists who supported the destruction of old church structures instead of the establishment and consecration of new ones. As a result, Somaliland’s minister of religion at the time, Sh. Khalil, stated that the government has decided to permanently close the church due to considerable controversy. Jim Shannon, a member of the UK Parliament, rightly contested Gavin Williamson’s proposal to recognize Somaliland, arguing that “human rights guarantees and religious freedom must be central to any agreement.” In addition to imposing restrictions on religious freedom and punishing individuals who deviate from Islam, Somaliland arrested a significant number of gay men in recent years, and many of them received long prison sentences. Article 409 of the Somali Penal Code, which Somaliland adopted, criminalizes same-sex relationships and exposes individuals who identify as LGBT+ to societal shame and persecution. While in jail, I encountered individuals incarcerated because of their sexual orientation. When I appeared in court as a defendant, Abdi Qawdhan, the presiding judge of the Marodi Jeh regional court at the time, told me that the court handles more severe cases related to homosexuality than those involving religious offenses and apostasy. Similarly, the Somaliland Upper Chamber (Guurti) initiated a discourse to deal with the rising number of such cases, acknowledging the imprisonment of forty individuals at that time in Somaliland’s correctional facilities. This demonstrates that Somaliland’s persecution in these matters is irreconcilable with western liberal democracies that uphold individual rights, including LGBT+ rights. In summary, while Islamist terrorists have ravaged the conflict-ridden southern regions of Somalia, Somaliland has attained peace and relative stability, necessitating international recognition. Although Scott Perry’s bill and other policy suggestions advocating for “the recognition of Somaliland statehood” are commendable for their potential to aid the US in advancing its strategic interests in the region, it is also crucial for the US to maintain a balance between its commitment to human and minority rights and its strategic and security priorities, with a primary emphasis on religious freedom. This implies that Somaliland’s recognition could depend on the cessation of all human rights abuses. Accordingly, Somaliland must seriously confront these human rights violations and guarantee the release of persons imprisoned for personal matters that do not contravene laws designed to uphold public order. The newly elected president, Abdirahman Irro, and his administration should consider implementing policy modifications to enhance the protection of the indivisible human rights while recognizing contextual and cultural limitations.
No solvency for investment. At most the plan means the AU recognizes Somaliland. Other Western countries and institutions such as the US, the UN, the EU, etc won’t recognize it because of human rights abuses. Without this people aren’t going to invest, especially institutions such as the World Bank
Jamya Case, 1-13, 25, Opinion – Human Rights Concerns as Somaliland Seeks International Recognition, https://www.e-ir.info/2025/01/13/opinion-human-rights-concerns-as-somaliland-seeks-international-recognition/
Violations of human rights and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, including freedom of opinion, speech, and religion, might pose major barriers to Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition from Western liberal democracies. As an individual who underwent arrest on charges of apostasy, I intend in this article to draw attention to the injustices perpetrated by the former Somaliland administration, particularly the violations of the freedom of religion or belief and the prolonged prison terms for homosexuals, which remain unaddressed locally. The International Bill of Human Rights documents collectively form the core international legal framework protecting freedom of religion or belief, guaranteeing the right to choose, change, and manifest one’s beliefs without coercion or discrimination, urging nations to resist such intolerance and to foster understanding and respect for FoRB. Somaliland disregards this essential human right.
Somalia and Ethiopia have repaired relations because Ethopia has agreed not to engage Somiland AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION. The plan would reverse that, rupturing relations
Faisal Ali, 1-12, 25, The Guardian, Somalia and Ethiopia agree to restore diplomatic ties after year-long rift, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/12/somalia-and-ethiopia-agree-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-after-year-long-rift
Somalia and Ethiopia have agreed to restore diplomatic representation in their respective capitals, more than a year after Somalia severed ties over a sea access agreement landlocked Ethiopia signed with the separatist northern Somali region of Somaliland. In a joint statement after an unexpected visit by Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, both countries committed to “restore and enhance bilateral relations through full diplomatic representation in their respective capitals”. Ethiopia’s state minister for foreign affairs, Mesganu Arga Moach, called the step a “big milestone forward in our bilateral and brotherly relations”. The announcement is the latest indication that Ethiopia and Somalia have begun to turn a corner in their relations, after a controversial memorandum Ethiopia signed with Somaliland at the start of 2024 that caused a bitter rift between the East African neighbours. The memorandum reportedly involved Ethiopia securing access to a port along Somaliland’s coast in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s independence from Somalia. Ethiopian officials have also said the deal included permission to build a naval facility along the Gulf of Aden coast. The memorandum provoked a fierce response from Somalia, which accused its larger neighbour of attempting to “annex” its territory and threatened war against Ethiopia to stop it. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, claiming the borders of a former British protectorate in the region, but neither Mogadishu nor the international community recognise it. It has functioned autonomously for over three decades. The diplomatic standoff risked undermining security cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia in their fight against al-Shabaab, the al-Qaida affiliate in Somalia that seeks to overthrow the central government. Somalia announced plans to expel Ethiopia from a UN-backed peacekeeping mission fighting the group, in which Ethiopian troops play a significant role. Somalia has since said it would “reconsider” an Ethiopian troop presence, after a meeting of defence ministers of both countries this month, but said last month that it had obtained commitments for the mandated number of soldiers from other countries in case. Somali officials have said they do not oppose Ethiopia’s desire for access to a port, but take issue with its decision to bypass the central government and with the use of Somali territories by Ethiopia to build a naval facility. In a social media post, Somalia’s ambassador to Ethiopia said part of what was agreed at the Addis Ababa meeting was a “one-door policy”, suggesting Ethiopia would not directly engage Somaliland without Somalia’s permission. The sudden breakthrough in relations comes after the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, mediated talks between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia in the Turkish capital last month. The discussions culminated in the Ankara declaration, in which Somalia’s president and Ethiopia’s prime minister pledged to resolve their differences through dialogue and to address their shared concerns. The Somali president’s visit to Ethiopia, the first in over a year, coincided with the participation of Somalia’s foreign minister in a meeting in Cairo with Eritrea and Egypt – both of which also have troubled relations with Ethiopia and forged an alliance in October to counter it. Egypt’s foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, said the trio had discussed the presence of non-Red Sea countries gaining access to the strategic waterway, telling reporters: “It is completely unacceptable to allow any military or naval presence by non-littoral states.” Egypt began supplying arms to Somalia last summer and is preparing to hold talks with Mogadishu regarding the deployment of Egyptian soldiers to join the peacekeeping mission supporting Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab.
Terrorist threats in Africa increasing
Clarke, 1-10, 25, Colin P. Clarke is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Director of Research at The Soufan Group, Trends in Terrorism: What is on the Horizon in 2025? https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/01/trends-in-terrorism-whats-on-the-horizon-in-2025/
ISIS attacks in Dagestan and Oman showed the group’s geographic expanse, a trend likely to continue in the coming year as it seeks to resurge from Syria to Somalia. The group inspired a plot to attack the United States on Election Day in November. Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi was arrested by the FBI before he was able to put his plan into action, in which he intended to murder civilians with AK-47 rifles. The ISIS-K presence in Afghanistan, which the Taliban has failed to attenuate, will continue to destabilize South Asia, where militant groups including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Baluchistan Liberation Army also remain growing threats to monitor. The former has directly threatened the government in Islamabad while the latter continues to target Chinese nationals and disrupt security along Beijing’s signature foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road infrastructure project. Sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Sahel region, will continue to be a hotbed of terrorism, as failed states and ungoverned spaces provide sanctuary to a range of jihadist groups associated with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin operates with near impunity in Western Africa, even conducting a massive attack last year that killed more than 600 people in Burkina Faso. The security situation continues to deteriorate as jihadist groups push out toward coastal West Africa, threatening previously stable countries like Ghana and expanding their reach from Cameroon to Nigeria. Along with Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have employed private military contractors from Russia’s Wagner Group (now rebranded as Africa Corps) to help with coup-proofing, and the mercenaries have behaved predictably, engineering a scorched earth counterinsurgency approach that has exacerbated the terrorist threat, rather than mollifying it. Elsewhere in Africa, both al-Shabaab and ISIS threaten Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa, while the Islamic State’s presence has ebbed and flowed in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among other states in the region.
Trump will recognize Somaliland now
Adem, 1-10, 25, Dr Seifudein Adem is a research fellow at JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development in Tokyo, Japan, Mail & Guardian, Ramifications of the US recognising Somaliland as a state, https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/2025-01-10-ramifications-of-the-us-recognising-somaliland-as-a-state/
Should Trump recognise Somaliland, as has been reported in the US and United Kingdom, it would be because, among other things, he wanted a military base in one of the best natural harbours Africa has, the port of Berbera. Trump is not alone in seeking to recognise Somaliland. US congressman Scott Perry introduced a Bill last month calling for recognition of the territory. If the US recognises Somaliland, other countries will probably follow suit.
Maxwell Webb, 12-17, 24, Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia., There’s a rare opportunity to deepen US-Somaliland ties. But several obstacles stand in the way., https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/theres-a-rare-opportunity-to-deepen-us-somaliland-ties-but-several-obstacles-stand-in-the-way/, Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.
Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland.
A US base in Somaliland triggers a China-US military arms race and leads to Somiland-Taiwan ties that put pressure on China and isolate it
Adem, 1-10, 25, Dr Seifudein Adem is a research fellow at JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace and Development in Tokyo, Japan, Mail & Guardian, Ramifications of the US recognising Somaliland as a state, https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/2025-01-10-ramifications-of-the-us-recognising-somaliland-as-a-state/
China has a military base in neighbouring Djibouti. Apart from adding an extra layer of complexity to the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, Trump’s recognition of Somaliland would fuel Sino-American rivalry in that region. Colonial roots In 1991, the Somali Republic (Somalia), which was created in 1960, split into Somaliland (a former British colony) and Somalia (a former Italian colony). Somalia does not recognise the secession of Somaliland. Also in 1991, Eritrea, which was created and so named by Italy in 1890, seceded from Ethiopia. Somaliland seceded from a union with greater Somalia, to which it had originally consented, but Eritrea seceded from a union with Ethiopia that had been imposed upon it. In the case of the Somali Republic, the union of the former British and former Italian territories was an attempt to reject European colonial boundaries. In the case of Eritrea, its annexation into Ethiopia was an attempt to substitute European colonial boundaries with indigenous imperial control. Given this, what would Trump’s recognition of Somaliland mean for the key stakeholders? US and Somaliland Since 2002, the US has operated Camp Lemonnier, a naval base in what was French Somaliland; Djibouti, as it is known today, is a tiny country sandwiched between Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia. This means the US will get a strategic prize (vis-à-vis China) in return, should Trump recognise Somaliland. It would also mean that, if all goes well, Somaliland could be on the verge of regaining statehood. For more than two decades, the Republic of Somaliland has maintained relative peace (unlike its conflict-ridden neighbour Somalia), has formed governments and has held periodic democratic elections. In most places in Africa, less than a decade after independence, the basic principles of democracy have been ignored. Unfortunately for Somaliland, the international community has been reluctant to recognise it as a legitimate state. States need international recognition just as humans need oxygen to survive. That Somaliland has not only survived without international recognition for more than 30 years, but thrived in the international system, is fascinating. One more thing that makes the experience of Somaliland perplexing has to do with the neighbourhood in which it strove to consolidate its democratic institutions. According to the rating by Freedom House (2024), Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia score lower (meaning they are less democratic) than Somaliland. China, Eritrea and Taiwan Should Trump recognise Somaliland, China might seek to counter by looking for an alternative option for a military or naval base in another relatively new Red Sea-bordering state. Eritrea is an ideal candidate. China-Eritrea relations are already cordial. In fact, Eritrea’s leader, Isaias Afwerki, received military training in China in the early 1960s at the start of Eritrea’s 30-year war of liberation with Ethiopia. If China gets a military or naval base in Eritrea, in response to the US’s base in Somaliland, it would in some ways be reminiscent of the time from 1952 to 1974 when the US, at the height of the Cold War, operated defence installations in Eritrea. In 1952, Eritrea had federal status in Ethiopia but the territory was “re-unified” with Ethiopia in 1962 — with tacit US support. In other words, should China decide to pursue an alternative base in Eritrea, the logic used by the US vis-à-vis Eritrea could retain some validity for China, too. The US abandoned its military communications base in Eritrea when it became less useful because of the advent of satellite technology. Although Somaliland already has excellent relations with Taiwan, extra complications could arise for China’s diplomacy in the Horn of Africa regarding Taiwan if Trump should recognise Somaliland. This is a result of the possibility that the recognition will prompt the newest state in the Horn of Africa to upgrade and formalise its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister, Francois Wu, visited Somaliland on 12 December. The newly formalised ties between independent Somaliland and Ethiopia could, in turn, elevate the profile of the bilateral relations between Somaliland and Taiwan, at least in Africa. This fear perhaps explains China’s strong opposition to any such diplomatic manoeuvres by both Taiwan and Somaliland. As Mai Ning, the spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, put it last month: “China firmly opposes mutual establishment of official institutions or any form of official exchanges between Taiwan authorities and Somaliland.” is already supportive of Somaliland’s independence and its recognition by other countries. Turkey would incur diplomatic cost, as would Egypt, to a larger extent. The bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Turkey will be tested, if Ethiopia recognises Somaliland. Indeed, Turkey has been engaged in an exercise of what could be called diplomatic miscegenation in the region. In December, it brought together the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia, in Ankara, with a view to helping them resolve their differences. It favours the unity of Somalia and Somaliland and sees itself as a friend of both countries. Egypt’s historical machinations to undermine Ethiopia are well known. But they have intensified in recent times as the country seeks to leverage closeness to pressure Ethiopia over the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Egypt had initially attempted to do this through Sudan, which has descended into a seemingly endless civil war. Its diplomatic infatuation with Somalia in the last few months is a direct consequence of this broad strategy. There is an element of irony in Egypt’s misfortune, should Trump recognise Somaliland, because it was Trump himself who openly suggested in October 2020, during his first term as president, that Egypt might blow up the dam. In the final analysis, Somaliland must be seen in the broader context of the contiguities of geography and the continuities of history that have shaped and re-shaped the alignment of forces among the unequal regional players in the Horn of Africa. Should Trump recognise Somaliland, it will also be a catalyst for great power competition in the region. After all, Somaliland has enormous strategic value, including proximity to the world’s major shipping routes and oil reserves.
Other countries won’t recognize
Ezra Nnko, 1-9, 25, What if President trump Recognizes Somaliland, https://www.vifindia.org/2025/january/09/What-if-President-Trump-recognizes-Somaliland
Trump administration may recognize Somaliland although it will be politically impossible for its Western allies to do the same. According to the International Chamber of Shipping trade group, European countries are the most affected by the Yemen conflict in terms of shipping costs to the US. Europe would seek alternatives to deal with both Somalia and Somaliland without disturbing the status quo, as how it did in the China-Taiwan crisis. The UK still stands firmly with its declaration of non-interference in the Somalia-Somaliland crisis while China assured Somalia of its support to safeguard Somalia’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Somalia isn’t stable
Joshua Meservey, Senior Fellow Democracy, Terrorism, Corruption, Hudson Institute, 1-8, 25, Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland, https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/seven-inaccuracies-about-us-support-somaliland-joshua-meservey
The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed.
Greater engagement with Somaliland angers Somalia
Maxwell Webb, 12-17, 24, Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia., There’s a rare opportunity to deepen US-Somaliland ties. But several obstacles stand in the way., https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/theres-a-rare-opportunity-to-deepen-us-somaliland-ties-but-several-obstacles-stand-in-the-way/, Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.
Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia “reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea.” However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region.