Taiwan Daily 2024

China increasing its military threat to Taiwan; US support key to deterrence

Reuters, 10-5, 24, https://www.yahoo.com/news/impossible-peoples-republic-china-motherland-134135516.html, ‘Impossible’ for People’s Republic of China to be our motherland, Taiwan president says

In a concerning escalation of military tension, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) announced that 27 Chinese military aircraft and six naval vessels were detected operating near Taiwan from 6 a.m. on Sunday to 6 a.m. on Monday (local time). This marks yet another instance of heightened military activity by China in the region, which the country has been monitoring closely amid rising concerns of potential conflict. Chinese Aircraft Breach Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone According to Taiwan’s MND, 19 out of the 27 aircraft operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s northern, central, and southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The ADIZ is an area in which Taiwan requires aircraft to identify themselves for national security purposes. The median line, though unofficial, has traditionally acted as a buffer between the country and mainland China, with both sides generally avoiding crossing it to maintain a semblance of peace. However, China’s frequent breaches of this line have become increasingly common, heightening fears of potential military confrontations. In an official post on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter), the country’s MND stated, “27 PLA aircraft and 6 PLAN vessels operating around the country were detected up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8) today. 19 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s northern, central, and southwestern ADIZ. We have monitored the situation and responded accordingly.” 27 PLA aircraft and 6 PLAN vessels operating around Taiwan were detected up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8) today. 19 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s northern, central, and southwestern ADIZ. We have monitored the situation and responded accordingly. pic.twitter.com/3pTHiwlT4A — 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) 🇹🇼 (@MoNDefense) October 7, 2024 The ministry further assured the public that the country’s armed forces had tracked the movements of the Chinese aircraft and vessels, activating land-based missile systems, and dispatching its own air and naval forces to monitor and respond to the situation. The country has remained vigilant, bolstering its defenses as China’s military actions near the island intensify. Rising Tensions and Frequent Incursions The incident on Sunday marks just one of the numerous military incursions that the country has faced over recent months. Since September 2020, China has notably ramped up its military activity around the region, employing what experts describe as “gray zone” tactics. These tactics involve the use of non-combat provocations, such as frequent aircraft incursions and naval maneuvers, designed to apply pressure on Taiwan without triggering a direct conflict. China has carried out regular air and naval incursions into the country’s ADIZ, often coinciding with major international events or key political moments in Taiwan’s calendar. The frequent breaches of the country’s ADIZ are seen as a clear message from Beijing, asserting its claim over Taiwan as part of its territory. This aggressive posture is in direct contradiction to Taiwan’s stance, which maintains its independence and sovereignty as a self-governing entity. Although no shots were fired, these continuous incursions have raised alarm in the country and among international observers, including the United States and its allies. Beijing’s increased military presence near the island is widely interpreted as part of its long-term strategy to erode Taiwan’s defense capabilities and signal its intent to reunify the island with the mainland, by force if necessary. A Pattern of Escalation The recent activity detected near the country is part of a broader pattern of Chinese military escalation in the region. Over the past few years, China has gradually increased its number of military aircraft and naval vessels operating in proximity. This pattern has been characterized by PLA aircraft crossing into Taiwan’s ADIZ and sometimes breaching the median line of the Taiwan Strait—a boundary that China has repeatedly stated it no longer recognizes. These developments represent a constant strain on its military resources. The island’s defense forces have had to remain on high alert, scrambling jets to intercept Chinese aircraft and tracking the movements of Chinese warships. These operations, though necessary for the protection of Taiwan’s airspace, are resource-intensive and put immense pressure on Taiwan’s military personnel and equipment. Since 2020, China’s gray zone tactics have become increasingly sophisticated and difficult to counter. Chinese military operations around the country are designed to avoid direct conflict, but they also serve to gradually wear down the country’s defenses, leaving the island vulnerable to potential future military action. Response and International Concern In response to these growing threats, the country has strengthened its military capabilities, including increasing its defense budget and bolstering its alliances with democratic nations. The U.S. remains the country’s most important partner, supplying military hardware, training, and intelligence support. Recently, the U.S. Congress has approved several arms deals with Taiwan, aimed at enhancing the island’s ability to defend itself from potential Chinese aggression. President, Tsai Ing-wen, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the island’s preparedness to defend its sovereignty. Under her leadership, Taiwan has focused on modernizing its military, improving asymmetric warfare capabilities, and ensuring that its armed forces can counter Chinese aggression effectively. Internationally, China’s military activities around the country have drawn significant attention and concern. Many analysts view these moves as part of a broader strategy by China to test the resolve of the United States and its allies in the region. With the U.S. having a long-standing commitment to the country’s defense, the increasing frequency of Chinese incursions raises questions about how far Beijing might be willing to push its ambitions. While China claims the country as part of its territory, most countries, including the United States, do not formally recognize this claim. Instead, most nations follow a “One China” policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China but maintaining unofficial relations with the country. The U.S., in particular, has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” supporting Taiwan’s defense capabilities without formally recognizing it as an independent country. Looking Ahead: A Fragile Balance The situation in the Taiwan Strait remains precarious. China’s continued incursions into the country’s ADIZ and the crossing of the median line signify an ongoing campaign of intimidation, one that is likely to persist as Beijing seeks to assert its territorial claims. Maintaining its independence and sovereignty remains a top priority, even as it faces increasing pressure from Beijing. The Taiwanese government, under President Tsai, has continued to emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong defense and building strategic partnerships with countries that support democratic values. The coming months will likely see continued military posturing from both sides, as China continues to exert pressure on the country through its gray zone tactics. For now, Taiwan’s vigilance and the support of its allies, particularly the United States, will remain critical in maintaining stability in the region. As tensions rise, the international community will be closely watching the developments in the country’s Strait, hoping that diplomatic channels can prevent further escalation and maintain peace in one of the world’s most geopolitically sensitive regions.

China will use cyber attacks to break Taiwan; this is true even if we do not win China will attack Taiwan with its military. China will win this cyber game unless the US supports Taiwan

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 10-4, 25, Targeting Taiwan, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/04/targeting-taiwan/

“The complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and it will definitely be fulfilled,” declared Xi Jinping on the 110th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, underscoring Taiwan’s reintegration into China as a core element of his vision for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), using minimal military force and preserving Taian’s infrastructure and economy during reunification are paramount. A cyber-enabled economic coercion campaign is the CCP’s most strategic and logical approach to realizing this long-term national priority. The CCP’s strategy to win without fighting is not new. In writings by ancient strategists Sun Tzu and Kautilya, undermining enemy morale and cohesion plays a prominent role. But modern globalization has created more economic connections that China can exploit to achieve coercive aims. Technological innovation created even more digital connections, offering more possibilities for coercion, including through the targeting of critical infrastructure. Yet the analysis in Washington shaping U.S. strategy toward China does not reflect this reality. There is a conceptual gap. A growing number of war games and tabletop exercises (TTXs) in Washington and Taipei study the “cross-strait invasion” scenario or the “joint blockade” scenario — what operational planners commonly refer to as the “most dangerous” scenarios. War by other means and subterfuge are afterthoughts to modeling naval campaigns and counting missiles. To overcome this analytical gap, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance conducted a TTX on the “most likely” scenario: Sometime in the next decade, China will combine economic coercion, malicious cyber activity, and limited military moves short of kinetic attacks to break Taiwan’s societal and/or economic resilience and force a major adjustment in its policy toward unification. In this scenario, China learns from Russia’s mistakes and “wins” without a bloody war and widespread condemnation. The TTX involved 20 players, the majority of whom were senior Taiwanese banking and finance experts, replicating senior policymakers in Taiwan, the United States, and China. The first scenario, “the Long Walk,” involved a protracted and graduated economic coercion campaign to target Taiwan’s resilience and cohesion. The second scenario, “The Ghost in the Machine,” involved cyber-enabled economic warfare over weeks and months (not years), placing pressure on players to identify more immediate options to increase resilience to avoid a major crisis in the future. In this scenario, the CCP simultaneously continued economic attacks on critical infrastructure, disrupted supply chains, reduced confidence in Taiwanese manufacturing, and unleashed cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns that undermined communications, energy, and banking systems. The TTX concluded with a series of crisis vignettes that forced players to re-evaluate their strategies to account for a gray zone campaign and a prolonged military exercise that isolated Taiwan for months. China’s Siege Mentality Across the TTX, China’s actions against Taiwan extended beyond the traditional concept of a blockade. Instead, China’s broader siege mentality aimed to gradually starve the island of resources and attack its critical infrastructure to drain its resilience. This strategy involved not just the restriction of goods and services but also sustained psychological and economic warfare to encircle and weaken Taiwan from within. The objective was not just containment but also the eventual capitulation of the besieged. Dr. Benjamin Jensen introduces TTX scenario. The insights from the TTX were stark. An integrated cyber and financial/economic attack by the CCP against Taiwan is a significant risk. The diplomatic and economic costs to the CCP are lower than expected, and the likelihood of success, barring significant actions by Taiwan, the United States, and other partners, is much higher than expected. The CCP’s barrier to entry is lower than a blockade or cross-strait invasion. Beijing has the ability to back in or back out as needed; the “tools” or “weapons” are cheap and sometimes re-usable; and Beijing has plausible deniability for certain actions (especially in cyberspace). The risk thresholds for Taiwan — to both economic and societal resilience — are rapidly approached as the economic and psychological effects produce political pressure on Taipei to act in a manner that military threats short of war do not. One alarming insight from the TTX was that many CCP actions did not “trip” any redlines in Washington or among allies that an invasion or blockade would. In other words, unless the United States develops, exercises, tests, and calibrates responses to economic and cyber campaigns, Washington’s reactions will likely be too slow to meaningfully support Taiwan. Resilience is key for Taiwan to prevent attacks, mitigate the impact of attacks, and hasten the response and recovery from attacks. In short, Taipei, together with Washington and regional allies, must strengthen Taiwan’s economic, cyber, and societal resilience to extend its ability to withstand Chinese coercion from weeks to months or years. Building resilience is a process. It is deliberate and time-consuming and requires coordination across the public sector, private industry, and civil society. But it can be done. Taiwan can reduce its exposure to Chinese financial influence while building redundancies in communications and energy infrastructure. Adopting lessons from U.S. efforts to improve public-private collaboration, Taiwan can advance its cyber resilience by improving threat sharing, prioritizing certain infrastructure assets — what Washington calls systemically important entities — and designating a civilian agency to coordinate critical infrastructure defenses. To improve societal resilience, Taiwan can continue investing in counter-disinformation efforts to combat efforts to degrade public trust. The United States and its Asian allies, meanwhile, can strengthen Taiwan’s integration into global markets and help Taiwan build more cyber-secure networks. And Washington and its partners can identify pre-agreed responses to CCP economic coercion, including multilateral economic retaliation against key sectors in mainland China. With the CCP at its center, a network of dictators and despots is building a new authoritarian playbook. Democracies, in turn, need options for campaigning in the gray zone that balance escalation risks with ceding the initiative to despots. The report takes the first steps in providing a framework for thinking about how to defend democracies under siege around the world. …. Conclusion The tabletop exercise confirmed that an integrated cyber and economic warfare campaign is a significant risk for Taiwan. The limited diplomatic, economic, and military cost to the CCP — especially compared to the blockade or cross-strait invasion scenarios — means that China can turn up and down the pressure at will. Most concerning, the compounding financial and psychological effects impose escalating political pressure on Taipei without crossing any U.S. redlines. The answer for Taiwan is to increase economic and societal resilience. Extending the island’s ability to withstand CCP coercion from days and weeks to months and years not only provides time for America to impose countermeasures and corral reluctant democratic allies but also decreases the likelihood of CCP aggression in the first place. Building this resilience itself takes time and coordination across central and local governments, the private sector, and civil society. Identifying and mitigating complex interdependencies in critical infrastructures and deploying novel technologies to enhance digital resilience must happen before, not during, a crisis. Taiwan is not alone in its struggle to combat authoritarian coercion. Democracies around the world are under siege by an increasingly aggressive and coordinated axis of authoritarian states. The United States and its allies need pre-planned, dynamic, coordinated, and rehearsed playbooks with creative options for countering China in the Indo-Pacific, Russia in Eastern Europe, Iran in the Middle East, and their fellow travelers around the world

China will invade by 2027

Joe Sabella, 3-22, 24, China ‘on Track’ for Potential Taiwan Invasion by 2027: US Admiral, https://thedefensepost.com/2024/03/22/china-potential-taiwan-invasion/

A US military commander has claimed that China is on track in its preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027. Speaking before the US House Armed Services Committee, Admiral John Aquilino said the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been ramping up activities and nuclear capabilities “to levels unseen since World War II.” He also said Beijing has increased its defense budget by 16 percent over recent years, making it the second highest behind the US at 1.6 trillion yuan ($222 billion). Additionally, Aquilino said that in his three years of leading the US Indo-Pacific Command, he has seen the PLA commission more than 400 new fighter jets and 20 warships, as well as double its ballistic and cruise missile inventory. These signs, he said, suggest that the country is sticking to its ambitions of reuniting the self-ruled island with China, “by force if necessary.” “All indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping’s directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,” the admiral stressed, adding that the PLA’s actions “indicate their ability to meet Xi’s preferred timeline” for reunification. Increased Activities Around Taiwan According to Aquilino, the Chinese military has been carrying out various tasks linked to potential operations against Taipei. These include war games and simulations, including in April 2023 when it did a mock encirclement of the small island nation and performed simulated strikes. Committee chair Mike Rogers seemed to agree with the admiral’s assessments, saying the PLA has indeed fielded modern weapons and can project power well into the Pacific. Just recently, the Taiwanese defense ministry said it detected 36 Chinese aircraft and six naval ships operating around the island, marking it by far the largest single-day incursion of the Chinese military in 2024.