Full Evidence Set for Subscribers | Topic Essay
60 – Iran war sabotages AI development
Jason Hiner, Editor, The Deep View, March 23, 2026, Iran conflict threatens AI and global economy, https://www.thedeepview.com/articles/iran-conflict-threatens-ai-and-global-economy
Iran conflict threatens AI and global economy The tech industry is notorious for operating within its own bubble — sometimes even its own reality distortion field — but the impacts of the Iran-U.S. war are threatening to bear down on it. Multiple factors are now in play in the conflict that could disrupt tech companies and impact the pace of AI growth: Iran names U.S. tech firms as targets: The official news agency of the Iranian military listed Amazon, Microsoft, Palantir, and Oracle as the “enemy’s technological infrastructure” and made clear that it considers them military targets. This was connected to the U.S. threat to obliterate Iran’s power plants, a stance that has since been softened. Critical mineral shortage disrupts chip makers: Semiconductors run the world, especially AI, and the industry is facing a critical shortage of minerals because of the conflict. A third of the world’s helium comes from Qatar, and it’s essential for cooling systems and circuits in producing semiconductors. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz puts the semiconductor supply chain at risk, and Iran has already struck the Qatar helium plant at Ras Laffan and taken it offline. Hyperscalers rethink Middle East expansion: Tech companies had been preparing to invest billions of dollars in data centers and AI factories, but the instability and uncertainty of the conflict between the U.S./Israel and Iran has put those plans in jeopardy. Iran has already attacked AWS buildings in the UAE. OpenAI, Nvidia, Oracle, and Cisco have been collaborating on a potential 5-gigawatt facility in the UAE. But a prolonged conflict could redirect this and other projects to safer havens like India, Southeast Asia, or Northern Europe. Our Deeper View In terms of the economic fallout, we may only be a week or two away from the conflict bringing the semiconductor industry to a halt. That will have cascading impacts across many sectors of the economy and risk triggering a global recession if the conflict becomes prolonged. More broadly, tech companies becoming military targets is evidence of how central the industry has become to nearly every aspect of modern life. The employees of tech companies in the region are now at risk, as are Iranian civilians who work at power plants. As is often the case in war, the norms and standards of conflict can get thrown out the window when leaders and countries become impatient or desperate. And tech has suddenly become a high-value target.
59-Strong US global power projection deters Russian aggression in Europe
Suzanne Loftus, March 23, 2026, Why Russia Is Worried About the Iran War: A US victory in Iran would seriously endanger Russia’s international support network, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-is-worried-about-the-iran-war, Suzanne Loftus is an associate professor of national security strategy at the National War College and senior research fellow for the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. Suzanne previously served as a global fellow and Member of the Advisory Council at the Kennan Institute, and as an associate professor of National Security at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Suzanne specializes in post-Soviet studies, Russian foreign policy and identity, transatlantic security, and great power competition. These views are her own and do not represent those of the US government.
On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of the country’s senior leaders within the first day. According to the Trump administration, the objective of this campaign is to degrade Iran’s ability to wage war. This includes degrading its nuclear enrichment program, its missile development systems and capabilities, and its ability to arm proxy forces throughout the Middle East. Iran responded by attacking US bases across the region as well as neighboring countries.
Many commentators and analysts argue that rising oil prices and renewed American attention to the Middle East could give Russia an advantage in its war against Ukraine. While this may prove true in the short term, this view overlooks a potential strategic consequence of the United States’ renewed willingness to employ coercive diplomacy and targeted military force to reshape regional power balances. If the United States succeeds in significantly degrading Iran’s military capabilities and weakening the regime, it could contribute to a gradual weakening of the geostrategic ecosystem that has helped Russia withstand Western pressure since its invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort depends not only on battlefield dynamics but also on a network of political partnerships, economic ties, and military cooperation. This helps Moscow evade Western sanctions, mitigate diplomatic pressure, and reinforce the narrative of an emerging multipolar world order.
The strikes against Iran did not occur in isolation. As recently demonstrated in Venezuela with the toppling of President Nicolas Maduro and the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, members of this broader geostrategic ecosystem may be weakening or reorienting themselves. Assuming the West continues to support Ukraine and maintain pressure on Moscow, the gradual erosion of Russia’s coalition partners could reshape the strategic environment surrounding the war and influence its long-term trajectory.
Russia’s International Support Network
The Kremlin frames its war in Ukraine as part of a larger struggle against Western domination. This narrative has gained traction in the “Global South,” particularly among victims of Western colonialism or interventions. Russia’s continued ability to withstand Western pressure lends credence to the idea of an emerging multipolar world order where the West no longer holds as much leverage to shape global affairs.
This idea is celebrated by much of the non-Western world and actively supported by a coalition of anti-Western states that some have categorized as the “CRINK” grouping of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Together, the “CRINK” provides an axis upon which to balance Western power, helping one another evade Western sanctions and resist Western military and normative domination.
In Russia’s war against Ukraine, North Korea has supplied Moscow with ammunition and troops, and Iran has supplied it with Shahed drones and military technology. China has bought vast amounts of Russian oil and provided the Kremlin with dual-use technology. These countries, along with many others in the Global South, have served as alternative trading partners for Russia, helping the Kremlin evade sanctions.
While it may not be their explicit goal to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, the “CRINK” grouping is interested in helping Russia sustain itself against Western pressure to weaken the West’s relative power. Consequently, Russia has been able to avoid complete diplomatic and economic isolation, leaving the Kremlin better equipped to sustain its war in Ukraine.
With respect to the Middle East, Russia has positioned itself as an alternative interlocutor to Western powers. It has maintained a careful balancing act in its relationships with Iran and the Gulf monarchies. This approach has enabled Russia to expand its influence in the region, leading to greater trade and cooperation while reinforcing the narrative of an emerging multipolar order in which Western primacy is gradually fading.
The Ukraine War Comes to the Persian Gulf
Potential consequences of the war in Iran include the weakening of Russia’s diplomatic balance in the Middle East and its influence over a key partner. Russia’s reported intelligence support for Tehran, while Iranian strikes directly impact Gulf states, risks undermining the perception of Russia’s neutrality in the region. At the same time, Moscow’s inability to provide more direct support to Iran demonstrates the limits of its regional leverage.
Meanwhile, a diplomatic opportunity for Ukraine has presented itself. Kyiv is now a leading expert at countering Iranian-designed Shahed drones due to Russia’s extensive use of them on the battlefield. Ukraine is now lending support to the United States and Gulf countries facing similar threats, which may strengthen its diplomatic position in the region and possibly secure additional military support.
The overt security threat facing Gulf countries is likely to push them closer to the United States and Israel. In this context, Russia’s recent diplomatic overtures to mediate regional tensions while simultaneously supporting Iran with intelligence are overshadowed by Ukraine’s provision of military and technical support.
The Iran War and US Grand Strategy
The war in Iran appears to be part of a broader foreign policy shift in the United States centered around coercive diplomacy, economic pressure, and targeted military operations to shape the international environment in a traditional great power competition. Rather than focusing on democracy promotion or nation-building initiatives that characterized much of the post-Cold War era, this administration appears to be applying sustained pressure on adversarial regimes to coerce them into cooperating with Washington.
The larger goal is to reshape the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East in favor of the United States and its allies, enabling Washington to focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific, where the United States faces its most significant long-term challenger.
With respect to the war in Iran, successful regime change would be a very complex and uncertain undertaking. Nevertheless, the United States and Israel may succeed in weakening Iran’s ability to wage war and weaken the regime’s overall military reach, at least for the foreseeable future. Elsewhere, renewed American diplomatic engagement with Venezuela after the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power affects the orientation of that country, a formerly important partner for Russia in the western hemisphere.
The Trump administration claims it has its eyes on Cuba next, which has been facing near economic collapse as its main source of economic support in Venezuela has been cut off. Taken together, the weakening or re-orientation of these nation-states could represent a gradual fragmentation of the loose coalition of countries that support Russia’s geopolitical ambitions.
This policy isn’t new. Throughout the Cold War, the United States also sought to shape the global balance of power through influencing the alignment of other states, at times using explicitly coercive measures. Even if the main aim of current US interventions is not explicitly stated in this way, such actions can produce broader strategic consequences much like they did in the past.
How US Resolve in Iran Changes Russia’s Ukraine Calculus
The war in Iran and the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela are moves that may change the Kremlin’s perception of American resolve. Demonstrations of US willingness to employ decisive political and military measures against regimes aligned with Russia could alter the Kremlin’s risk calculus, potentially reducing its willingness to escalate in Ukraine or beyond.
At the same time, these developments may confirm Moscow’s long-standing fear that the United States ultimately seeks regime change in states that challenge its interests and may therefore become increasingly skeptical of current diplomatic efforts to end the Ukraine War.
While the Kremlin may conclude that its best path forward is to persist with its military campaign, current dynamics suggest Moscow may be operating in an environment of increased constraints on its behavior. With a heightened perception of US resolve, Russia may be discouraged from attempting to test NATO’s limits or from intensifying its nuclear signaling. If the United States and its Western partners sustain current levels of support for Ukraine, these shifts could gradually shape the long-term trajectory of the war.
Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine depends not only on battlefield dynamics but also on the strategic ecosystem that helps it circumvent Western sanctions and evade diplomatic isolation. This coalition helps shape the narrative that the West is no longer dominant in an emerging multipolar world order. If this coalition weakens or realigns because of the use of American hard power, Russia’s strategic environment shifts to its disadvantage.
With a renewed willingness to use coercive tactics in today’s great-power competition, the United States can begin to reshape the broader geopolitical landscape by weakening adversarial coalitions. Assuming the West sustains current levels of support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia, these geostrategic shifts could impact Russia’s prospects in the war.
62–US military power won’t defeat Iran
Tabaar ’26 [Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar Is Associate Professor Of International Affairs At Texas A&M University’S Bush School Of Government and Public Service, A Fellow At Rice University’S Baker Institute For Public Policy, A Nonresident Fellow At The Harvard Kennedy School, And A Nonresident Scholar At The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. He Is The Author Of Religious Statecraft, 3-20-2026, “How Iran Sees the War”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-iran-sees-war]
After years of condemnations, sanctions, and small-scale attacks, in late February, the United States and Israel finally launched a large-scale war on Iran. In the time since, U.S. and Israeli forces have assassinated Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, along with many other senior officials and destroyed many of the country’s military installations, government buildings, airports, energy facilities, and civilian infrastructure. Now, three weeks into the campaign, U.S. and Israeli leaders are persistently predicting that Iran is on the verge of military defeat and that its regime will come out of the war either significantly weakened or swept aside.
Washington and Israel are right that their bombs have wreaked havoc on Iran’s military capabilities. But if they believe that Tehran is about to keel over, they are probably mistaken. The Islamic Republic has maintained remarkable cohesion since the attacks started. Its command-and-control system remains intact, even though it has lost many leaders. It has retained enough firepower to launch missile strikes against U.S. bases, Israel, and various Persian Gulf Arab countries. And it swiftly named the elder Khamenei’s hard-line son Mojtaba as its new supreme leader.
This resilience should not come as a surprise. For more than two decades—since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and especially since the 12-day war last June—Tehran has been preparing for a large U.S. attack and signaling that it would respond with fury. It based its strategy on a plan to cause maximum chaos in hopes of restoring deterrence—which is exactly what it has done.
Iran is also using the war to bolster its domestic position. Before the bombings began, the regime had grown deeply unpopular at home and was subject to repeated mass protests that it could suppress only with increasing repression. But beyond providing further justification for a more brutal crackdown, the war with Washington affords it a potential new source of legitimacy. The conflict has allowed Iran’s leaders to argue that they are bravely standing up to foreign invaders. It is fostering a sense of cohesion akin to the one that took root after the Iran-Iraq War. The bombings, after all, are killing both military personnel and civilians, generating a culture of martyrdom that is sweeping across Iranian cities.
61-War means Iran power consolidation
Tabaar ’26 [Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar Is Associate Professor Of International Affairs At Texas A&M University’S Bush School Of Government and Public Service, A Fellow At Rice University’S Baker Institute For Public Policy, A Nonresident Fellow At The Harvard Kennedy School, And A Nonresident Scholar At The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. He Is The Author Of Religious Statecraft, 3-20-2026, “How Iran Sees the War”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-iran-sees-war]
The Iran-Iraq war helped the Islamic Republic consolidate power.
And over the last few weeks, the government has mobilized large numbers of Iranians. It has, for example, successfully encouraged sizable crowds to gather in major squares across Iranian cities in support of the state. These citizens by no means speak for all Iranians; it is likely that a large majority prefer a secular government—particularly if a peaceful path to such a transition were available. But the regime believes that popular resentment of its protest suppression is being eclipsed by admiration for the sacrifices of wartime martyrs, such as the nearly 200 children and teachers who were killed when a U.S. missile struck an Iranian girls’ school. One trauma, in other words, is being replaced by another.
The Islamic Republic also believes the war could help consolidate support for the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, much as the Iran-Iraq War helped empower his father. Ali Khamenei was a relatively minor political figure when that conflict began, but the death of many other Iranian leaders meant that just one year into the Iraqi invasion, he was elected president. During the war, he and other Islamist clerics marginalized rivals while helping expand the IRGC from a small, loosely organized force into a central pillar of the state. Khamenei also raised his public profile by presenting himself as a wartime leader, regularly visiting the front and delivering speeches to mobilize both fighters and the broader population.
When the conflict ended and Khomeini died, elites thus chose him to be supreme leader. A similar dynamic already appears to be unfolding with Mojtaba. For years, the younger Khamenei remained behind the scenes. Many Iranians barely know what he looks like or what his voice sounds like. But in a moment of crisis, when experienced leaders have been killed and the regime is prioritizing loyalty and cohesion over formal credentials, Mojtaba’s close ties to the security apparatus—particularly the IRGC—appear to have become an asset. Even as reports suggest that he has been injured and has not appeared publicly, at pro-Islamic Republic demonstrations, people have pledged allegiance to him. The war, in other words, may be helping transform a largely opaque figure into a symbol of continuity and resistance.
THE TWO WARS
It is, of course, unclear if Iran’s strategy will prove effective. The United States and Israel remain unbowed by the rising costs of the war, at least so far. The millions of Iranians who hated the regime before the war began may blame the Islamic Republic as much as the United States and Israel for the bombings. But the pain from the conflict has just started. As images emerge of dead Iranian civilians and soldiers and devastated infrastructure, the public may grow increasingly furious at foreign attackers and fearful the conflict will lead to state collapse instead of regime change. If so, they may indeed focus less on the regime’s recent brutality and massacre of protesters.
But what is clear is this: Iran is fighting a fundamentally different kind of war than its adversaries. The United States and Israel are attempting to weaken the state from above via decapitation strikes and destruction of the country’s infrastructure. But the Islamic Republic is working from below, mobilizing supporters and reshaping public sentiment through wartime nationalism. It wants to defeat its enemies on the battlefield. But it is just as focused on consolidating its position at home.
60- US terrible at diplomacy
Salo 26 (Edward Salo, 3-20-2026, “Donald Trump’s Iran Coalition-Building Mistake”, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trumps-iran-coalition-building-mistake)
Donald Trump wants an international coalition to defend the Strait of Hormuz. He should have thought of that before striking Iran. One of the most cited quotes about coalition warfare is Winston Churchill’s observation that “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” As the Iran War continues to escalate, the current Trump administration is beginning to understand the British prime minister’s insight. The United States’ greatest strategic mistake in a conflict with Iran would not be military; it would be diplomatic: failing to build a coalition before the first shot is fired. One of the major problems emerging in the war is Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which 20 percent of globally traded oil passes. Disruption here is already sending pandemonium through global energy markets and the broader international economy. Currently, the US objectives include maintaining freedom of navigation of the straits and deterring further Iranian interference with commercial shipping, while avoiding a wider regional escalation of the conflict. These goals require not only military capability but also a sustained multinational presence to ensure continuous maritime security operations. The Trump administration’s request for allied participation is not merely an attempt to gain political legitimacy for the operation but also an operational necessity. Many US allies initially stated their reluctance. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said, “This is not our war, we have not started it.” Moreover, Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini said, “sending military ships in a war zone would mean entering the war.” Now, as attacks on Persian Gulf energy infrastructure intensify, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan have jointly expressed greater openness to keeping the straits clear. Still, the Trump administration is frustrated by the less-than-total support and has even called on China to help, undermining previous US rhetoric about countering Chinese influence in the region. Regardless of one’s interpretation of the Trump administration’s rationale for the recent military action against Iran, it is clear that White House strategists overlooked key coalition-building lessons from two earlier conflicts, World War I and the Gulf War. By initiating military operations without first assembling a robust coalition, the administration has weakened its strategic position, undermining both the legitimacy of its actions and its capacity to shape postwar outcomes. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, the government debated how it would use the newly mobilized forces in the conflict. The French and British forces had been bled white, and their governments wanted to deploy US troops to replace existing units. However, President Woodrow Wilson believed that without an independent American fighting force, he would have no hope of shaping the post-war peace, thereby negating the overwhelming sacrifices of American troops. President Wilson’s logic was sound, and the United States gained a significant role in both combat operations and peace negotiations, providing a significant boost to American international prestige. Today, the Trump administration risks reducing US leverage by asking China and other nations to join a coalition retroactively. Giving China a seat at the table in framing the post-war Middle East order lends credence to China’s great-power ambitions and harms US interests. It also gives the impression that the United States must rely on allies for military operations, countering the image of a decisive, unilateral actor cultivated by the successful military operations in Venezuela. Rather than jerry-rigging a post hoc coalition, the United States should have learned lessons from the Gulf War. President George HW Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft understood that the United States needed a broad coalition to enter the first major post-Cold War military conflict. Accordingly, the Bush administration created a 35-nation international coalition that participated in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Authorized by a United Nations resolution to liberate Kuwait, this coalition included the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others. While some nations provided military might, others provided logistical or diplomatic support for the operations. However, Scowcroft and others realized that it was critical to form the coalition before the hostilities commenced to present a unified front and ensure a unity of purpose. Had the United States constructed a coalition after hostilities began, it would have introduced significant strategic risks and become an exercise in concession rather than coordination. This would have limited Washington’s ability to dictate both the conduct of the war and the structure of the peace, thus potentially weakening the post-war order. The lesson from both World War I and the Gulf War is clear: coalitions are most effective when they are constructed deliberately and in advance of military action. By contrast, attempting to assemble partners after the onset of conflict weakens both strategic coherence and diplomatic leverage. If the United States sought to not only prevail militarily over Iran but also to shape the political order in the region that follows the conflict, it should have treated coalition-building not as an afterthought but as a central element of strategy from the outset. In great power competition, battlefield success is only half the war. The other half is deciding who shapes the peace. And that contest is often decided before the war even begins.
59-Island ground invasion destroys the global economy
Imogen Garfinkel, March 20, 2026, Trump is considering ordering US troops to seize or blockade Iran’s Kharg island but ‘risks irrevocable damage to global economy’ – as Netanyahu also hints at putting boots on the ground, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15663971/Trump-considering-ordering-US-troops-seize-blockade-Irans-Kharg-island-risks-irrevocable-damage-global-economy-Netanyahu-hints-putting-boots-ground.html
Donald Trump is considering ordering American troops to seize or blockade Iran’s Kharg island but risks ‘irrevocable damage’ to the global economy if he goes ahead with the move. Four sources with knowledge of the issue told Axios the White House was discussing plans to occupy or blockade the island, which is Tehran’s most important economic asset and the launch point of 90 per cent of its oil exports. ‘We’ve always had boots on the ground in conflicts under every president, including Trump,’ a senior official told the outlet. ‘I know this is a fixation in the media, and I get the politics. But the president is going to do what’s right.’ At the end of last week, America announced the deployment of 5,000 marines and sailors, as well as USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship, to the Middle East, signalling the possibility of a ground operation. It comes as Benjamin Netanyahu also hinted at putting boots on the ground as war rages on, admitting there must be a ‘ground component’ involved in forcing the Iranian regime to crumble. The US President would target the island – the heart of Iran’s oil industry, located 20 miles off the beleaguered nation’s southern coast – in order to destroy the government’s oil revenues. He could also use the seizure of Kharg island as a bargaining chip, choking off the regime’s oil profits to force it into reopening the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas flows. But destroying its oil infrastructure would inflict ‘irrevocable damage to the Iranian economy and the global economy’, warned retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, the former commander of US Central Command, in comments to the Wall Street Journal. The Israeli Prime Minister alluded to the possibility of deploying troops during a press conference, reiterating that his military was working to create the conditions for Iranians to topple the regime. ‘You can do a lot of things from the air, and we are doing, but there has to be a ground component as well,’ he said, before adding: ‘There are many possibilities for this ground component, and I take the liberty of not sharing with you all those possibilities.’ A general view of the Port of Kharg Island Oil Terminal, located 20 miles off the beleaguered nation’s southern coast ‘Yes, the regime could change,’ Netanyahu told reporters. ‘Is it guaranteed? No. And it is up to the Iranian people in the final accounting to make use of the conditions that we’re [creating], weakening the regime.’ A road named ‘Oil Boulevard’ traverses Iran’s five mile island, once the world’s largest offshore crude oil terminals. The road is said to have a loading capacity of roughly seven million barrels per day and is a vital organ for Iran’s sanction hit economy. “Boots on the ground” at Kharg Island – smart move or disaster? Smart – gives leverage in negotiations Disaster – could turn into a forever war Unsure – not enough information The seizure of Kharg island would mean the US would ‘not have to worry’ about Iranian attempts to keep the Strait of Hormuz shut, because it would get ‘all of the oil’ out of Tehran’s hands, Jarrod Agen, a White House adviser, previously claimed. ‘What we want to do is to get such massive oil reserves in Iran out of the hands of terrorists,’ Agen, executive director of the National Energy Dominance Council, told Fox. The de facto closure of the waterway for most of the world’s tanker traffic has proved disastrous for global energy and trade flows, triggering the largest oil supply shock in history and surging global oil prices. Oil prices gained on Friday despite leading European nations, Japan and Canada offering to join efforts to secure safe passage for ships through the strait, and the US outlining moves to boost oil supply. Brent futures rose $1.20, or 1.1 per cent, to $109.85 a barrel this morning, while US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude added 6 cents, or 0.1 per cent, to $96.20. On Monday, Trump threatened to strike Kharg island’s oil pipelines, after a US military attack last week ‘totally obliterated’ military targets while preserving oil assets. ‘We can do that on five minutes’ notice. It’ll be over. But for purposes of someday rebuilding that country, I guess we did the right thing, but it may not stay that way,’ he told reporters Monday. ‘Just one simple word, and the pipes will be gone too, but it’ll take a long time to rebuild that.’ He reiterated the point on Tuesday. ‘We can knock out their oil in Kharg Island,’ he told reporters. ‘The only thing we didn’t take down was the oil, because if we knock out, I call them the pipes, very complex, but if you do that, it will take them forever to rebuild.’ An operation to take over Kharg island would be perilous for American troops, positioning them directly in the line of fire, so it would have to take place after the US further degrades Tehran’s military capacity around the Strait of Hormuz. ‘We need about a month to weaken the Iranians more with strikes, take the island and then get them by the balls and use it for negotiations,’ a source with knowledge of White House thinking said. On top of the three different Marine units on their way to the region, the White House and the Pentagon are considering sending even more soldiers soon. ‘He wants Hormuz open. If he has to take Kharg Island to make it happen, that’s going to happen. If he decides to have a coastal invasion, that’s going to happen. But that decision hasn’t been made,’ a senior administration official said. By seizing the island and holding it for ransom – as opposed to destroying its oil infrastructure – Trump would avoid ‘permanently degrad[ing] the world economy’, McKenzie said. Such a raid could be accomplished by sea, and may involve the USS Tripoli launching ship-to-shore vessels carrying Marines and equipment that can land directly on the shore. Or, the seizure could be accomplished by air, using Marines aboard F-35Bs and helicopters designed to land without a runway. There are two ways the aircraft could be launched: from the ships or from nearby Gulf countries, if those partners facilitate overflight and basing rights. Crucially, positioning Marines on islands off Iran’s coast – rather than inside Iran itself – could be a loophole allowing the US President to claim he honoured his promise of never putting American boots on the ground in Iran. ‘I don’t see them in Iran proper,’ retired Vice Adm. John Miller, who formerly commanded US Naval Forces Central, told the Journal. ‘I think if you’re going to put them anywhere, the place where it would be on some of the islands that are around Iran, in the Gulf, that might give you some advantage from a tactical sense for a period of time.’ One US official, who confirmed to Reuters that the Trump administration was discussing plans to send ground forces to the island, warned that the operation would be very risky, as Iran has the ability to reach the island with drones and missiles. Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery told Axios that, as opposed to an invasion of Kharg, what was more likely was two more weeks of attacks to degrade Iran’s capabilities, before the US sends destroyers and aircraft into the Strait of Hormuz to escort tankers, eliminating the need for an invasion. The president cryptically denied any intention of ordering American ground troops onto Iranian soil, telling reporters as he spoke to Japan’s Prime Minister on Thursday: ‘No, I’m not putting troops anywhere. If I were, I certainly wouldn’t tell you.’ When asked on Tuesday if he was worried about Vietnam-style combat in Iran if he were to deploy troops, he shot back a decisive ‘No’, before adding: ‘I’m not afraid of anything.’ Any use of US ground troops – even for a limited mission – could pose significant political risks for Trump, given low support among the American public for the Iran campaign and Trump’s own campaign promises to avoid entangling the US in new Middle East conflicts. Military action against Kharg also poses an enormous risk because it might ignite a full-scale war by Tehran against energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. A widening crisis in the Middle East involving the destruction of oil field ports and natural gas storage depots could send crude prices surging, bringing the globe dangerously close to a recession. Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said sending troops to take over Kharg island was a ‘no-brainer’ as it would choke off Tehran’s ability to bankroll its military. However, he warned that attacks might embolden Iran’s hard-liners and make it more difficult for Washington to identify moderate leaders it could work with after the war comes to an end. ‘The lesson we learned in Iraq was that you don’t destroy the infrastructure of a country that you want to be your ally the day after regime change,’ he said. It would not be the first time the island has been targeted, with Saddam Hussein’s forces heavily shelling it during the Iran-Iraq war in an attempt to cut off the country’s primary revenue stream. ‘If President Trump were to decide to seize this pivotal hub, it would deal a significant blow to the Iranian regime, as it would deprive them of a critical source of revenue,’ oil analyst Tamas Varga told CNBC. ‘Such a move would be reminiscent of the US intervention in Venezuela at the beginning of the year, when it effectively took control of the country’s oil sector.’ But he warned US forces would remain highly vulnerable to attacks and it would further intensify the conflict which has already spiralled out of control.
58-War is killing thousands of civilians
Corbett 26(Jessica Corbett, 3-15-2026, “‘Human Cost of This Reckless War Is Alarming,’ Says UN Rights Chief as Civilians Pay Highest Price Across Middle East”, Common Dreams, https://www.commondreams.org/news/iran-civilians)
‘Human Cost of This Reckless War Is Alarming,’ Says UN Rights Chief as Civilians Pay Highest Price Across Middle East “To pull the region back from the brink and prevent the further loss of civilian life and destruction of vital public infrastructure, renewed diplomatic efforts are critical.” Jessica Corbett Mar 19, 2026 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk renewed his call for achieving peace through diplomacy on Thursday, highlighting how the US-Israeli war on Iran is having a disproportionate impact on civilians across the Middle East. “The human cost of this reckless war is alarming. Hostilities are being waged without regard to the immediate and long-term consequences for civilians across the entire region,” Türk said in a statement as the US and Israel bombed Iran, retaliatory Iranian strikes hit fossil fuel facilities throughout the region, and Israeli forces attacked alleged Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. “Attacks on energy infrastructure—including South Pars in Iran and Ras Laffan in Qatar—will only compound hardship,” the UN official warned. “Disastrous humanitarian, economic, and environmental consequences will be triggered if such attacks continue, resulting in deep harm to civilians—potentially for years to come.” On Wednesday, Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field and Qatar said that Iranian missiles caused “extensive damage” to the world’s largest liquefied natural gas export facility. US President Donald Trump then threatened to “massively blow up the entirety” of the Iranian site if attacks on Qatari energy infrastructure continued. According to the Iranian Red Crescent Society, US and Israeli attacks over the past few weeks have already damaged at least 67,414 civilian locations, including homes, schools, medical facilities, energy installations, courthouses, and UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization World Heritage sites. “All parties to this conflict are bound by their obligations—irrespective of the conduct of any other party—and must take all feasible measures to avoid harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects,” Türk stressed. “In times of war, the rule of law, due process, and other human rights obligations continue to apply. The ugly reality of war is not a carte blanche to violate human rights.” The high commissioner declared that “to pull the region back from the brink and prevent the further loss of civilian life and destruction of vital public infrastructure, renewed diplomatic efforts are critical.” He also acknowledged an upcoming Muslim holiday: “Many across the region and beyond will be observing Eid al-Fitr this weekend in circumstances of hardship, uncertainty, and fear. I extend my Eid wishes to all those who observe it, and my heartfelt solidarity to all those enduring the hardships of conflict and instability.” Citing the Iranian Health Ministry, Drop Site News reported Thursday that “at least 1,444 people have been killed and 18,551 injured” across Iran. Reuters noted that as of Wednesday, the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency put the death toll in Iran even higher, at 3,134. The Lebanese Ministry of Public Health said Thursday that Israeli attacks this month have killed 1,001 people and wounded 2,584 across Lebanon. Additionally, Iranian missiles have killed at least 15 Israeli civilians and four Palestinian women in the illegally occupied West Bank, according to Reuters. The Israeli military has confirmed the deaths of two soldiers in Lebanon, and the Pentagon has verified that 13 US service members are dead, and another 200 have been wounded. Despite the rising body count, and polling that shows the war is unpopular with the US public, including Trump voters, the president is seeking another $200 billion dollars from Congress, which has not authorized the war on Iran. Responding to that request, US Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) said that “the best way to end this war, protect our troops, save civilian lives, and rein in a lawless administration is to cut off funding. I’m a hell no.”
57-Gulf energy flows at-risk
Peace. 26 (Amr Hamzawy Is A Senior Fellow and Director Of The Middle East Program At The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace., 3-18-2026, “The Gulf Goes Backward”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/persian-gulf/gulf-goes-backward)
Even with support from the United States, the cost of security in the Middle East is rising dramatically, and the implications extend far beyond the region. Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure are not simply military operations; they are strikes against the backbone of the global energy system. The Gulf region hosts some of the world’s most important oil and gas production facilities, export terminals, and shipping routes. The Strait of Hormuz, for instance, a narrow strip of water between Iran, the UAE, and Oman that transits about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply each day, is one of the most critical and vulnerable chokepoints in the global economy. There is a real risk that Iran could take complete control of the strait through military means, and Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure, ports, and vessels in the surrounding region raise the possibility of prolonged instability that could disrupt energy flows and commercial shipping. Even limited interruptions to production or transport can reverberate through international energy markets and fuel inflationary pressures worldwide. This is already evident; since the war began on February 28, global oil prices have increased by almost 40 percent, and the International Energy Agency released a historic 400 million barrels from its reserve oil supply in a bid to offset the spike.
56-Middle East escalation risks increasing
Peace. 26 (Amr Hamzawy Is A Senior Fellow and Director Of The Middle East Program At The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace., 3-18-2026, “The Gulf Goes Backward”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/persian-gulf/gulf-goes-backward)
As a result of Iran’s escalation, the Middle East now appears to be moving away from a recent period of cautious de-escalation that was marked by an uptick in multilateral diplomacy and greater consideration of regional frameworks based on the principles of collective security. In its place, a more confrontational geopolitical environment is taking shape—one defined by renewed military competition, hardened alliances, and diminished prospects for diplomatic accommodation and security coexistence between Gulf states and Iran. In this sense, the Middle East may be witnessing a return to an earlier era, one in which security dilemmas dominated regional politics and cooperation became increasingly difficult to sustain. Unless a major diplomatic breakthrough halts the current escalation, the Gulf and the broader Middle East may be entering a prolonged period of instability marked by persistent military confrontation, rising economic uncertainty, and the steady narrowing of any space for regional cooperation. The clock, in many ways, seems to be turning backward
55-Deployment in the middle east doesn’t deter
Gallagher 26 (Adam Gallagher, 3-19-2026, “Why US Middle East Bases Are a Disadvantage, Not a Deterrent”, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/why-us-middle-east-bases-are-a-disadvantage-not-a-deterrent]
Justifications for the US military presence in the Middle East have become exercises in circular logic. Since the US and Israel launched the Iran War on February 28, Iran’s attacks on US bases have killed multiple US service members, injured many others, and damaged billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment, while providing limited utility in the conflict. These bases are the physical manifestation of the United States’ needless entanglement in the region. Even as the United States chooses yet another Middle East war, there are very few direct threats to US national security emanating from the region. The only reason that Iran, or any of its allies, poses a threat to the United States is because of the presence of these bases and the tens of thousands of troops deployed to the region. The United States should redress its overextension and close most of the bases as part of a broader retrenchment from the Middle East. Given that such a maneuver would be politically impractical amid war, the United States should use the eventual termination of this conflict as an opportunity to pull back and significantly reduce its presence in the region. There’s no doubt that the United States recognizes how exposed these bases are. In a roughly 13-month period following Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, US bases and personnel in the region faced 170 attacks from Iranian-allied groups. One of those attacks killed three American service members stationed in a poorly defended outpost in northeast Jordan in January 2024. As the US conducted a massive military buildup in the weeks leading up to the February 28 launch of this war, the Pentagon advised some personnel at CENTCOM’s forward headquarters at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar to evacuate. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain reduced staffing to “mission-critical” levels ahead of the attack. Similarly, ahead of its strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025, the United States moved military assets and personnel from bases in the Middle East. If these bases are so vital, why would the US military reduce its personnel in advance of a war? In the first week of the war alone, Iranian missile and drone strikes have done extensive damage to US bases in the region, including hitting the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Iran has destroyed or severely degraded expensive US radar systems in Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE that are used for missile defense. As of March 10, at least 17 US sites have been damaged in the war. The presence of these bases is also incentivizing Iran to attack host countries in the region, leading to a wider, increasingly uncontrollable war. Among the administration’s numerous justifications for launching the war on Iran, according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is that they expected Israel to strike Iran first, and Tehran to subsequently retaliate by attacking US personnel in the region. By that logic, if the United States didn’t have such a large presence in the region, there would have been no need to join Israel’s war because Iran would not have had numerous US targets in range. Eliminating, or at least greatly reducing, the US presence in the region would have numerous strategic upsides for the United States. Chiefly, it reduces US troops’ vulnerability to attack and lessens the potential for escalation and deeper entrenchment in the region. A withdrawal of US personnel would also mean Washington could remove other assets, including missile defense systems and carrier strike groups. This would encourage Middle Eastern states to end their free-riding, take their own defense more seriously, and reduce reliance on the United States. The Trump administration has rightly called on Europe to share a greater burden in its own defense—it should do the same with its Middle East partners. The US presence has also fostered a moral hazard in the US-Israeli relationship, whereby Israel undertakes aggressive actions because it is confident of US backing. Rubio’s justification for the war is a prime example of this problem. US interests in the region are limited and certainly do not justify such a substantial presence. Middle Eastern states should be just as, if not more, responsible for keeping sea lanes open and ensuring the flow of oil—indeed, they have a strong incentive to do so. The same goes for the threat posed by groups like ISIS, which are a much greater threat to regional states than the United States. More broadly, most of the challenges the Middle East faces are political and can’t be resolved by an overly militarized US presence in the region. Just days before the war with Iran began, the United States announced that it would totally withdraw American troops from Syria. This is a good start. Unfortunately, US attention and resources will now be focused on fighting yet another reckless Middle East war, instead of rightsizing America’s overextension in the region.
54-US needs to defend the Gulf countries against Iran
Epstein, 3-19, 26, Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an expert at the N7 Foundation, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University. He also sits on the advisory board of the Alekain Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to providing education to women and girls in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He specializes in Eurasia and the Middle East, and his work has been featured in various outlets such as Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, The Hill, the Atlantic Council, Novaya Gazeta, RFE/RL, Foreign Policy, and others, States, How Iranian Missiles Could Secure Israel-GCC Normalization, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/how-iranian-missiles-could-secure-israel-gcc-normalization
The Arab nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council are realizing that Iran is not a true diplomatic partner, but a long-term strategic threat requiring closer coordination with America and Israel.
Three weeks ago, it would have been unthinkable for Al Jazeera to run an op-ed arguing that the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran was working. The Qatari state-funded outlet has been at the vanguard of the information war against Israel since the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, 2023. Indeed, it employed at least six journalists who simultaneously served as operatives in Hamas’ military wing and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, giving terrorist fighters cover as credentialed press.
Yet on March 16, Al Jazeera published exactly that article—written from Doha by an academic living under Iranian missile alerts. When the house organ of Qatari soft power begins making the case for American and Israeli war aims, something fundamental has shifted.
What shifted was Iranian ordnance falling on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The ensuing outrage across the Gulf has created the most significant opportunity for American strategic interests in the Middle East since the Abraham Accords: the chance to bring the GCC states decisively into a formalized security architecture with the United States and Israel. For the first time in decades, the countries of the Persian Gulf are not hedging between Washington and Tehran. They are choosing—and more specifically, they are choosing America.
Iran Shot Missiles at Its Arab Neighbors—and Itself in the Foot
For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic sought to unite the Muslim world in antithesis to the United States and Israel. Through proxy networks, nuclear ambiguity, and rhetorical positioning as defender of Palestinian and Shia causes, Tehran cultivated a regional order that even regional American allies found it prudent to accommodate. Saudi Arabia pursued a Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in 2023. The UAE maintained back channels. Qatar bet that playing both sides would insulate it. Oman wagered that its neutrality would make it useful to everyone.
Winston Churchill once observed that an appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile in the hopes that it will eat him last. The Gulf states fed the Iranian crocodile for years, to no avail. In early March, Iran launched missiles and drones at every GCC member state—countries that had given Tehran ironclad assurances their territory would not be used to attack Iran. The UAE absorbed 174 ballistic missiles, 689 drones, and 8 cruise missiles, with strikes hitting Dubai International Airport, the Burj Al Arab, and the Ruwais industrial complex. Qatar detected over 100 ballistic missiles and shot down two Iranian Su-24 bombers—the first time any nation has downed an Iranian aircraft in combat. Iranian drones struck Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery, curtailing 550,000 barrels of oil production per day. Kuwait’s international airport was hit. Even Oman—the country that had spent weeks brokering negotiations between the US and Iran—was not spared. In total, Iran has fired over 3,000 projectiles—missiles and drones—at GCC countries in less than three weeks, the most sustained state-on-state aerial assault in the Middle East since the Gulf War.
Then Tehran escalated further. On March 18, after Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field, Iran made good on explicit threats to target Gulf energy infrastructure. Iranian missiles struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City—one of the world’s most critical gas processing and export hubs and the source of 80 percent of Qatari government revenue—causing significant damage and forcing a halt to all Qatari gas production. Missiles and drones simultaneously targeted Saudi Arabia’s SAMREF refinery and Jubail petrochemical complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn gas field, and Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery, one of the largest in the Middle East. Saudi air defenses intercepted four ballistic missiles over Riyadh and two more over the Eastern Province. The UAE dealt with 13 ballistic missiles and 27 drones in a single engagement. The Gulf saw the move for what it was: deliberate economic warfare against the region’s most vital assets.
The transformation in Gulf attitudes has been swift. Qatar, which in June 2025 expressed “regret” over American “attacks on the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran” during the US-led Operation Midnight Hammer, issued its strongest condemnation in the country’s history and is now arresting IRGC operatives on its soil. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman described the Iranian strikes as “cowardly” and offered to use “all Saudi capabilities” to defend its neighbors. The UAE recalled its ambassador from Tehran. The GCC issued an unprecedented joint statement with Washington condemning Iran’s “indiscriminate and reckless” attacks—language that would have been diplomatically impossible a month ago. President Donald Trump told CNN that Gulf countries “were going to be very little involved, and now they insist on being involved.”
Trump was right. Iran intended its strikes to coerce the US-Israeli operation into stopping. Instead, Tehran created the conditions for the Gulf to join it. When Iranian drones are striking your airports and oil infrastructure—when your citizens are receiving evacuation orders in the middle of the night—the abstraction of strategic hedging collides with the concrete reality of state-on-state warfare.
How the United States Can Gain from Iran’s Blunder
Even if the Islamic Republic survives in diminished form, the damage it has inflicted on its own regional position will not soon be forgotten. The question for Washington is what comes after—and the answer should be ambitious.
First, the United States should propose a mutual defense framework for the Gulf. The absurdity of the current arrangement was exposed on February 28: the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait each intercepted Iranian missiles in the same 48-hour window, fighting the same war with no coordination. A formalized architecture—integrated air and missile defense linking American, Israeli, and GCC systems, permanent forward-deployed THAAD and Patriot batteries, and joint naval patrols in the Strait of Hormuz—would replace the ad hoc arrangements that leave Gulf states exposed every time Washington’s attention shifts.
Second, the Abraham Accords framework should be expanded with a hard security component, with Saudi Arabia as its centerpiece. Before February 28, Saudi normalization with Israel was framed as a diplomatic concession to Washington—politically costly and strategically optional. Iranian missiles changed that calculus. The country that offered to place all its capabilities at the region’s disposal and the country whose missile defense technology helped intercept the barrage are natural partners. An expanded Abraham Accords should include intelligence sharing on Iranian proxy networks, coordinated sanctions enforcement, and a joint commitment to preventing Tehran from reconstituting the capabilities now being destroyed. The political conditions for such an arrangement may not exist six months from now, but they exist today. The United States must strike while the iron is hot.
Wars clarify. The aftermath of wars, if mismanaged, obscures. The Islamic Republic handed the United States and Israel a strategic gift. America’s task now is to make it permanent.
52-3Iran will develop nuclear weapons after the war
Martin Ayoob, 3-18, 26, How the Iran War Will Accelerate Iran’s Nuclear Program, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/how-the-iran-war-will-accelerate-irans-nuclear-program
The lesson that Tehran will take away from this conflict is that it needs an ironclad deterrent in the form of a nuclear weapon.
The primary objective of the war now unfolding following the attack by Israel and the United States on Iran is clear: preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Regime change is but the means to achieving this goal. Paradoxically, the conflict is likely to produce precisely the opposite outcome. The strategic logic unleashed by war may push Iran toward the very decision the war was meant to prevent.
Three dynamics explain why the war may push Iran toward weaponization: the harsh lesson of deterrence, the collapse of Iran’s threshold strategy, and the political transformation now underway inside the Iranian leadership.
The most powerful lesson Iran could draw from the war concerns deterrence. States without nuclear weapons remain vulnerable to external attack, while nuclear-armed states enjoy far greater security.
Recent history reinforces this perception. Countries that abandoned or never developed nuclear weapons—such as Libya or Iraq—eventually faced military intervention and regime collapse. By contrast, nuclear-armed states have proven far harder, in fact impossible, to coerce. North Korea is the most obvious example. Despite decades of confrontation with the United States, the regime in Pyongyang has shielded itself from direct military intervention through its nuclear arsenal. For Iranian strategists, the present war may reinforce a stark conclusion: restraint does not prevent attack; in fact, it encourages it.
Iran spent decades avoiding an explicit decision to build nuclear weapons. Yet it has now experienced large-scale military strikes on its territory, including attacks targeting strategic infrastructure and senior leadership. In this sense, the war reinforces a central insight of realist international relations theory. As the international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz famously argued, nuclear weapons create powerful deterrent effects because the costs of escalation become catastrophic. In a 2012 essay in Foreign Affairs, Waltz even suggested that a nuclear Iran might stabilize the Middle East by creating a balance of power with Israel. Whether or not one accepts Waltz’s broader argument, the logic of deterrence will now loom much larger in Iranian strategic thinking.
Before the war, Iran pursued a carefully calibrated strategy of nuclear ambiguity. Tehran developed extensive nuclear infrastructure and enriched uranium to high levels, especially after President Donald Trump reneged on the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018. However, Tehran still stopped short of openly producing nuclear weapons. This allowed Iran to remain a “threshold state”—technically capable of building a bomb but without formally crossing the nuclear line.
Strategic ambiguity offered several advantages. It preserved Iran’s nuclear option while avoiding the full consequences of overt weaponization, including severe international isolation and preventive military strikes. The Israeli-American attack has dramatically weakened the logic of this strategy. If Iran can be attacked despite remaining below the nuclear threshold, ambiguity no longer offers meaningful protection. From Tehran’s perspective, this war has demonstrated that remaining a threshold state does not guarantee security.
Under these conditions, the strategic calculus shifts. If Iran faces military attack regardless of its nuclear status, then actually possessing nuclear weapons may appear to be the only reliable way to prevent such attacks in the future. This dynamic has precedents. Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 convinced Saddam Hussein that nuclear weapons were essential for Iraq’s long-term security. Libya’s abandonment of its nuclear program in 2003 likewise did not prevent NATO intervention during the 2011 uprising—an episode frequently cited by Iranian officials as a cautionary lesson. The present war has reinforced these conclusions.
The war has also transformed Iran’s political environment in ways that may have removed one of the most important constraints on nuclear weaponization. For years, Iran’s leadership maintained that nuclear weapons were prohibited on religious grounds. The late Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, repeatedly declared that producing or using nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islamic law. This position served both ideological and strategic purposes. It allowed Iran to defend its nuclear program as peaceful, citing religious grounds, thus avoiding the political costs of openly pursuing nuclear weapons.
But the war has fundamentally altered this formula. The removal of the elder Khamenei—who was killed during the early phase of the conflict—may have paradoxically eliminated one of the most significant ideological barriers to weaponization. His successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, presides over a political system under siege and may not feel bound by the same doctrinal constraints.
Moreover, by all accounts, it is the hard-line commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who are calling the shots in Tehran and are expected to be much more inclined to exercise the nuclear option, particularly in light of the current war. In this sense, the war may have done more than change Iran’s strategic environment. It may also have reshaped the ideological landscape within which nuclear decisions are made.
Another reason the war may accelerate nuclearization is that Iran already possesses much of the technical infrastructure required to build nuclear weapons. Years of sanctions and international pressure failed to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, they pushed Tehran toward mastering key elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge technology.
Even if military strikes damage specific facilities, they cannot erase decades of accumulated expertise. Nuclear programs are resilient precisely because their most important assets are scientific knowledge and technical experience. Iran, therefore, retains the ability to rebuild key parts of its nuclear infrastructure. If Tehran ultimately decides to pursue nuclear weapons, the remaining technical barriers may be relatively limited. In other words, the war may delay Iran’s nuclear program. It is unlikely to eliminate it.
Instead of weakening support for nuclear programs, military strikes are likely to strengthen Iran’s resolve to pursue them. National pride, fear of external threats, and the desire for strategic autonomy can transform nuclear weapons from controversial projects into symbols of sovereignty. The current war can therefore be expected to unify Iran’s political factions around the idea that a nuclear deterrent is necessary.
For policymakers in Washington and allied capitals, this possibility carries an uncomfortable implication. If the goal remains to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, military pressure alone is unlikely to succeed. Durable nonproliferation outcomes emerge not from coercion alone but from political arrangements that reduce states’ perceived need for nuclear deterrence.
Absent such a framework, the war may leave Iran’s leaders with a simple and dangerous conclusion: survival requires the bomb. And once that conclusion takes hold in Tehran, the strategic logic of proliferation with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt following suit may become almost impossible to reverse.
Grajeski & Panda, 3-19, 26, NICOLE GRAJEWSKI is an Assistant Professor at Sciences Po and a Nonresident Scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance From Syria to Ukraine. ANKIT PANDA is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon, Foreign Affairs, The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence And Why It Augurs a More Dangerous World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunning-failure-iranian-deterrence
Iran made hundreds of pounds of near-weapons-grade uranium and began producing uranium metal, a key industrial step necessary in the manufacture of a bomb. By early 2025, almost seven years after the first Trump administration violated the JCPOA, Iran was in a position where it could theoretically produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon in under a week. It possessed enough uranium to, if enriched just a bit more, sustain roughly nine or ten weapons. It was, without a doubt, the nonnuclear state closest to getting the bomb.
But by letting everyone know the gradual nuclear progress it was making, Iran made itself more vulnerable to attack. There are two ways a country on the cusp of having nuclear weapons can protect itself. The first is ambiguity: concealing its nuclear program so that adversaries cannot confidently assess whether a strike would knock out the nuclear program, how quickly it could reconstitute its capabilities, or whether it might already possess a nuclear weapon in secret. In that case, adversaries must plan for the worst. Israel itself has taken this approach by neither confirming nor denying that it has nuclear weapons.
The second way is to make a nuclear weapon so quickly and covertly that by the time adversaries recognize the threat, it would already be too late for a preemptive strike. After the collapse of a U.S.-North Korean nuclear deal in 2002 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Pyongyang rushed a weapons program in secret and tested a device before other countries could organize a decisive response. Once a country has a bomb, their adversaries’ calculus shifts. An attack at that point is no longer preventative; it risks nuclear retaliation.
Both pathways require opacity, which Tehran had relinquished by agreeing to the JCPOA and trumpeting its nuclear progress once the United States had left the deal. The United States and Israel had the confidence to strike Iran’s nuclear program in 2025 and 2026 in part because they knew almost exactly what they were up against. Iran’s error wasn’t getting close to a bomb; it was in revealing too much about its capacities along the way.
NEW RULES
Iran wasted its conventional and proxy forces by treating them not as guardians of its nuclear program but as tools of offensive regional competition. Its network of partners that was supposed to make Iran too costly to strike had, by 2026, made it conspicuously vulnerable. The missile arsenal that was supposed to threaten devastating retaliation had been prematurely spent. All Iran had left was its latent nuclear program, but even that failed because the regime divulged details that should have been kept secret.
The failure of Iran’s deterrent invited a devastating regional war. Tehran wanted the benefits of a nuclear weapon without the actual weapon. It wanted the power of a regional proxy network without the discipline to husband it carefully. These contradictions compounded until the structure Iran had built for four decades gave way all at once.
The current war may end with an Iranian leadership in place that remains resolutely hostile to Israel and the United States. If such a regime decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will have likely learned to keep its nuclear activity under wraps and to disperse sensitive nuclear equipment and materials. It will have also probably concluded that remaining indefinitely at the nuclear threshold is more dangerous than crossing it. It therefore may create the conditions to rapidly build a nuclear weapon in secret: maintaining smaller stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, preserving centrifuge expertise, and developing the technical components required for weaponization in ways that are harder for inspectors and intelligence services to detect. Iran’s nuclear future may come to resemble that of North Korea’s after 2009, which was the year that inspectors were evicted from that country, never to return since.
For the United States, the lesson is a deeply uncomfortable one. Wars fought to prevent proliferation can end up accelerating it, by making the bomb look more valuable—and not just to the country being targeted. Governments watching the destruction of Iran will draw the same conclusion that North Korea did years ago: a nuclear weapon is essential to prevent an attack from the United States. The very transparency that nonproliferation agreements demand will come to look, in light of Iran’s fate, like an invitation to be targeted if the United States shifts course. Washington has not yet reckoned with the world made by its war on Iran, one in which the bomb looks more attractive than ever and would-be nuclear states understand the urgency of developing a weapon in secret.
51-Crack-down prevents an uprising
Margherita Stancati and Henna Moussavi, March 16, 2026, Wall Street Journal, Iran Unleashes New Crackdown on Its People to Head Off Uprising, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-unleashes-new-crackdown-on-its-people-to-head-off-uprising-e7785b1c
Iran’s rulers have unleashed a new crackdown against domestic dissent, arresting people suspected of collaborating with foreign entities and threatening would-be protesters with death to hold back the risk of an uprising. Iranian security forces have been battered by U.S. and Israeli attacks. Bombing raids have shattered the headquarters and command posts of Iran’s police, the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the plainclothes Basij militia. But Iranians say security forces are using fear to keep a tight grip on the streets. Armed men ride around on motorcycles brandishing their weapons to intimidate people, residents say, particularly at night, when city dwellers rarely leave their homes. The men, usually in plainclothes and with their faces covered, also have set up a network of security checkpoints around cities such as Tehran where they routinely stop and search cars. At least 500 people have been arrested since the start of the war, facing accusations that include sharing information with international media or with enemy forces with the purpose of helping them identify targets, Ahmad-Reza Radan, the commander of Iran’s police force, said Sunday on state television. Many were detained for taking photos or videos of sites hit by airstrikes. Others were accused of being monarchists, a reference to supporters of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, the most prominent opposition leader abroad. State-run media said 11 suspected monarchists resisted police and were killed. Among those detained were a mother and her teenage son who are accused of celebrating the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, according to Human Rights Activists in Iran, a U.S.-based group that monitors the country. An Israeli strike on Khamenei’s compound killed him in the opening salvo of the war. A message in Farsi sent to Iranians on a messaging app, threatening a “stronger blow” to “new ISIS” if street riots continue. A text message from the Revolutionary Guard warns rioters that they would face ‘a stronger blow than January 8.’ Several civil-society activists were also detained. Among them is Leila Mir Ghaffari, who had been detained several times before, including during the women’s rights protests of 2022, according to two activists familiar with her situation. “The system is messaging very clearly that any kind of dissent or mobilization at a popular level will not be tolerated,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House. “Iran is facing an existential crisis, and I think it’s very clear that they will use whatever means to suppress the internal dimension of the threat.” The crackdown reflects the pressure of a joint U.S.-Israeli air campaign that has repeatedly struck Iran’s internal security forces since the start of the war. The attacks are aimed at creating the conditions for an uprising that could topple the government. While the government has sent terrified protesters into hiding and faces no overt domestic challenge to its rule, it is showing signs of stress under the bombardment. Israeli forces have targeted the new checkpoints set up by the internal security forces. Four were hit in various parts of Tehran on March 11 alone, killing 10 Basij militants and other armed forces, according to the semiofficial Fars News Agency. A man in northern Iran said he recently saw members of the Revolutionary Guard at a local bakery. There were a dozen of them, fully armed and visibly tense even though they were just buying bread, he said. Regular police have all but disappeared from the streets of Tehran, adding to a sense of general insecurity, residents said. But the security forces are working to make their presence felt on the ground and over the airwaves. “I believe the regime still has the capacity to use force, but the scale and intensity of repression also reflect deep insecurity and a shrinking base of legitimacy,” said Omid Memarian, an Iran expert at DAWN, a Washington-based research and advocacy group. “Maintaining constant control becomes harder in wartime, because economic disruption, physical destruction and public anger accumulate simultaneously, and at some point they might explode.” Protesters in Tehran block a street at night while a car burns. A protest in Tehran in January. Middle East Images/AFP/Getty Images Security officials are threatening would-be protesters in television broadcasts and through text messages, saying there is a shoot-to-kill order in place. The Revolutionary Guard over the weekend sent a text message to mobile-phone users, a copy of which was viewed by The Wall Street Journal, warning rioters that they would face “a stronger blow than January 8”—a direct reference to the recent mass killings of antigovernment protesters that ended widespread unrest at the beginning of the year. Members of the Revolutionary Guard and of the plainclothes Basij militants were the main perpetrators of the violence, with nearly 7,000 demonstrators confirmed killed, according to Human Rights Activists in Iran. A near-total internet blackout, introduced when the war started, is still in place, making it difficult for people to stay informed and communicate, let alone mobilize. Internet connectivity has been further restricted since Sunday, according to NetBlocks, an independent organization that tracks internet flows. Advertisement Iranian authorities are hunting down users and suppliers of illegal Starlink terminals, which are used by Iranians to bypass the official restrictions. Police last week arrested a 37-year-old man accused of running an illegal Starlink sales network, according to the semiofficial Mehr News Agency. SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS What will it take to change the regime in Iran? Join the conversation below. Select pro-government users have long been allowed unfiltered internet access thanks to so-called white SIM cards. Fatemeh Mohajerani, a government spokeswoman, said last week an exception was made to allow internet access “for those who can amplify the country’s voice to the world.” The heavy security presence, the continued bombing and the prospect of renewed violence by the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, mean that many Tehran residents are too scared to leave their homes, let alone to rise up against the government. One civil-society activist in the city said the masked men controlling the streets clearly aren’t there to protect them. “That makes them scarier,” the person said.
50-US cannot end the Iran war; Iran won’t accept
Swanson, March 17, 2026, [NATE SWANSON is a Resident Senior Fellow and Director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council. He served as Director for Iran at the National Security Council between 2022 and 2025. In the spring and summer of 2025, he served on the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, How America’s War on Iran Backfired Tehran Will Now Set the Terms for Peace, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-americas-war-iran-backfired]
Iran’s economic woes are in large part the consequence of a foreign policy designed to counter U.S. interests. When faced with popular discontent, Khamenei consistently resisted reforms and resorted to violence to repress his people—most notably in January, when his regime murdered thousands of its citizens. But he clearly prepared Iran for this moment. Confronted with a truly existential threat, Iran has mounted a much more deliberate, decentralized, and effective response than many expected, striking not only Israeli territory and U.S. diplomatic and military installations but also civilian targets throughout the Persian Gulf, including airports, hotels, and energy infrastructure. Trump likely wants to declare victory soon. The Iranian military has been severely degraded. Israel may be running low on missile interceptors, and keeping global markets stable will require reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has declared closed to its enemies. But he cannot force surrender on a government that refuses it. Even after the heavy damage to Iran’s military, the regime that Khamenei put in place has powerful incentives to pursue continued conflict, and it retains a variety of tools to sustain a war of attrition. The war is thus barreling toward an inflection point at which all the potential options are bad. To agree to a cease-fire, Tehran will almost certainly demand assurances that the United States will constrain future Israeli strikes on Iran, Trump retains substantial leverage over Netanyahu because of Israel’s dependence on U.S. military assistance, but it is still a huge ask. Very soon, the U.S. president will face a choice between doubling down on an unpopular war or, to end it, wresting a concession from Israel that Iran could frame as a triumph. Despite the tactical brilliance of its joint offensive with Israel, strategic success remains elusive for the United States. Trump went to war against a country of 92 million people with no clear plan for what would happen after the guns fell silent. He initially declared that victory would be achieved if the Iranian people rose up and dismantled the Islamic Republic themselves—an extraordinary and unrealistic request. The regime’s horrific crackdown in January produced no meaningful defections from the regime or security services, and government leaders have already shown they are willing to kill as many of their own people as needed to stay in power. In 2023, while serving as Iran director at the National Security Council, I attended a diplomatic meeting with an Iranian official in the aftermath of a major protest. Surprisingly, the official acknowledged strong opposition to the Islamic Republic. Yet he cautioned that the United States failed to understand that an equal number of Iranians were prepared to die for the regime and pointed out that most Iranians just wanted a better day-to-day life. Although he didn’t break it down into numbers, I began thinking of this as the 20-20-60 ratio. Twenty percent of Iranians are dedicated to the downfall of the Islamic Republic, 20 to its preservation, and the remainder to a better life. I long assumed that after Khamenei died, the Iranians who wanted a better life would join forces with those strongly opposed to the Islamic Republic and force the country’s leaders down a different path than the one the supreme leader had charted. But the bitter irony is that the U.S. and Israeli approach to the recent war afforded Khamenei a martyr’s death—a gift to the regime, as it diverted attention away from the Islamic Republic’s failures. It elevated Khamenei’s hard-line son and turned much of the nation’s focus toward surviving an external assault. All these outcomes only marginalize the silent majority of Iranians who just want a measure of well-being. Moving forward, Iran does not need to score major military successes every day. The regime only needs to inflict enough periodic damage to keep regional partners, markets, and the American public jittery. Despite catastrophic damage to the Iranian navy and other branches of the military, periodic drone attacks on tankers attempting to traverse the Strait of Hormuz are probably enough to keep traffic snarled in a shipping channel responsible for a fifth of global oil supply. There are, of course, huge risks to this strategy. It could unite the Gulf countries against Tehran and invite further escalation. Iran must also hold some offensive capabilities in reserve. This may be why it has not asked for more of the Houthis in Yemen, undertaken broad cyberattacks, or mounted acts of terrorism on U.S. interests outside the Middle East. But Khamenei obviously gambled that even if he died, his regime could handle more losses than the United States or the Gulf states could. SCYLLA AND CHARIBDIS Although the parallel is imperfect, Israel’s current tactics and objective appear to resemble the ones that undergirded its 2024 campaign to neuter Hezbollah in Lebanon. That effort included a series of decapitation strikes on Hezbollah’s leadership and a swift degradation of the militia’s ability to pressure Israel. Israel parlayed those tactical gains into a status quo that allowed it to periodically “mow the grass,” continuing to strike the organization as needed with few repercussions. Israeli leaders understand that Trump may seek to end this particular conflict speedily, but they will not be content in the long term with a cease-fire that largely leaves the Islamic Republic in place. It will be only a matter of time before they attempt to reinitiate conflict and further weaken Iran. Trump appears more focused on burnishing his legacy than on any specific objective. His references to his “little excursion” in Iran echo a boast in 1898 by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay that his country’s four-month conflict with Spain had been a “splendid little war” that demonstrated American power and glory. At some point, the toll on the U.S. arsenal and the global economy will demand that Trump bring the show to a close. Keen to avoid Hezbollah’s fate, however, the Islamic Republic is not seeking an off-ramp. Iranian leaders want to extend the war as long as possible and make the U.S. president less eager for a future conflict. Trump could continue to prosecute the war in Iran by persisting with his devastating aerial campaign. But this is already yielding diminishing returns, given that the U.S. military has already struck most of its targets. The alternative is to put American boots on the ground. That comes with awful risks and is precisely what Trump, as a presidential candidate, repeatedly pledged never to do. But it may be the only way to ensure an Iranian regime more amenable to his demands. Trump may also consider smaller, more targeted operations related to maritime security or Iran’s nuclear program. But these, too, would pose significant risks to American soldiers and likely prompt retaliation—and there is little chance that they would lead to Iran’s capitulation. The Islamic Republic is keen to avoid Hezbollah’s fate. Alternatively, Trump could outsource the war by arming political or ethnic factions that oppose the regime in Tehran. That would be a recipe for disaster: mobilizing the Kurds or any other ethnic separatist group would keep many anti-regime Iranians at home and fragment the opposition. Such a move could result in the deaths of a few more Iranian soldiers, but it would be highly unlikely to meaningfully diminish the regime’s ability to repress internal dissent. It would also risk exacerbating regional conflict and driving mass migration. That leaves one option: try to achieve a formal cease-fire. Theoretically, of course, Trump could simply declare that the degradation of Iran’s military and the killing of Khamenei constitute victory and walk away. But this is harder than it sounds. He cannot unilaterally stop Tehran from attacking U.S. assets or the Gulf states. Iran would rather fight a protracted war with the United States now than repeated wars with Israel in the coming years. Even if the United States unilaterally withdraws from the fight, if a future Iran-Israel conflict looks inevitable, Iran will likely continue targeting U.S. interests in the region as well as the Gulf states and energy infrastructure. Iran’s strategic objective now is to impose such high costs on the United States and the Gulf states that Trump will opt for a cease-fire that includes a restriction on future Israeli actions. In essence, Iran wants to force him to choose between Israel’s security interests and the stability of global markets. The bottom line is that the war Trump started has no good ending. And every day it goes on seems to delay a better future for the Iranian people. This is a tragedy that only Khamenei and Trump, together, could engineer.
49–Silicon Military Industrial Complex driving overseas deployments and war
Silverman, March 17, 2026, Jacob Silverman is a contributing writer for Business Insider. He is the author, most recently, of “Gilded Rage: Elon Musk and the Radicalization of Silicon Valley.” Business Insider, Keyboard warriors Alex Karp, Palantirianism, and the tech industry’s embrace of total war, https://www.businessinsider.com/palantir-guide-stopping-world-war-iii-karp-book-review-2026-3
Last July, four high-ranking tech executives — all of them involved with artificial intelligence — were sworn into the US Army Reserves with the rank of lieutenant colonel. They were part of a new unit called Detachment 201, also known as the Executive Innovation Corps. The Pentagon has introduced many initiatives to deepen relationships with Silicon Valley. But making officers out of multimillionaire executives with no military experience served as a strong symbol of a new era in which venture capitalists and technologists see themselves as essential to the defense of the nation.
The tech industry, which once prided itself on its libertarian- and counterculture-inflected antiwar ideals, has emphatically re-enlisted in the American military project. Drawn by patriotism and lucrative government contracts, numerous tech companies — from established giants like Google and SpaceX to military-minded startups in Southern California — have started working for the defense establishment, from supplying the Department of Homeland Security to building AI-powered drones and autonomous weapons to be used in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran. Anduril, a leading munitions startup, just announced a Pentagon contract that may be worth up to $20 billion.
No company has driven tech’s transformation from keyboard to warrior like Palantir, a data and analytics firm cofounded by Peter Thiel, which has a current market cap of $360 billion. Palantir’s financial network and its alumni are responsible for bringing numerous defense-tech startups into being. And it helped brush away the tech industry’s reticence to be involved in war-making.
Now, a growing canon of books by and about Palantirians is helping to crystallize, and proselytize, tech’s new hawkishness. Last year, Karp and his Palantir colleague Nicholas W. Zamiska published “The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West,” which outlined their austere vision for a militarized republic secured by Silicon Valley technologies and led by highly skilled engineers. Last fall, New York Times Magazine contributor Michael Steinberger published an authorized biography, “The Philosopher in the Valley: Alex Karp, Palantir, and the Rise of the Surveillance State.” Now, Shyam Sankar, Palantir’s chief technology officer and one of the four techies-turned-officers, has published “Mobilize: How to Reboot the American Industrial Base and Stop World War III.” Cowritten with his colleague Madeline Hart, “Mobilize” claims that the US government needs to urgently boost military production — with the help of Silicon Valley — in order to head off a conflict with China, which the authors think will attempt to capture Taiwan in 2027.
From these books, and from a battery of public statements by Karp and his cofounders, a distinctive worldview emerges — an unapologetically nationalistic attitude that has total contempt for one’s enemies in politics and business and that sees constant, world-rending conflict in our future. This belief system was developed by a group of people who exhibit a profound wish to live in interesting times, to be the shield defending America in a world of constant threats. You might call it Palantirianism.
“Mobilize: How to Reboot the American Industrial Base and Stop World War III,” by Shyam Sankar and Madeline Hart
Birthed from the 20-year-long global war on terror, which coincided with the tech boom, Palantirianism holds that America’s adversaries don’t negotiate for peace. They surrender entirely — or, as Karp has said, they will be too “scared” to challenge the US in the first place because they fear immediate destruction. Palantirians’ catchword is “deterrence” — derived not from fear of mutual nuclear annihilation or diplomacy but by developing overwhelming AI-based firepower. “The preconditions for a durable peace often come only from a credible threat of war,” Karp writes in “The Technological Republic.”
Under Palantirianism, the military-industrial complex that President Dwight Eisenhower famously warned about is good for the world — but it would be far better with the tech industry’s participation and leadership. “Eisenhower wasn’t warning about the existence of the military-industrial complex; he was warning about its potential for undue influence, a distinction often lost,” write Sankar and Hart. In their view, bringing together Silicon Valley and the Pentagon is not a step toward undue influence for America’s tech billionaires. It’s exactly what the country requires: “American capitalism and the American military need each other,” they write. “Reuniting the American industrial base, commercial and defense, is an existential issue.”
Palantirians see securing American military hegemony as the national priority. Karp, who once called himself a “neo-Marxist” and a Democratic Party supporter before drifting rightward, told his biographer that national security is the only issue that matters to him, and that the tech industry’s workers should devote themselves to the same. “A generation of programmers remains ready to dedicate their working lives to sating the needs of capitalist culture, and to enrich itself, but declines to ask more fundamental questions about what ought to be built and for what purpose,” he writes. The answer for Karp, the high priest of Palantirianism, is obvious: What ought to be built is what makes people safer. What makes people safer is empowering the military, police, and intelligence services. That is his vision of the common good.
His vision is now transforming the tech industry, the military, and how we look at national security. “We have made the mistake of allowing a technocratic ruling class to form and take hold in this country without asking for anything quite substantial in return. What should the public demand for abandoning the threat of revolt?” Karp writes, sounding like the Marxist of his youth. “Free email is not enough.”
Palantir grew out of a program at PayPal — where Thiel was CEO — to fight financial fraud in its system. The company itself was later founded in 2003 with an explicit mission: defending the West, which its founders see as imperiled. “A moment of reckoning has arrived for the West,” Karp writes early in his book. It’s not always clear what those threats are (or even what constitutes “the West”). In the conservative tech mogul’s imaginarium, wokeness and DEI seem to be as dangerous to the American public as a revanchist Russia. Karp frequently refers to an organized “assault on religion,” without elaborating except to say that it “left us vulnerable as a society.”
With seed money from the CIA’s In-Q-Tel venture capital firm — which the agency established to help incubate national-security startups — Palantir slowly grew to become the go-to analytics platform for much of the military and intelligence establishment. It wasn’t an easy ride: The company was in the red for more than 20 years, and it sued the US Army, claiming that it had boxed out Palantir by violating its own procurement rules. Palantir won the lawsuit, cultivated numerous government and military insiders (who were sometimes given its software for free), and now runs a software platform, known as Project Maven, that’s used across the US military and NATO. It has other software tools that have been used by corporations, police departments, hospitals, and the federal government when it was tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.
Peter Thiel
Karp met his Palantir cofounder Peter Thiel when the two were disenchanted students at Stanford Law School.
Maven started as software to analyze drone video feeds, with a $10 million contract going to Google. After Google employees protested working for the Pentagon and Google dropped the project, Palantir, working alongside other tech companies, picked it up and ran with it. Maven eventually became “an all-purpose AI operating system” integrating vast data sources into a dashboard that intelligence analysts have said makes their work much easier, even saving lives in the field. Maven is now used in conjunction with other systems, such as Anthropic’s Claude chatbot, which sits on top of Palantir’s platform. The Washington Post reported that Claude was used to rapidly generate thousands of targets for the ongoing US-Israeli bombing campaign in Iran. The US military is investigating whether AI was used to target the bombing of a school that killed at least 100 Iranian children. In a sign of how Maven has the potential to take humans out of the loop, Sankar and Hart note in their book that “machine-to-machine connections were enabled to allow Maven to communicate with weapons systems and send confirmed targets directly to artillery.”
With its martial mission, Palantir isn’t like many software companies. Most employees have one of three job titles: deployment strategist, product development engineer, or forward-deployed engineer. The latter group is software engineers sent to work directly with clients — whether in Manhattan or Kabul — to customize Palantir’s tools and troubleshoot on the fly.
Karp calls himself “a fluorescent praying mantis.”
Leading this motley “artists colony” is Karp, who has a Ph.D. from Goethe University, enjoys cross-country skiing with his Norwegian ex-commando bodyguards, practices tai chi, and retains four Austrian assistants with whom he speaks in German. An ex-Israeli intelligence officer serves as “a kind of fixer” for Karp, who describes to his biographer a lifelong feeling of personal vulnerability.
Karp once had a policy of never spending more than $1 million for a home; that was before he received a $1.1 billion pay package in 2020. Now he owns a private jet and lavish properties all over the country, most of them in ski areas. Recently, he spent $120 million on a Benedictine monastery in Colorado.
He calls himself “a fluorescent praying mantis.” With his many-limbed mannerisms and braggadocious quips, Karp has turned himself into a mascot for Palantir’s culture. “Always energetic and upbeat around the office,” he’s known for launching into impromptu talks with employees that become an “orgy of free association,” Steinberger writes. He can be “a little bit incoherent,” but also exhibits “crazy charisma.”
In public, his mad-mogul image can play well, generating viral clips of his vows to drone enemies with “fentanyl-laced urine.” TV producers began to love him because “he was reliably unfiltered, thanks in part to his practice of getting hopped-up on Mexican Coke beforehand.”
The son of a white Jewish father and a Black mother, Karp’s identity has been a core throughline in his life and career. As a child, Karp was bullied at school, contributing to a sense of fear and personal instability.
“You’re a racially amorphous, far-left Jewish kid who’s also dyslexic — would you not come up with the idea that you’re fucked?” Karp says to Steinberger. In this context, Karp’s sense of identity was hopelessly complicated and a potential social liability.
One of Karp’s close friends from college said, “He was much more of a Black man then than he is now.”
Karp didn’t tell his Palantir colleagues that he was Black until 2019, but he presented differently in his youth. He went to college at Haverford, where he “was active in black student affairs, and his social life mainly revolved around Haverford’s black community,” Steinberger writes. He organized a conference at Yale about racism on college campuses and wore a Palestinian keffiyeh in a yearbook photo. One of his close friends from the time said, “He was much more of a Black man then than he is now.”
After college, Karp enrolled at Stanford Law School, which he almost immediately regarded as a mistake. He became friends with another disenchanted classmate, Thiel, who at the time was already a deeply ideological veteran of campus culture wars.
After Stanford, Karp moved to Germany to pursue a doctorate in sociology at Goethe University. Karp would later say that Jurgen Habermas, one of Germany’s postwar intellectual giants, was for a time his dissertation advisor, which Habermas has denied. According to letters examined by Steinberger, Habermas tried to steer Karp toward an English-language degree in another subject. “Your topic would require a literary approach to a topic that often overwhelms the linguistic sensibility of us native speakers — and yours, you won’t blame me, even more so,” Habermas wrote to Karp.
Karp didn’t listen. He went on to finish his dissertation — an examination of how aggression is used as a tool of social integration — which he wrote in German under the supervision of Karola Brede, who had previously studied under Habermas. With Brede, Karp cowrote an academic article — the only one he published — a consideration of “eliminationist” anti-Semitism and Daniel Goldhagen’s book “Hitler’s Willing Executioners.”
In the years since, Karp has embraced his Jewishness while expressing reluctance to claim his Black identity. The story of his parents’ relationship became for him a kind of cautionary tale of how identity politics run amok.
“My father wanted to marry a Black woman,” says Ben Karp, Alex’s brother. “Dating Leah was a powerful way of signaling his progressivism,” Steinberger notes. Leah Jaynes liked that Bob Karp was Jewish, and Karp liked that she was Black. They eventually divorced, after which Bob Karp remarried and adopted biracial children. Bob’s new family didn’t sit well with his sons. “Alex’s realization, years later, that racial and ethnic identity had been foundational to his parents’ relationship was part of the reason he developed a visceral dislike of identity politics,” writes Steinberger. “He felt as if he had been the product of virtue signaling, and it bothered him.”
Steinberger depicts Karp’s personal reckoning over his parentage as part of what moved him to the right. In 2015, he told company employees that he didn’t like Trump. According to “The Philosopher in the Valley,” Karp once told a friend that he wouldn’t mind pushing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu out of a helicopter. The company has gone on to work for ICE and other government agencies executing hardline Trump policies.
Two global events contributed to Karp’s political metamorphosis: COVID and Hamas’ attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. During the pandemic, Karp stocked up on canned food and bullets, and loved his time in isolation. “While the pandemic was wretched for most people, Karp found it blissful,” writes Steinberger. Plenty of time for cross-country skiing.
After Palantir returned from remote work, Karp’s proclamations became more extreme. He started calling Palantir “a prepper company” and reveling in its role in doling out violence to enemies of the West.
Oct. 7 reanimated Karp’s sense of personal vulnerability and his commitment to Israel. Having once celebrated the virtues of debate with his friend and political opposite Peter Thiel, he told Palantirians that the company wouldn’t tolerate any disagreement over its work for the country. Palantir took out a full page ad in The New York Times declaring, “Palantir Stands With Israel.”
Under Karp’s never-apologize-never-explain leadership, Palantir has become a leading bogeyman for opponents of the surveillance state. New York City is now speckled with posters denouncing the company as the “enemy.” Former Treasury Secretary Robert Reich recently called Palantir “America’s most dangerous corporation.”
The truth is more tangled. By its own claim, Palantir proudly stands for American militarism, abets the surveillance state, and has catalyzed a shift in the tech industry toward supporting the security services. But influential as Palantir is, the company makes software — tools to implement government policy. It does not directly collect data or conduct surveillance. It sucks up that information from clients, including authoritarian states, making the job of war-making or repression potentially much easier. There are numerous firms beyond Palantir — including the big five “prime” defense contractors — engaged in this kind of work.
Palantirianism — a belief system that is now being spread through venture capital investments in startups like Anduril, Saronic, and Shield AI, and tech’s close alliance with the Trump administration — is far more influential than Palantir itself. People “want to know they are safe, and safe means that the other person is scared,” Karp said at an appearance at the Ronald Reagan Defense Forum. This is the simple core belief that now animates the defense tech industry and swaths of the Silicon Valley elite. (Elon Musk is a Karp fan.)
By 2025, Karp was writing in shareholder letters that the West owed its success to its primacy at “applying organized violence” — a notion of which he evidently approved. He started talking about how certain cultures were “regressive and harmful” compared to others.
“We have been building products for a world that is violent, disjointed, and irrational, a world in which you have to show strength,” Karp said during an earnings call. People “have to pick sides.” Some people “are violent and not conformant with morality.”
For many years, Karp said that fascism was his greatest fear. He wanted nothing more than to stem the rise of the far right in America. Yet Karp‘s company has provided direct assistance to what many observers have described as the most authoritarian president in US history. He did all this with the help of his close friend Peter Thiel, Palantir’s chairman, an early Trump supporter who decades ago said that he had tired of electoral democracy. Steinberger summed up the contradiction: “With Trump restored to power, it appeared that authoritarianism had triumphed in the United States and that Palantir, which Karp had always touted as a bulwark of the liberal international order, would henceforth be serving the agenda of a president who was contemptuous of America’s political tradition.”
Although Karp has matured, in his biographer’s view, into a “statesman CEO,” he is still driven by spleen. Throughout “The Philosopher in the Valley,” he repeatedly complains that his college alma mater hasn’t invited him to give a speech or cultivated him as a donor. Karp seems to detests Haverford with a similar passion that he applies to terrorists and student protesters. “I eventually came to realize that he needed enemies,” Steinberger writes of Karp. That need, it turns out, has implications for us all.
48-US deploying ground troops into Iran
John Michael Raasch, March 17, 2026, The Daily Mail, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15654729/trump-not-afraid-ground-combat-iran.html
President Donald Trump said Tuesday he is ‘not afraid’ to deploy US ground troops within Iran, further emphasizing the lengths he is willing to go in his Middle East war. Speaking from the Oval Office alongside Ireland’s Taoiseach, Micheal Martin, the President fielded many questions about the Iran war. ‘Are you afraid that if you put boots on the ground in Iran, it could be another Vietnam?’ one reporter asked. ‘No,’ Trump shot back, adding, ‘I’m not afraid of anything.’ The President has previously said that he would deploy ground troops if ‘necessary,’ but he has offered few details on what scenario would prompt a boots-on-the-ground invasion. He also said during the sit-down with the Taoiseach that the US has contemplated destroying Iran’s energy infrastructure. ‘We could take out their electric capacity in one hour,’ he said, adding, ‘there’s nothing they can do.’ Though the President said the war should only last weeks, there is concern among administration officials that the offensive could last much longer. Donald Trump with Ireland’s Taoiseach Micheal Martin on Tuesday. The President has said he is ‘not afraid’ of anything, even sending ground troops to Iran in a Vietnam War-style invasion It comes as Director of the United States National Counterterrorism Center Joe Kent resigned on Tuesday over frustration with the Iran war + It comes as Director of the United States National Counterterrorism Center Joe Kent resigned on Tuesday over frustration with the Iran war Three sources familiar with the matter told Axios that the Middle East could run into September, a much longer timeline than Trump has ever discussed publicly. The President was also confronted about the news that his top counterterrorism official, Joe Kent, resigned over the war. ‘I always thought he was a nice guy, but I thought he was very weak on security. Very weak on security. I didn’t know him well, but I thought he seemed like a pretty nice guy,’ Trump said. ‘But when I read his statement, I realized that it’s a good thing that he’s out, because he said Iran was not a threat.’ Kent resigned early on Tuesday and published a letter publicly noting how he ‘cannot in good conscience support the ongoing war in Iran.’ ‘Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby,’ Kent said in his dramatic public break-up with the administration. Evidence that the US is considering a ground invasion in Iran is mounting. Last week, the military ordered 2,000 US Marines and their equipment, along with several Naval vessels, to be deployed to the Middle East from the South Pacific near the Philippines. The Marines and Sailors aboard the USS Tripoli and USS New Orleans, along with the supporting Navy vessels, are a part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that is close to 5,000 service members in total. The ARG’s primary objective is to land Marines in coastal environments using aircraft and landing vessels. The USS Tripoli also maintains an arsenal of aircraft, like F-35 fighter jets and attack and transport helicopters, to ferry troops and project power. It is estimated that the ARG will arrive in the Middle East ten to 15 days from its initial deployment late last week, meaning the force should arrive near Iran at the end of this month. Concerns about sending US troops to Iran have been rippling around Capitol Hill. ‘We seem to be on a path toward deploying American troops on the ground in Iran to accomplish any of the potential objectives here,’ Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut said last week after a classified briefing from military officials. ‘So the American people deserve to know much more than this administration has told them about the cost of the war, the danger to our sons and daughters in uniform and the potential for further escalation and widening of this war,’ the Democrat added. Americans are against sending in troops, too, according to the latest Quinnipiac survey of 1,000 US voters published March 9. The results showed that 74 percent of respondents oppose sending ground troops into Iran. A majority, 53 percent, said they are against the war altogether.
47-US-allied relationships collapsing
Danny Kemp, March 16, 2026, Yahoo News, Trump faces coalition of the unwilling on Iran, https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/trump-faces-coalition-unwilling-iran-013250250.html
President Donald Trump spent his first year back in power disparaging US allies. Now he wants them to help America in the Iran war — and they are none too enthusiastic. From tariffs to insults and threatening to invade Greenland, Trump has rarely missed an opportunity in recent months to criticize America’s partners. Yet now the 79-year-old Republican has said he expects the same allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz to oil traffic and reacted angrily when they rebuffed him. “It’s an extraordinary demand,” said Philip Gordon, the former national security advisor to vice president Kamala Harris and now an academic at the Brookings Institution. Trending on Yahoo 100 See full list U.S. seeks coalition for Strait of Hormuz Trump presses NATO, China, and other partners to join a security mission for the oil-rich Strait of Hormuz after Iran blocks shipping, but key allies including Europe and Australia decline. The closure drives up global energy prices, sparking concern among U.S. officials. AFP Associated Press Finance Bloomberg Covered by 12 sources AFP AFP Strikes shake Tehran as Trump presses allies to help in Mideast war “To justify risking people’s lives, not only for that operation, but for a president who has done nothing but insult and berate you for the last 15 months, that’s probably a bridge too far,” Gordon told AFP. Trump has warned that the NATO alliance could be at risk if it fails to step up to unblock the strategic waterway, saying other countries get most of their oil supply through it and must contribute. But while he insisted Monday that “we don’t need anybody” to clear the straits, he also thundered that US allies from Europe to Asia owe Washington for giving them decades of protection. Trump has also hit out at China for failing to help. – ‘Layers of irony’ – In foreign capitals there has been deep skepticism over getting involved in a war Trump did not consult them on, yet which has caused major disruption to their economies. More in Politics Musk says taxing every billionaire at 100% would barely make a dent in the national debt. Bernie says tax them 5% and you’re $3,000 richer Their reluctance has been compounded by Trump’s repeated tongue-lashings since returning to office. Trump has slapped tariffs on allies, berated NATO members over their defense spending and support for Ukraine, and unveiled a national security strategy that prioritized boosting pro-Trump parties in Europe. He has disparaged the contributions of nations whose soldiers fought and died alongside US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan — and claimed that America won World War II by itself. And just weeks ago came Trump’s threats to invade Greenland, which prompted an unprecedented display of unity behind fellow NATO member Denmark that forced Trump to back down. “There are several layers of irony,” remarked Erwan Lagadec of George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Lagadec said the United States had “launched a war without consulting allies, expecting them to mop up the mess, and that’s not going fly.” NATO would also unlikely be in a position, or achieve consensus, to launch any major mission in the Strait of Hormuz, Lagadec added. – ‘Bullying and blackmail’ – Before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, then-president George W. Bush spent months building up what he called a “coalition of the willing” of more than 40 countries to back the United States. But Trump, whose criticism of the Iraq war and other US quagmires was a centerpiece of his “America First” policy, failed to construct any similar alliance for a war he believed would be over soon. European nations already struggling to deal with Ukraine and their own economies have very practical concerns about getting involved now in Iran, said Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations. “It is not payback, but just very real constraints and policy trade-offs,” Fix told AFP. But while US allies will still be wary of irking Trump over Hormuz, they may also choose to show that they can no longer be pushed around. “If they do go along with him, his experience will be that bullying and blackmail work. That’s been his experience for the whole first year, and then Greenland put a stop to it,” said Gordon, who was also a special assistant to president Barack Obama. “Now the chickens are coming home to roost.”
46-US can’t end the war; Iran will still be aggressive
Megan Messerly, March 17, 2026, Politico, ‘They hold the cards now’: Trump allies fear Iran is slipping beyond the president’s control, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/17/they-hold-the-cards-now-trump-allies-fear-iran-is-slipping-beyond-the-presidents-control-00830449
When the U.S. started firing Tomahawk missiles at Iran late last month, many of President Donald Trump’s allies hoped it would be a quick, surgical operation, similar to last year’s strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities or the ouster of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro in January. Though uneasy, they were reassured by the belief that Trump’s open-ended objectives gave him the flexibility to declare victory whenever he saw fit. Now, more than two weeks into the campaign, some of those allies believe the president no longer controls how, or when, the war ends. They fear Iran’s attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, which have rattled global crude markets and threaten broader economic distress, are boxing Trump into a situation where escalating the conflict — potentially even putting American boots on the ground — becomes the only way to credibly claim victory. “We clearly just kicked [Iran’s] ass in the field, but, to a large extent, they hold the cards now,” said one person close to the White House, who like others in this story was granted anonymity to speak candidly about the war. “They decide how long we’re involved — and they decide if we put boots on the ground. And it doesn’t seem to me that there’s a way around that, if we want to save face.” The concern among some Trump allies is that ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz could require securing parts of Iran’s shoreline, a step that would almost certainly mean putting American troops on Iranian soil. “The terms have changed,” said a second person familiar with the U.S. operation in Iran. “The off-ramps don’t work anymore because Iran is driving the asymmetric action.” The dynamic is fueling anxiety among the president’s “America First” allies, who worry he is drifting toward the kind of open-ended Middle East conflict he has long railed against. With Iran able to disrupt global oil supplies and drive up gas prices at the pump, some Republicans fear the conflict could soon become a political liability for a White House already grappling with voter frustration over affordability ahead of the midterm elections. Oil prices have surged since the conflict began, increasing from less than $70 per barrel to roughly $100 per barrel, while the national average price for gasoline has climbed to $3.70, up about 25 percent from a month ago, according to AAA. “For the White House, now the only easy day was yesterday,” the person familiar added. “They need to worry about an unraveling.” White House aides continue to argue the war is not just going as planned but is a “tremendous success,” with Iranian ballistic missile attacks down 90 percent and drone attacks down 95 percent. The operation, they say, will continue until the president determines his goals have been achieved. “Thanks to a detailed planning process, the entire administration is and was prepared for any potential action taken by the terrorist Iranian regime,” said White House spokesperson Anna Kelly. “President Trump knew full well that Iran would try to stop the freedom of navigation and free flow of energy, and he has already taken action to destroy over 30 minelaying vessels.” “The president has also been clear that any disruptions to energy are temporary and will result in a massive benefit to our country and the global economy in the long-term,” she added. The allies’ concerns have only been heightened by the U.S. moving additional forces into the region, including the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, which is carrying the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. The deployment places roughly 2,000 Marines and their aircraft within striking distance of the war, capable of seizing ports, protecting shipping lanes and launching limited ground operations. In recent days, Trump has oscillated on the war’s trajectory, at times suggesting the fighting could end soon while also warning that the U.S. is prepared to escalate if Iran continues targeting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices fell below $95 per barrel on Monday as Trump said he would soon announce which countries have agreed to help secure the strait. Some of Trump’s most vocal “America First” allies are urging the White House not to rush toward a ground war, arguing the U.S. still has multiple ways to pressure Iran without sending troops ashore. Still, they acknowledge that the president’s alternatives narrow with each additional escalatory step the U.S. takes. The campaign has so far focused on air and missile strikes targeting Iranian military facilities and leaders, a strategy designed to weaken Tehran’s ability to retaliate without committing large numbers of American troops. Trump ally Jack Posobiec, appearing on former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon’s show Monday morning, listed a series of ways in which the U.S. could still ratchet up pressure without ground troops — by stopping oil tankers, launching cyberattacks, targeting Iranian financial assets and leaning on allied navies, like Israel’s. “This also increases the level of escalation, but doesn’t necessarily require boots on the ground,” Posobiec said. “There are people who are deeply and seriously agitating … for the president to put boots on the ground because they realize once he has done so that the mission creep will be so far in that this then could explode into a full-fledged war, and they deeply want that.” Iran’s strategy has centered on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil shipments. With its conventional forces taking heavy hits, Tehran has leaned into a tactic military planners have long feared, threatening commercial shipping through one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. Some Trump allies say the scale of the U.S.’s opening strikes — which killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with dozens of senior commanders and members of his family — may make it harder for the regime to back down. “You’ve killed one guy, the next guy up is even more radical. You killed his dad and his wife,” said a third person close to the White House, referring to Iran’s new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late leader. “Do you think he’s gonna be more — or less — reasonable?” The person added that putting boots on the ground isn’t Trump’s “instinct” — and suggested doing so would tank Trump’s approval ratings to those of former President Richard Nixon after the Watergate scandal. Trump’s approval rating is hovering around 40 percent, down from above 50 percent at the start of his term; Nixon’s approval rating when he resigned was about 25 percent. “He’s seen that story before,” the person said, “and I think he knows how that plays out politically.”\
45-Iran puts US leadership at the brink. A loss of credibility and security guarantees collapses US global leadership
Kashif Hasan Khan, March 14, 2026, Asia Times, Iran may be where the US-led world order ends, https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/iran-may-be-where-the-us-led-world-order-ends/
Donald Trump could usher in the end of US global dominance. In his monumental work “The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”, historian Edward Gibbon argued that empires rarely collapse suddenly. Their decline is usually gradual, shaped by long-term structural changes. Yet, history occasionally records moments when a single strategic miscalculation accelerates the process. The question worth asking is whether the United States may have approached such a moment. The joint US–Israeli strike against Iran in February 2026 has triggered intense debate among scholars and policy observers. Military conflicts in West Asia are not unusual, but this particular episode may carry consequences far beyond the immediate battlefield. Some analysts have drawn parallels with the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Britain and France attempted to seize the Suez Canal after Egypt nationalized it. Although the operation initially succeeded militarily, it collapsed politically after the US forced its European allies to withdraw. The crisis revealed that Britain could no longer act as an independent global power and symbolized the end of its imperial dominance. Today, Iran strike could represent a comparable geopolitical inflection point. For more than seven decades, the US has anchored the global order, not only through military power but also through institutions, rules, and economic arrangements that have structured the post–Second World War international system. Many countries, including emerging powers, expanded economically within this framework. China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse and Russia’s growing integration into global markets both occurred largely within an economic system shaped by American leadership. The legitimacy of US leadership, therefore, rested not only on strength but on the perception that the system it created produced stability and shared economic benefits. Nowhere was this arrangement more strategically important than in West Asia. Foundations of US leadership in West Asia West Asia has long been one of the most volatile regions in global politics. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, recurring conflicts between Israel and Arab states, along with sectarian rivalries and civil wars, have produced persistent instability. Yet the region also possesses vast oil reserves, making its political stability essential to the functioning of the global economy. To manage this strategic environment, the US developed a security and energy framework that became central to its global influence. Beginning in the 1970s, Washington offered security guarantees to Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. In return, these states agreed to price and trade oil primarily in US dollars. This arrangement, commonly known as the petrodollar system, reinforced the central role of the US dollar in global finance while ensuring reliable energy supplies. The relationship functioned as a strategic bargain. Gulf states received security protection in a region marked by geopolitical rivalry, while the United States secured both energy stability and financial influence Over time, this arrangement helped sustain economic development across the Gulf and strengthened Washington’s position as the primary external power shaping regional security. Iran, however, has long stood outside this system. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between Tehran and Washington deteriorated sharply. Iran positioned itself as a challenger to US influence and developed networks of regional alliances with actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. These relationships deepened tensions across the region and reinforced the reliance of Gulf monarchies on US security guarantees. For decades, American strategy in West Asia rested on three pillars: containing Iran, maintaining the petrodollar system and guaranteeing the security of Gulf partners. This framework allowed Washington to shape regional dynamics while sustaining its broader global leadership. Why the regional order may be fracturing Recent developments, however, suggest that the foundations of this system are weakening. The February 2026 strike on Iran has raised serious questions about both the credibility and sustainability of US leadership in the region. One major concern relates to diplomatic trust. Reports indicate that negotiations between the US and Iran were ongoing in Oman when the first strike occurred. Launching a military attack during diplomatic engagement risks undermining confidence in negotiation processes. In international diplomacy, credibility remains a crucial resource, even among strategic rivals. The legitimacy of the operation has also been widely debated. The strike reportedly lacked formal authorization from the US Congress and did not receive approval from the United Nations Security Council. Actions that bypass established international mechanisms inevitably raise questions about the rules governing the use of force and the consistency of the international order. More importantly, the regional consequences have highlighted growing vulnerabilities. Iran’s retaliatory actions have targeted infrastructure and strategic locations associated with Gulf states. For these governments, the episode raises a fundamental question: if the US cannot shield them from regional escalation, can it still serve as a reliable security guarantor? These concerns have been developing gradually. In recent years, Gulf states have increasingly diversified their strategic relationships. China’s expanding economic presence in the region has created alternative partnerships that were previously limited. Through large-scale investments, infrastructure projects and energy cooperation, Beijing has steadily strengthened its position as a major economic actor in West Asia. China has also begun to play a diplomatic role. The 2023 agreement restoring relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, facilitated by Beijing, demonstrated that alternative diplomatic actors are emerging in a region historically dominated by American mediation. At the same time, the economic consequences of escalating conflict could extend far beyond the Middle East. Any disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime passage through which a significant share of global oil shipments pass, would push energy prices sharply higher. Oil prices exceeding US$100 per barrel would generate inflationary pressures across the global economy, affecting both developed and emerging markets. The broader concern is that the US risks undermining the very system that once sustained its leadership. The post-war order commanded legitimacy because it appeared to promote stability, predictable rules and economic growth. If Washington is increasingly perceived as a destabilizing rather than stabilizing force, the credibility of that leadership may gradually erode. This dynamic is already visible in the growing interest among many countries in diversifying economic and financial systems. Initiatives within the BRICS grouping aimed at reducing reliance on US-dominated financial institutions reflect a broader search for alternatives to the existing order. Still, it would be premature to declare the end of American global leadership. The US remains the world’s most powerful military actor and continues to occupy a central position in global finance and technology. Yet hegemonic systems rarely collapse suddenly. More often, they weaken gradually as confidence in the dominant power diminishes. The debate surrounding the February 2026 strike on Iran reflects precisely this uncertainty. If the credibility of US security guarantees continues to erode in regions that once anchored its influence, the global order may gradually shift toward a more multipolar structure. Emerging powers, regional actors and new economic coalitions will increasingly shape international politics. Whether the events of 2026 ultimately prove to be a turning point remains uncertain. But history suggests that moments of strategic overreach can accelerate deeper transformations. For the US, the challenge will be whether it can adapt its leadership to a changing world—or risk witnessing the slow erosion and eventual passing of the very order it once built
44-US increasing Middle East deployments
Lara Sellgman, March 13, 2026, Wall Street Journal, Pentagon Is Moving Additional Marines, Warships to the Middle East, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/us-israel-iran-war-news-2026/card/pentagon-sends-marine-expeditionary-unit-to-middle-east-WeoODg0XIIe31W3np2aI
The Pentagon is moving additional Marines and warships to the Middle East as Iran steps up its attacks on the Strait of Hormuz, according to three U.S. officials. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has approved a request from U.S. Central Command, responsible for American forces in the Middle East, for an element of an amphibious ready group and attached Marine expeditionary unit, typically consisting of several warships and 5,000 Marines, the officials said. The Japan-based USS Tripoli and its attached Marines are now headed for the Middle East, two of the officials said. Marines are already in the Middle East supporting the Iran operation, the officials said. The move comes as Iran’s attacks on the strait have paralyzed traffic through the strategic waterway, disrupting the global economy, driving up gas prices and posing a major military and political challenge for President Trump. A Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment.
43-Trump supports imperialism and massive military intervention
Alex Shephard, March 13, 2026, Alex Shephard is senior editor of The New Republic, where he has covered politics and culture since 2015. His work has also appeared in New York, GQ, The Atlantic, The Nation, and other publications, New Republic, With the War in Iran, Trump Has Launched His Own Brand of Forever War, https://newrepublic.com/article/207720/war-iran-trump-forever-war
A decade later, Trump is the one making stupid, costly, destructive decisions. The war on Iran is probably the worst American foreign policy move since Iraq, and that’s only one of several ill-conceived imperialistic adventures abroad during his second term. He is leading the United States into a new kind of forever war that may well continue even if the one in Iran winds down.
Did Trump really believe any of what he said on the debate stage in 2016? He certainly understood something back then: that he was really running against the political establishment writ large, that Jeb Bush was the perfect stand-in for that establishment, that few recent events encapsulated its failures like the Iraq War, and that millions of people viewed that war as a costly disaster and a waste of resources. Trump was running on refocusing those resources on the issues he said actually mattered: a supposed epidemic of violence and drug abuse caused by a flood of undocumented immigrants.
At the same time, Trump had more strategic criticisms of the war. Again and again, he railed against Bush—and President Obama, to a lesser extent—for failing to seize Iraqi oil during the war. But he also clearly viewed the war as a cautionary tale. Once you deploy tens of thousands of ground troops, as Bush did, it’s very hard to pull them out. And if you can’t pull them out, you can’t declare victory.
A great deal of Trump’s foreign policy can be explained via those conclusions. Trump believes American power should be used in a coercive, extortionary, and often outright imperialistic manner. He shuns the abstractions of “soft power” and thinks the NATO alliance is a con job because weaker nations don’t pay up for the protection the U.S. provides. He also believes that military intervention and regime change should always prioritize new revenue streams: When the U.S. kidnapped Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in January, Trump didn’t pay lip service to democracy or freedom—he went on TV and said he took Maduro in large part so he could seize Venezuela’s considerable oil reserves.
Trump’s pointed criticism of the Iraq War in 2016 led many to conclude that he was an isolationist. Nothing could be further from the truth. Trump loves using American military power, and he has few compunctions about using it. In his six years in power, he has bombed over a dozen nations, assassinated and kidnapped foreign military and political leaders, and risked war via bombastic and reckless actions on a number of occasions. He has embraced missile and drone strikes, in particular, but on occasion has used stealth bombers (as he did against an alleged Iranian nuclear site last June) and U.S. special forces (as he did to kidnap Maduro). He has, it seems, just one red line: He is extremely reluctant to deploy thousands of American troops overseas.
The lack of a mass deployment is misleading in two ways, however. For one, Trump is waging his own kind of forever war. The U.S. military, under his command, has been constantly active all over the world during his second term: Air strikes in Yemen last year were followed by ones in Somalia and then Syria; the raid in Caracas was followed less than two months later by the bombing of Iran. While the war on terror under Bush and, to a lesser extent, Obama was motivated by an unattainable end goal (to rid the world of “terror”), Trump’s forever war is even less well defined: There is no stated or apparent policy uniting these military operations.
The second way stems from the first. Recent reports suggest that Trump expects the war in Iran to continue for another month, but his public statements have suggested it could either end imminently (he said earlier this week that it was “very complete, pretty much”) or never (he has warned the Iranian regime that he is prepared for it to go on “forever”). His one stated criterion for the war’s conclusion is something that seems highly unlikely to happen anytime soon: The Iranian regime must “unconditionally surrender.” Trump has expressed his displeasure with the nation’s new leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, without providing any indication of what a more acceptable alternative would look like. It’s not clear what Trump wants from this war, in other words, which means it’s not clear how it will actually end.
What is clear is that this is already the exact type of overseas conflict that Trump was railing about a decade ago. The U.S. is relying on faulty on-the-ground intelligence—over 100 Iranian schoolchildren are dead because of it—to wage a war that has no clear purpose. The war has already enveloped the entire Middle East, as Iran lashes out at its neighbors and Israel takes advantage of the moment to wage a destructive ground campaign in Lebanon. The widening conflict is taking on a momentum of its own, which the U.S. may be powerless to stop even if Trump decides to end U.S. involvement.
All of this was predictable when U.S. airstrikes began 14 days ago. But Trump blithely rushed ahead, falsely believing the Iran regime would crumble quickly and that there would be little to no disruption in the markets. Dissenting voices were shut out in the rush to war. They are still largely silent. “Inside the administration, some officials are growing pessimistic about the lack of a clear strategy to finish the war,” reported The New York Times earlier this week. “But they have been careful not to express that directly to the president, who has repeatedly declared that the military operation is a complete success.”
The Iran regime is being mercilessly bombed but has choked the global oil supply. By closing the Strait of Hormuz, it arguably seized control of the narrative of the war itself. What started as a test of bombing capability—the U.S. concentrated its massive, technologically advanced arsenal against Iran, which has fought back by lobbing missiles and deploying drones at its Gulf neighbors—is now a battle over who can absorb more pain. Iran’s pain is obviously greater and more visceral, but it may have an edge in that fight, especially as gas prices tick up.
The war is not a “complete success,” in other words. It’s a “beauty” of a mistake, costing more than a billion dollars a day. As it drags on, the likelihood of troops being deployed grows. It is likely such forces would be small, elite, tactical units, but it’s not hard to envision a situation—think Black Hawk Down or the botched attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980—that quickly spirals into something larger. It is, as Trump said about Iraq in 2016, a big fat mistake.
Watch that clip again. What stands out now is Trump’s hubris. He wasn’t wrong about the Iraq War. But his real point was that George W. Bush was stupid, while he was smart—smart enough to avoid a boondoggle like Iraq. In office, Trump’s foreign policy has increasingly been guided by a belief that, for that reason, he can have his cake and eat it too: He can bomb and pillage wherever he wants and skate away before things turn really sour. He wouldn’t launch a forever war. He wouldn’t destabilize the Middle East. He was different.
42-Iran a significant threat
Afshon Ostovar, March 12, 2026, Foreign Affairs, How a Wounded Islamic Republic Can Still Threaten the World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/dangers-weak-iran, AFSHON OSTOVAR is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the author of Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East.
After nearly two weeks of withering attacks, the Islamic Republic is weaker than it has been at any point in its history. U.S. and Israeli strikes have killed much of its leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, destroyed much of its navy, heavily degraded its missile program, and buried its nuclear facilities. Bombings have cratered government ministries, police stations, and military buildings. Even the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—or the IRGC, the country’s most powerful institution—has been reduced to ruins.
But although the Islamic Republic is down, it is not out. The regime selected Khamenei’s hard-liner son, Mojtaba, to succeed him as its leader, opting for continuity in the theocracy’s most important position. Government officials are united behind the retaliatory campaign Iran is now carrying out against the United States and its partners, and the IRGC remains functional. The Islamic Republic is still very capable of inflicting violence on its adversaries, neighbors, and people.
If the regime holds on to power, it will, no doubt, be in an extremely difficult position. The strategic programs it had spent decades developing (such as its missile and nuclear enrichment infrastructure) have been severely weakened. Its relations with its neighbors are in crisis, and its economy is bleeding. But even with a bad hand, officials are likely to stick with what they know: resistance and aggression. Defenseless and with dwindling capabilities, they will probably fall back on old habits and take new risks. That means they could retaliate by carrying out more acts of terrorism, which is a low-cost tool the regime has already mastered. In the long term, Iranian officials may finally dash for and build a nuclear weapon. A weak Iran, in other words, will remain very dangerous.
41-No way for the people to overthrow the government
Afshon Ostovar, March 12, 2026, Foreign Affairs, How a Wounded Islamic Republic Can Still Threaten the World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/dangers-weak-iran, AFSHON OSTOVAR is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the author of Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East.
Iran knows that it cannot defeat Israel and the United States militarily. It has thus adopted a simpler and much more achievable goal: survival. Even though U.S. President Donald Trump has called on Iranian citizens to rise up, an air campaign alone cannot get rid of the personnel and small arms that the regime uses to stamp out protests. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic’s supporters—including civilian officials, security force commanders, foot soldiers, and Basij volunteers—have displayed impressive unity and resilience.
40-US needs to deploy ground forces to secure nuclear material
Afshon Ostovar, March 12, 2026, Foreign Affairs, How a Wounded Islamic Republic Can Still Threaten the World, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/dangers-weak-iran, AFSHON OSTOVAR is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the author of Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East.
Berman, March 11, 2026, Ilan Berman is senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Departments of State and Defense. Mr. Berman is a member of the Associated Faculty at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, as well as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics, What to Watch for Next in the Iran War, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/what-to-watch-for-next-in-the-iran-war
What is already being called the Third Gulf War is now in its second week, and most of the commentary so far has focused on US and Israeli military operations, as well as Iran’s maximalist response. But three other issues are likely to determine the conflict’s future course and what might come next for both Iran and the region.
The first is the fate of Iran’s remaining uranium. Even if key nuclear facilities have now been damaged or destroyed, the most important issue isn’t the technology that they housed but the regime’s existing fissile material. Iran had managed to accumulate significant stocks of enriched uranium before the war, and those weren’t successfully eliminated during last summer’s “12-Day War.” According to authoritative estimates, the regime still possesses 440 kilograms or more of 60 percent enriched uranium—a sufficient quantity, if it were enriched further, to produce 10 nuclear weapons.
The location of that material is still unverified, although international authorities now believe they have a pretty good idea. Yet, unless it is located and secured, the Iranian nuclear problem at the crux of the current military campaign has not been solved in a meaningful sense. Physically gaining custody of that nascent stockpile, however, will require a ground component of some sort in the conflict.
Worried over the political optics, US officials like Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have remained coy about deploying a ground presence into Iran. But at least a small contingent of special forces operators might be needed to complete this mission. Alternatively, it could be taken up by trusted partners on the ground, which is likely part of the reason why the administration has explored other potential options (including the prospect of arming ethnic factions like the Kurds). So far, though, Washington doesn’t seem to have hit upon a workable solution.
39-US needed to protect Gulf Security
Berman, March 11, 2026, Ilan Berman is senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Departments of State and Defense. Mr. Berman is a member of the Associated Faculty at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, as well as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics, What to Watch for Next in the Iran War, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/what-to-watch-for-next-in-the-iran-war
Second, there is a need for a regional security architecture. Persian Gulf states have watched the current conflict nervously, for a host of reasons. Most directly, they have become major targets of Iranian aggression, as Tehran has repeatedly sought to widen the war. But these energy producers are also rightly worried about escalation and oil market shocks, as the conflict continues to threaten to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of world oil exports pass.
If the war ends without a credible assurance framework—one capable of deterring Iran in the future and securing regional energy flows—Tehran will retain unacceptable leverage over politics in its neighborhood. Pentagon planners would do well to start thinking now about what such an architecture should look like, from an integrated air-and-missile defense architecture in the Gulf to expanded maritime security cooperation. They would do even better to begin those consultations without delay.
38-Continuing the war empowers Russia against the Ukraine
Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2026, Trump Should Aim to Neutralize the Iran Regime, Not Destroy It, https://www.cfr.org/articles/trump-should-defang-irans-government-not-destroy-it
Trump has additional reasons to tread cautiously and aim for a relatively short conflict. With an eye toward his own political standing and the November midterms, he needs to avoid U.S. involvement in yet another “forever war.” A majority of Americans oppose the campaign against Iran, and Trump’s own MAGA base is uneasy. Weapons stockpiles in the United States, Israel, and neighboring states under attack are not unlimited. The military campaign against Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz and regional airspace, producing a surge in the price of oil and in shipping costs. Iran’s retaliatory strikes are taking lives, disrupting daily life, and damaging commerce. The conflict aids and abets Russia’s war against Ukraine by increasing Russia’s energy revenues and shifting the attention and resources of the United States and its European allies to the Middle East. Trump has many good reasons to end this war sooner rather than later.
37-Overthrowing the regime won’t work and it will produce mass violence
Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2026, Trump Should Aim to Neutralize the Iran Regime, Not Destroy It, https://www.cfr.org/articles/trump-should-defang-irans-government-not-destroy-it
The United States and Israel enjoy effective control of Iran’s airspace, and air strikes are bringing to bear overwhelming firepower. But they have no ground troops with whom they can partner, a big problem given that airpower alone is a quite ineffective instrument for toppling regimes. The United States could proceed with efforts to arm Iran’s minority populations—Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis among them—but doing so could lead to a civil war. And given the large population of Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis in Iran’s neighboring countries, a civil war in Iran would be unlikely to stay in Iran.
In addition, Iran’s regime runs deep and broad and would be quite hard to take down. The country has one of the largest armed forces in the Middle East, with a total strength of more than one million troops. The elite IRGC has close to two hundred thousand men and has control over the Basij, a paramilitary force that can tap over half a million volunteers. The IRGC is deeply embedded in the Iranian economy and is a powerful tool of social control. The country’s police force tops two hundred thousand personnel and works alongside the IRGC and the Basij militia to repress domestic dissent. Despite the relentless bombing campaign, Iran’s security apparatus shows no signs of cracking. On the contrary, Mojtaba Khamenei, the new supreme leader, is a favorite of the IRGC and his appointment demonstrates the corps’ continuing influence.
Many Iranians are certainly disaffected by years of economic hardship and repression. Yet the regime’s consistent readiness to use violence to snuff out domestic unrest has proved effective. Earlier this year, the Islamic Republic killed thousands of Iranians in a crackdown on protesters. An organized opposition capable of resisting the state’s security apparatus is nowhere in sight.
Even if the Islamic Republic were ousted, it is doubtful that it would lead to a stable Iranian government committed to regional stability. Recent history has repeatedly demonstrated as much. The United States expended copious amounts of blood and treasure orchestrating regime change through force in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The results were disastrous.
Afghanistan is again controlled by the Taliban. Taking down the Ba’ath regime in Iraq produced a violent insurgency that confounded the U.S. occupation and eventually led to the rise of the Islamic State. Libya after the fall of the Muammar Qaddafi regime turned into a failed state and a magnet for extremist groups. Syria was wracked by years of civil war, which enabled the Islamic State to move in and set up a caliphate. Support from Iran and Russia helped President Bashar al-Assad hang on until late 2024, when his government fell to a militia formerly linked to al-Qaeda. Not exactly a track record that should inspire enthusiasm for toppling the Islamic Republic.
To be sure, Iran is one of the Middle East’s few organic nations, with a long imperial history and deep cultural roots. Its society is not organized along tribal lines, making it less likely to fall prey to the internal fragmentation that foiled collective governance in tribal societies like Afghanistan and Libya. But Persians make up only about 60 percent of the population, with Kurds, Turkic peoples, Arabs, Circassians, and other minorities making up the rest. As has happened in many other countries in the Middle East, instability and regime change could mobilize ethnic and sectarian rivalries
The results of the Arab Spring provide a cautionary warning on this front. Instead of birthing an Islamic Reformation and a wave of democratization, the Arab Spring produced a surge in political Islam and widespread instability. Even Tunisia, the one country in the region to emerge from the uprisings as a working democracy, reverted to autocratic rule in 2021. Instead of clearing the way for pluralism and tolerance, the overthrow of strongmen brought to the surface religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal cleavages that coercive rule had long held at bay. Washington should be careful what it wishes for.
36 – US cannot handle Iranian drones
Nico Lange, March 6, 2026, Gulf States, Iran, Iran War, Israel, NATO, Patriot Missile, Patriot Missiles, Persian Gulf, Russia, Shahed-136, Ukraine, and Ukraine War, The New Economics of War, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-new-economics-of-war
Warfare today favors the side with cheap and plentiful offensive capabilities. Iran has been politically decapitated. The Iranian navy’s warships have been sunk. Thousands of targets in Iran have been destroyed by air strikes, and thousands of drones and missiles from Iran have been intercepted. Nevertheless, behind the scenes, Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states are feeling uneasy despite the reports of success. What if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) does not break? What if they continue to attack with ever more cheap drones, missiles, and small boats? Scenes like this are playing out throughout the Persian Gulf battlespace: a small drone approaches a US destroyer at high speed; the vessel sounds the alarm, and its defenses react immediately with expensive sensors, missiles, and maneuvers. An above-water drone costs a few thousand dollars. The response can cost millions. And the destroyer vessel is just one of many that require multi-domain defenses. This reveals a new economy of war. Cheap beats expensive. Mass beats perfection. Speed beats tradition. Iran relies on large quantities of drones, missiles, and small boats. This is not because they have been perfected over decades, produced for years, or operated without malfunction. Rather, they are sufficient for the task of overloading defense systems. They force the enemy to respond at great expense. And they reverse the cost ratios. Every successful defense ultimately results in an economic loss. If, in addition, expensive radars and sensors, which can cost billions and can only be replaced after years, are destroyed by comparatively simple drones, a tactical victory in this war may ultimately even include strategic defeats. freestar Whether Tehran will ultimately succeed in betting on the new economics of war remains to be seen. There is much to suggest that it will not. Nevertheless, this war already marks a turning point. The old American and Western idea of a technologically superior, fast, and clean military strike is crumbling. Opponents such as Iran and Russia are forcing defenders to respond to waves of low-cost attacks with expensive countermeasures repeatedly. Naval Warfare Why NATO Needs to Re-Focus on the North Atlantic The Western alliance has underinvested in the capabilities necessary to keep Russia from gaining a foothold in the Atlantic. Anna GustafsonRyan Moreman March 3, 2026 This is nothing new. The new military reality has been on display for years in Ukraine and elsewhere. But Western political decision-makers, military planners, and armament manufacturers have largely turned a blind eye to this until now, out of excessive complacency, arrogance, and bureaucratic paralysis. Those who assert themselves militarily at too high a cost also lose at the same time. And those who lose cheaply remain capable of acting in the end. Those who lose too expensively lose too much anyway. In the Gulf, we are currently seeing how this can change the geopolitical balance of power. As has been the case in Ukraine for years, this is most evident in the Gulf in terms of air defense. While Iran and Russia are producing drones and missiles in industrial quantities and constantly expanding production, the few manufacturers of air defense systems and guided missiles have barely increased their industrial output in the four years of Russia’s war of aggression. Entire annual production runs of missiles for high-performance systems such as THAAD and Patriot missile systems are currently being fired off in just a few days. Around the world, Ukraine, the Europeans, the Americans, and now even the Gulf states are scrambling for the meager supplies available, but all the money in the world seems unable to speed up the process. Iranian and Russian drone and missile production, on the other hand, will quickly replenish their depots. China will observe this with interest and seek to learn its lessons. Against this backdrop, the NATO countries, especially the European NATO members, are not in a good position. We have built high-end systems and continue to order high-end systems. We have loved complexity and continue to love complexity. “Everything is complicated, nothing is that simple, nothing is that fast”—that is the familiar message of the system. But high-end quality without quantity does not protect. And complexity without speed is ineffective. Efficiency remains a fantasy in the end if the enemy relies on favorable mass. A perfect system is no longer the deciding factor. The Patriot missile is a high-performance system. Yet, if we don’t have enough guided missiles, can’t replace them quickly, or buy them without breaking the bank, then even the Patriot will ultimately fall victim to asymmetric overload. The new economics of war are forcing us to think differently. This week, the US military announced that it will replicate and deploy cheap drones imitating the Iranian Shahed drones. Today, warfare also requires simple, robust systems in large quantities. And defense and deterrence require industrial production that can breathe and grow quickly when things get serious. This absolutely requires political decisions that allow for speed. This includes an offensive technology and industrial policy that sees security as its core task.
35 – Deployments needed to seize nuclear material
Barak Ravid, Marc Caputo , 3-8, 12, Axios, U.S. weighs sending special forces to seize Iran’s nuclear stockpile, https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear
The U.S. and Israel have discussed sending special forces into Iran to secure its stockpile of highly enriched uranium at a later stage of the war, according to four sources with knowledge of the discussions. Why it matters: Preventing Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon is one of President Trump’s stated war objectives. The regime’s 450 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium — convertible to weapons grade within weeks — is one key to that goal. The big picture: Any operation to seize the material would likely require U.S. or Israeli troops on Iranian soil, navigating heavily fortified underground facilities in the middle of a war. It remains unclear whether it would be an American, Israeli or joint mission. It would likely only take place after both countries are confident Iran’s military can no longer mount a serious threat to the forces involved. Behind the scenes: At a congressional briefing Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was asked whether Iran’s enriched uranium would be secured. “People are going to have to go and get it,” he said, without specifying who. An Israeli defense official said Trump and his team are seriously considering sending special operations units into Iran for specific missions. A U.S. official said the administration has discussed two options: removing the material from Iran entirely, or bringing in nuclear experts to dilute it on-site. The mission would likely involve special operators alongside scientists, possibly from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Between the lines: Two sources with knowledge of the issue said such operations were part of a menu of options presented to Trump before the war. NBC News reported on Friday that Trump has discussed the idea of deploying a small contingent of U.S. troops in Iran for specific strategic purposes. The U.S. official laid out the operational challenge of securing Iran’s uranium: “The first question is, where is it? The second question is, how do we get to it and how do we get physical control?” “And then, it would be a decision of the president and the Department of War, CIA, as to whether we wanted to physically transport it or dilute it on premises.” What they’re saying: Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One on Saturday that ground troops were possible — but only “for a very good reason.” “If we ever did that, [the Iranians] would be so decimated that they wouldn’t be able to fight on the ground level,” he said. Asked specifically whether troops might go in to secure nuclear material, Trump didn’t rule it out. “At some point maybe we will. We haven’t gone after it. We wouldn’t do it now. Maybe we will do it later.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told Axios that Trump “wisely keeps all options available to him open, and does not rule things out.” The intrigue: Beyond the uranium, administration officials tell Axios there has also been discussion of seizing Kharg Island, a strategic terminal responsible for roughly 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Zoom in: The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities last June buried Iran’s uranium stockpile under rubble. The Iranians themselves haven’t been able to reach it since, U.S. and Israeli officials say. The strikes also destroyed nearly all of Iran’s centrifuges, and there’s no evidence that enrichment has resumed. U.S. and Israeli officials say most of the stockpile sits in the underground tunnels of the nuclear facility in Isfahan, while the rest is split between Fordow and Natanz. In the opening days of the war, U.S. and Israel conducted strikes on Natanz and Isfahan that appeared aimed at sealing the entrances, likely to prevent any material from being moved. Zoom out: The U.S. and Israel see Iran’s 450 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium as a serious threat, as it would take only weeks to enrich it to weapons grade. If the entire stockpile reached 90% purity, it would be enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. The bottom line: “Boots on the ground for Trump is not the same as what it means for the media,” a senior U.S. official said. “Small special ops raids — not a big force going in,” another source added. “What has been discussed hasn’t been thought of in terms of boots on the ground,” a third source said. “People think Fallujah. That’s not what has been discussed.”
34-US can’t oust the Iranian regime
John Hudson and Warren P. Strobel, March 7, 2026, Intel report warns large-scale war ‘unlikely’ to oust Iran’s regime, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/07/iran-intelligence-report-unlikely-oust-regime/
A classified report by the National Intelligence Council found that even a large-scale assault on Iran launched by the United States would be unlikely to oust the Islamic republic’s entrenched military and clerical establishment, a sobering assessment as the Trump administration raises the specter of an extended military campaign that officials say has “only just begun.” The findings, confirmed to The Washington Post by three people familiar with the report’s contents, raise doubts about President Donald Trump’s declared plan to “clean out” Iran’s leadership structure and install a ruler of his choosing. The report, completed about a week before the United States and Israel initiated the war on Feb. 28, outlined succession scenarios stemming from either a narrowly tailored campaign against Iran’s leaders or a broader assault against its leadership and government institutions, the people familiar with its findings said. In both cases, the intelligence concluded that Iran’s clerical and military establishment would respond to the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by following protocols designed to preserve continuity of power, these people said. The prospect of Iran’s fragmented opposition taking control of the country was described as “unlikely,” said the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a classified report. The National Intelligence Council, or NIC, is composed of veteran analysts who produce classified assessments meant to represent the collective wisdom of Washington’s 18 intelligence agencies. The CIA referred questions to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which declined to comment. The White House did not say if the president was briefed on this assessment before approving the military operation, which has quickly expanded east to include submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean and west to counter-missile showdowns near NATO member Turkey.Ask The Post AIDive deeper “President Trump and the administration have clearly outlined their goals with regard to Operation Epic Fury: destroy Iran’s ballistic missiles and production capacity, demolish their navy, end their ability to arm proxies, and prevent them from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said in a statement. “The Iranian regime is being absolutely crushed.” U.S. spy agencies’ doubts about Iran’s opposition seizing power have been referenced in the New York Times, Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. The NIC’s involvement, and its analyses of the potential outcomes of small- and large-scale offensives, have not been previously reported. Suzanne Maloney, an Iran scholar and vice president at the Brookings Institution, said the NIC’s prediction that Iran’s institutions will endure stems from its rigorous knowledge of the Islamic republic. “It sounds like a deeply informed assessment of the Iranian system and the institutions and processes that have been established for many years,” she said. It does not appear that the intelligence report examined other possible scenarios, including sending U.S. ground troops into Iran or arming the country’s ethnic Kurds to foment a rebellion. It could not be determined whether the large-scale campaign that the classified document examined is identical to the operations now underway. The Iranian succession process that the report anticipated is now playing out but under duress from the extensive U.S.-Israel bombing campaign from the air and sea. The replacement of the supreme leader rests with Iran’s powerful clerical body, the Assembly of Experts. But members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and others within the country’s security establishment also play an influential role.Ask The Post AIDive deeper There has been intense speculation that the assembly will anoint the late supreme leader’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, but no official announcement has been made. The IRGC has been pushing Khamenei’s candidacy but has encountered resistance from other power brokers, including Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, a Western security official said. As the war enters its second week, Trump continues to demand Iran’s “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER,” as he put it in a Truth Social post, and has suggested he should have a role in picking the country’s next leader. Trump told journalists that the younger Khamenei is “incompetent” and a “lightweight,” and that he doesn’t want Iranian leaders who will simply “rebuild” the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. “We want them to have a good leader. We have some people who I think would do a good job,” he told NBC News. Iran’s Parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, rejected the notion that Trump will play any role in appointing Iran’s next leader. “The fate of dear Iran, which is more precious than life, will be determined solely by the proud Iranian nation, not by [Jeffrey] Epstein’s gang,” Ghalibaf said on X, referring to the late sex offender who was close friends with Trump for several years before they had a falling out. Current and former U.S. officials say they see little sign, at least so far, of a mass popular uprising in Iran or of significant fissures within the government or security forces that will result in a new regime. Iran’s security forces killed thousands of protesters during demonstrations in January fueled by the country’s abysmal economy. The guidance from Trump to the Iranian people has been to shelter in place until the U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign concludes. With Iran’s clerical and military establishment still in control, experts say Trump’s ability to dictate political outcomes is limited. “Bending the knee to Trump would go against everything they stand for,” said Holly Dagres, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The upper echelons of the clerical establishment are ideological, and so their modus operandi is to resist American imperialism.” Trump could play kingmaker if the regime were to crumble, but the NIC report does not view the establishment’s hold on power as brittle. “There’s no other force within Iran that can confront the remaining power that the regime has,” said Maloney, of the Brookings Institution. “Even if they’re not able to project that power very effectively against their neighbors, they can certainly dominate inside the country.”
33- Trump escalating the Iran war with no objecti e
Hoffman, 3-6, 26, Jon Hoffman is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute. His research interests include US foreign policy in the Middle East, Middle East geopolitics, and political Islam. Hoffman’s work has been featured in a number of academic and policy-oriented platforms, including Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, The National Interest, Middle East Policy, and more. Hoffman holds a PhD in political science, an MA in Middle East and Islamic Studies, and a BA in Global Affairs, all from George Mason University, The Making of a Forever War in Iran, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/the-making-of-a-forever-war-in-iran
President Donald Trump has embraced the military hubris in the Middle East that he once condemned. President Donald Trump has plunged the United States into an open-ended war with Iran, lacking clearly defined and achievable objectives, a discernible endgame, or a viable exit plan. This is a war of choice—Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States, and the White House is now scrambling to devise a strategy for a war already underway and proving more difficult than anticipated. The war will likely escalate as Iran digs in and hawkish voices push Trump toward maximalist—and largely unachievable—aims. By setting this crisis in motion, the Trump administration is repeating the same failures that have long defined US Middle East policy. Absent a course correction, the United States is on the path to another forever war. Buildvive Yelp Platt Park Restoration Yelp Trump’s ostensible justifications for this war have shifted repeatedly, as have the stated objectives. Prior to the initiation of Operation Epic Fury, the stated casus belli for military action provided by the Trump administration was fluid and contradictory. They oscillated between targeting Iran’s nuclear program (which Trump insisted he had destroyed last year during Operation Midnight Hammer), destroying its ballistic missile program, and liberating the Iranian people. Despite polling showing that the vast majority of Americans opposed and still oppose such a war, Trump proceeded undeterred. freestar The stated rationales have been no less fluid and contradictory since the war began. When announcing the war, Trump claimed Iran posed an “imminent threat” to the United States and openly embraced regime-change in Tehran as his objective, urging the Iranian people to “take back” their country. Since then, the Trump administration initially walked back its intentions, rhetorically distancing itself from regime-change—even after the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—but recently claimed Trump needed to be personally involved in selecting Iran’s next leader. The stated justifications from the Trump administration do not withstand scrutiny, and the lack of clearly defined, achievable objectives has led to strategic incoherence in Washington. Advancing American interests did not necessitate this war—the threat posed by Iran to the United States has been greatly inflated inside Washington for decades. Neither Iran’s nuclear nor ballistic missile program posed an imminent threat to the United States. Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapon, and its missiles were nowhere near capable of targeting the American homeland. After the war began, the Pentagon acknowledged that Iran was not planning to strike US forces stationed in the region unless Israel attacked them first. If Trump’s objective was nuclear non-proliferation, Iran was offering concessions to the United States that were objectively better than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump scrapped in 2018. War has now made that objective far more difficult to achieve. The principal catalyst for this war was not American strategic interests, but Israeli priorities. Israel was instrumental in blocking a nuclear agreement between Trump and Tehran, inserting a series of “poison pills” to collapse negotiations while pushing Washington toward war. Their objective was regime-change—Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has personally lobbied Washington for US military actions against Iran for more than three decades. freestar Done Plumbing, Heating, Cooling & Electric Done is your trustworthy choice for home maintenance solutions for Denver and Aurora communities, offering a variety of services, including plumbing, heating, cooling, and electrical work since 1999. We guarantee honest, no hidden-fee pricing and unmatched customer service, ensuring every aspect of Sponsored | Yelp Why Is Everyone Quitting Gmail? Why Is Everyone Quitting Gmail? Sponsored | Proton Mail 25+ Mind-Blowing Images From a Century Ago Entertainment Sponsored | Twist Digital Goldie Hawn, 80, Enjoys Beach Stroll With Husband Kurt Russell Entertainment Sponsored | Whisper Journal Israel wanted to capitalize on the series of blows it delivered to Tehran’s strategic position following Hamas’ terror attack on October 7, 2023, Israel’s subsequent wars in Gaza and Lebanon, and its direct military confrontation with Iran. Fearing changes in American public opinion about the US-Israel relationship, Netanyahu pushed Washington to pursue this war while Israel possessed the political capital to do so. Trump played into his hands. With no coherent strategy and entrenched special interests driving policy, Washington has committed itself to another open-ended war in the Middle East that shows no sign of abating soon. Iran appears determined to fight—it is preparing for a prolonged war of attrition. Airpower alone will not collapse the regime, and killing Khamenei is not sufficient to collapse the Islamic Republic. The regime remains deeply entrenched and had established contingency plans before the war to sustain the fight in the event of Khamenei’s death. The core of the regime’s coercive apparatus—the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—remains the strongest political, economic, and military actor inside the country. The IRGC is already tightening its control over decision-making inside Tehran, and benefits from a fiercely divided Iranian opposition. The United States also appears determined to escalate. Washington intends to increase the intensity of its bombing campaign, and Trump refuses to rule out the possibility of US ground troops inside Iran. After the United States and Israel failed to secure regime collapse following Khamenei’s death, it appears that, in the absence of their ability to install a new client government inside Tehran, they are now aiming to collapse the Iranian state. Trump is considering supporting various ethnic militias inside Iran—the CIA is reportedly already working to arm different groups, and US-armed Kurdish forces from Iraq are allegedly poised to enter Iran soon. Igniting a proxy war inside Iran risks inciting a prolonged insurgency, empowering extremist factions, and triggering further regional instability. There have already been negative consequences for the United States. At least six US servicemembers have been killed during this war. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has plummeted, and oil and gas prices have already spiked due to the war and are likely to rise further as the conflict continues. Racing to prevent this, Trump is now contemplating offering military escorts and political risk insurance for oil and gas tankers moving through the strait. However, the United States is facing significantly depleted missile-interceptor stockpiles, raising concerns about how long it can maintain this pace of operations. The administration has provided the American people with no clear timeline on how long this war will last—it continues to shift, and now stands at potentially eight weeks. Trump thrust the United States into war, believing it would not incur considerable political, economic, and human costs in the process. It epitomizes the hubris that has guided US Middle East policy for decades, producing neither greater regional stability nor tangible benefits for the United States. Trump must now decide whether to change direction in the interest of the American people or commit the country to another potential forever war.
32-We must end the Iran war before it spreads
Kaye, 3-6, 26, DALIA DASSA KAYE is a Senior Fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and the author of Enduring Hostility: The Making of America’s Iran Policy, Foreign Affairs, The Mirage of a New Middle East; War With Iran Won’t Reshape the Region the Way America Wants, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/mirage-new-middle-east, DALIA DASSA KAYE is a Senior Fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and the author of Enduring Hostility: The Making of America’s Iran Policy.
Eager to show that he can do what no American leader has done before, President Donald Trump has chosen conflict over diplomacy and gone to war with Iran. The Islamic Republic, knowing that this fight is existential, retaliated quickly with deadly missile and drone attacks on Israel, U.S. bases in the Middle East, and targets in Gulf states and beyond. This is now a regional war with global impact, disrupting oil and financial markets, supply chains, maritime commerce, and air travel. Threats to Americans and the death toll in Iran mount by the hour. These growing risks were predictable long before the war became reality, which might help explain why no previous president took the United States down this perilous path.
How this war will end remains uncertain. But when it does, the United States will have to face what comes next. To the extent that the Trump administration has considered plans for “the day after,” it seems to have made a series of overly optimistic assumptions about how the war might reshape Iran and the Middle East. For one, the Trump administration has insisted—including in Trump’s social media post on February 28 announcing the war—that a relentless degradation of Iranian leadership and military capabilities would weaken the regime enough that the Iranian people could rise up and “take over the government.” Even if that doesn’t happen, the administration’s logic goes, Iran would be defanged and so preoccupied with internal problems that it could no longer pose a threat to the region or American interests. Taking the current Iranian regime out of the equation, Washington assumes, would remove one of the largest sources of regional instability and usher in a new Middle East more to the United States’ liking.
But the outcome of this war will likely fall far short of these rosy expectations. After the bombing ends, Iran and the region could look worse, or at least not better, than they did before the war. The fighting could create a power vacuum in Tehran, sour U.S. allies on their partnerships with Washington, and produce ripple effects on conflicts elsewhere in the world, all without removing sources of regional strife that have nothing to do with the regime in Iran. The risks increase the longer the war goes on, so Congress and U.S. allies must press for a cease-fire now if there is to be any hope of mitigating these day-after dangers.
SAME OLD STORY
Few in the United States would mourn the demise of an Iranian regime that was founded on an anti-American ideology and has long supported terrorism. U.S.-Iranian hostility has been a constant since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; it has now lasted longer than the Cold War. But as much as Washington would like to see the end of the Islamic Republic, replacing the regime with a pro-American one through military force is unlikely to work. Iran is not Venezuela, with a figure like Delcy Rodríguez waiting in the wings to do Washington’s bidding. In the wake of the United States’ and Israel’s assassinations of Iran’s senior leadership, Trump acknowledged that “most of the people we had in mind [as potential new leaders] are dead.”
One option favored by some in Washington and the Iranian diaspora is to try to install a pro-American exile such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last shah of Iran, whom the United States helped bring to power and was overthrown in the 1979 revolution. But the level of support Pahlavi has within Iran is unknown; even Trump has expressed doubts about whether Iranians would accept his leadership. No other clear alternative has emerged from the divided Iranian opposition. What would more likely emerge is rule by a hard-line faction of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or a regime collapse that creates a political vacuum, dragging the country into a prolonged period of chaos and violence. Neither scenario promises a less hostile and more pragmatic Iranian government.
Iranian weakness will also not in itself resolve the local grievances and disputes fueling conflict across the Middle East. Arab states and Turkey play far more significant roles than Iran does in lingering conflicts in countries such as Libya and Sudan. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict began well before the emergence of the Islamic Republic, and the Iranian regime’s downfall would not repair the divides that fuel it. And in countries where Iran has played a dominant role through its sponsorship of proxies, which include militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, these groups are concerned with their own survival as much as Iran’s. They have their own domestic political projects and sources of power that do not rely only on Tehran: the Houthis, for example, have built a diffuse supply network and cultivated non-Iranian financing to support domestic arms production, and Hezbollah has developed its own capabilities to produce drones.
The United States will have to face what comes after the war.
This is not to say that taking Iran out of play doesn’t matter. Hezbollah would feel substantial pain from a change of leadership in Tehran, given how much Iran has invested in it. The fall of the longtime Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 had already disrupted the flow of arms and funds from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria. A loss of Iranian support entirely, combined with the military pressure of a renewed Israeli offensive in Lebanon, would further strain Hezbollah’s resources, giving the Lebanese government an opportunity to diminish Hezbollah’s influence.
But in general, militancy in the region will not be quashed even if Iran is defeated. The anti-Israeli sentiment that often drives recruitment to groups such as Hezbollah has been inflamed by Israel’s military operations in Gaza and throughout the region, including its renewed bombing in Lebanon. This could help Hezbollah survive and spark the formation of new militant groups hostile to Israel and the United States. And the militant groups not backed by Iran—including Sunni extremist movements such as the Islamic State—will remain a challenge regardless of the outcome of this war.
Hope that the war may push countries in the region further into the American orbit or toward normalization with Israel, even if it is not pushing them toward Tehran, may prove unfounded. Iran has attacked nearly all its neighbors since the conflict began, aiming not only at U.S. military bases but also at critical oil and gas infrastructure, economic targets including Amazon data centers in the United Arab Emirates, and central urban areas and airports in cities such as Doha and Dubai. Tehran aims to exact costs on American partners in the hope that they will pressure Washington to end the war. This is a risky gambit that may only reinforce the antipathy many Arab states feel toward Iran after years of Iranian interference through proxy forces, and could set back the recent rapprochement between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
But given their extensive economic ties and geographic proximity, Gulf states will still need to maintain some kind of relationship with Iran once this war ends. And their frustration with Iran does not automatically mean the United States will gain. The war may instead fuel popular resentment toward the United States and Israel in the region. Although Gulf states have no alternative to U.S. security guarantees, this conflict has underscored the danger of hosting American military forces—namely, that it puts these countries in the cross hairs of a U.S.-Israeli-Iranian confrontation. American bases were meant to protect Gulf states from external attacks, not invite them. And if these countries believe that the United States did not sufficiently defend them from Iranian missile and drone strikes or that it favored Israel’s defense needs over theirs, resentment toward Washington could grow.
There is no silver bullet to bring about a more stable Middle East.
The war is likely to turn regional publics more strongly against normalization with Israel, too. There is already a widespread perception that Israel has been launching military attacks across the region with impunity, both near its borders and as far afield as Qatar, where it struck the Hamas leadership in Doha last September. Arab populations are still angry about the war in Gaza and threats of Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Israel’s current campaign in Lebanon is triggering another displacement crisis. The United States’ collaboration with Israel to launch this war will further damage both countries’ reputations, and Arab leaders in influential countries such as Saudi Arabia are highly attuned to public sentiment opposing normalization.
The war may also have the unintended effect of imperiling some of the authoritarian leaders that the United States counts among its allies, which those who care about democracy and human rights may see as a silver lining. In Bahrain, where the ruling monarchy is Sunni but over half the population is Shiite, some people took to the streets to celebrate Iran’s recent attacks inside Bahrain targeting U.S. forces. They were expressing opposition to a government that, with Saudi support, has repressed them for years. There has been little space for protests of this kind—or for any calls for accountability and rule of law—since the suppression of the Arab Spring uprisings well over a decade ago. But the latest demonstrations may not be the end of public unrest in Bahrain or elsewhere.
The damaging global consequences of the war, meanwhile, are expanding beyond the immediate financial and commercial shocks. International laws and norms constraining the use of force had already been undermined by U.S. and European hypocrisy in immediately condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but not doing the same for the Israeli assault on Gaza. Now, the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, launched without evidence of an imminent Iranian attack that would justify the use of force, undermines it further.
Both China and Russia, although nominally allies of Iran, may also benefit from the United States’ being tied down by this war. China may believe it has a window to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as Washington shifts its military capabilities from Asia to the Middle East—an upside that could outweigh Beijing’s concerns about the disruption to oil supplies from the Middle East on which China depends. Russia, for its part, would not want to see another regional ally overthrown after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. But the war in Ukraine is Russia’s priority, and Iran’s war may give Moscow at least a temporary advantage in that fight. Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that the diversion of U.S. weapons to the Middle East could hurt Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russia.
DAMAGE CONTROL
There is no silver bullet to bring about a more stable Middle East. On the contrary, a war of choice that promises to free the region from an Iranian threat may have consequences that the United States did not intend and that ultimately damage its interests. Ridding the region of a brutal and destabilizing regime via a military intervention by an outside power that is also increasingly lawless and destabilizing is hardly a recipe for long-term peace.
Now that it has made the dangerous decision to start this war, however, the Trump administration must do what it can to mitigate the negative consequences. It will need to help Iran’s neighbors prepare to accept refugees to prevent the upheaval of the war from spiraling into a wider humanitarian crisis. It will also need to help countries in the region defend themselves from unpredictable attacks and reinforce infrastructure that has been impaired or destroyed by Iran’s salvos during the war.
At this point, aiming for anything more than damage control is unrealistic. Unfortunately, even as polls show that the majority of Americans oppose the war, too many American leaders continue to harbor fantastical expectations about shaping the Middle East through American power. In reality, that power is diminished by another reckless and costly war. Rather than help usher in a new Middle East, this war is likely to prolong the life of the old one, whether or not change comes to Iran. The time to end it is now.
31- Trump could attack Cuba
Laura Kelly – 03/06/26, The Hill, rump says Cuba’s next: Here’s how it could play out, https://thehill.com/policy/international/5770748-trump-pressure-cuba-regime-change/
America’s pressure campaign on Cuba is pushing the country to the breaking point, with President Trump and Republicans in Congress predicting the communist regime’s imminent fall. A major blackout across the western half of Cuba on Wednesday underscored the energy crisis exacerbated by Trump’s fuel blockade. Some analysts warn the Cuban government will exhaust all fuel reserves by mid- to late March, bringing the island to a complete standstill. Trump has tasked Secretary of State Marco Rubio to lead talks with Cuban officials and has floated a “friendly” takeover of the island. “They want to make a deal so badly, you have no idea,” Trump said at the White House on Thursday, suggesting that major changes will be happening in a few weeks. What exactly Trump has in mind is not clear. However, his threats are resonating loudly across the Straits of Florida after Trump’s successful military operation to capture Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and his ongoing war in Iran, which killed the country’s supreme leader. Latin American experts said Cuba’s leaders are likely considering a range of options that could secure their safety, along with economic reforms, cooperation on Trump’s regional priorities and scaling back ties with America’s adversaries. Rubio is reportedly holding talks with Raúl Guillermo Rodriguez Castro, the grandson of Raul Castro, the 94-year-old former president and de facto leader of the country. Raul Castro’s control over the Cuban military is viewed as the main power base on the island. Peter Brown, senior fellow for Western Hemisphere security and maritime affairs at the America First Policy Institute, said it would make sense if the Trump administration is floating secure exile and protections from prosecution for the Castros, or other major power brokers in Cuba. “Obviously I’m not in the room with Secretary Rubio, or the people who he’s meeting, but I would suspect that’s one of the elements of discussion,” Brown said, “what would be the circumstances under which a transition could take place, and what protections might be available to those departing from positions of power.” Ricardo Torres, a Cuban economist and faculty fellow with American University, said the Castros, and the military network around them, might be open to the Trump administration’s demands of economic reform, given Trump’s handling of Venezuela. “One notion was quite dominant at some point, which is they’ve [the regime] always refused significant economic reform because they thought, or they think, that will eventually lead to losing political control,” he said. “One may always argue, well this administration has a different theory of change.” Torres said there are some practical steps the Cuban government can take that would likely be welcomed by the Trump administration. This includes the release of political prisoners and some guarantees for people to have freedom of expression and association. Havana could also deepen cooperation with the U.S. on countering illegal migration, drug trafficking and terrorism. And it could form a bilateral task force to compensate American companies that were expropriated at the beginning of the revolution, he said. “They could do that very easily and it’s also in Cuba’s interest if it wants to become a more attractive foreign investment destination at some point,” he said. Havana can also offer the U.S. guarantees it will not enter into “any security guarantee with U.S. competitors” like Russia or China. “All of that, Cuba could do quite easily and then Trump could always say, ‘I got this, and this is very important for us, it’s a lot,’ as just kind of an initial deal,” he said. But all of that might not be enough for Trump or Republicans in Congress, who are calling for full-on regime change — rather than an arrangement like Venezuela, where Trump has been happy to work with remnants of Maduro’s regime. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) renewed his call for a complete overhaul in Cuba in the aftermath of Trump’s major military operation against Iran. “Cuba’s next, they’re gonna fall, this communist dictatorship in Cuba, their days are numbered,” Graham said Sunday on Fox News. Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-Fla.), who was born in Cuba, posted on the social media site X on Thursday that the regime in Cuba “MUST BE DESTROYED & RELEGATED TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY !” Trump has been more measured in his remarks, suggesting the U.S. will deal with Iran and Venezuela before turning its full attention to Cuba. “We could do them all at the same time but bad things happen, if you watch countries over the years, you do them all too fast, bad things happen,” Trump said at the White House on Thursday. Trump, in remarks to Politico on Thursday, said the demise of the communist regime in Cuba would be the “icing on the cake” following his other interventions. “And that’s one of the small ones for me,” he said. John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, said political reform in Cuba is not as important as economic reform if Havana wants to satisfy Trump. “The president doesn’t care whether you’re a dictatorship, monarchy, authoritarian, communist, junta — he doesn’t care as long as you can manage your economy,” he said. “And he defines managing the economy as the ability to import products and services from the United States.” Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel on Monday announced “urgent” economic reforms at the same time the Trump administration is demanding change. “He’s tinkering with the same model without changing the fundamentals,” said Sebastián Arcos, interim director of the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University. “It means nothing. This is not a reaction to U.S. pressure like we have seen in Venezuela when they say we’re going to release political prisoners.” “This is not that. It’s an internal conversation within the party rather than a message to the U.S. that they are implementing reforms.” The State Department seemed to agree. In a statement to The Hill, a spokesperson said the proposed reforms “do not go nearly far enough to begin to amend the decades of incompetence that have made the Cuban economy dysfunctional.” “Cuba’s failed policies and corrupt leadership cause the Cuban people immense hardship, while regime leaders squirrel away billions in foreign accounts,” the spokesperson added. Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, said at a minimum, Díaz-Canel needs to step down with a “transition figure” put in place. “I don’t think that the administration sees any semblance of the current Cuban government as being a government that they can work with,” he said.
30 – Military power won’t stop Iranian nuclearization
Nephew, 3-5, 26 [RICHARD NEPHEW is Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and Bernstein Adjunct Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He served as Deputy Special Envoy for Iran during the Biden administration and on the National Security Council and State Department during the Obama administration, The Abiding Question of the Iranian Bomb America Needs a Plan for Tehran’s Nuclear Program, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/abiding-question-iranian-bomb]
This is also not foolproof: Iran has every incentive to cheat on a deal and to maintain a nuclear weapons option, including because Trump has already withdrawn from a nuclear deal with which Iran was complying. It would also result in a deal with the current Iranian government, which is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Iranian protesters and will also likely try to reemerge as a regional power in the future. But this path may represent the best chance at securely removing the nuclear threat with any certainty. The United States and Israel have lost a critical deterrent against Iranian nuclear weapons development. Alternatively, the United States could press forward with combat operations until the Iranian government collapses, effectively removing Iran’s ability to carry out a coordinated, concerted nuclear weapons program. In this scenario, it is theoretically possible that the constant pressure of U.S. force will enable opposition forces in the country to emerge and, once empowered, to work with the United States on a managed removal of weapons-usable materials and equipment. This option carries huge risk, however, and it is by no means certain that the regime will collapse under pressure from airstrikes alone. The political scientist Robert Pape has long argued that airpower doesn’t translate to coercive power, and he has expressed skepticism that it will work in this case. Moreover, this scenario carries its own risks of proliferation, as Iranian scientists and commanders might look to abandon a sinking ship and take their nuclear materials with them. Consequently, such a scenario would require the United States and/or Israel to deploy ground forces at some point to secure and extract Iran’s highly enriched uranium—an exceedingly risky mission not least because of the potential capture or killing of U.S. or Israeli forces. Trump embarked the United States on a risky path in his first administration when he rejected a nuclear deal that, although imperfect, had been working to limit Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Over the following eight years, sanctions and negotiations failed to bring about a new agreement. Last June’s U.S.-Israeli strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program but did not end it, and Trump’s inconsistent focus on and assessment of the issue since then have only made it harder to reach a successful outcome. He must now take responsibility for the nuclear risk the world is facing and lay out a clear plan for fixing a problem that, in his two terms as president, he has made manifestly worse.
29 – Trump won’t attack Cuba
Diamint & Tadesco, 3-5, 26 [RUT DIAMINT is Professor of International Relations at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; LAURA TEDESCO is Associate Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences at Saint Louis University–Madrid, The Coming Showdown Over Cuba; How Escalating U.S. Pressure Could Reshape the Island, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/coming-showdown-over-cuba]
Under these compounding pressures, Havana has little room to maneuver. Yet the chances that Trump will launch a Maduro-style military mission in Cuba remain low. After his Venezuela operation, undertaking a similar ouster would no longer have the advantage of surprise, and Cuba’s security forces are generally believed to be more loyal to their regime than Venezuela’s were to theirs.
28 – Cuban military won’t fight the US
Diamint & Tadesco, 3-5, 26 [RUT DIAMINT is Professor of International Relations at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; LAURA TEDESCO is Associate Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences at Saint Louis University–Madrid, The Coming Showdown Over Cuba; How Escalating U.S. Pressure Could Reshape the Island, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/coming-showdown-over-cuba]
In either case, Trump is unlikely to turn first to military intervention; he would instead attempt to secure political change in Cuba through negotiation and diplomatic pressure. (Last week, he floated the idea of conducting a “friendly takeover” of the island.) According to reporting in Axios, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has already been talking with Raúl’s grandson, the 41-year-old Raúl Guillermo Rodriguez Castro. But after nearly seven decades of communist rule, there is no Cuban leader capable of bringing substantive change to the country. Too many inside government are loyal to the regime, and the opposition is divided and lacks a plan. One potential outcome relies on Cuban leaders accepting Trump’s demand that they make some form of “deal.” In January, Díaz-Canel seemed to suggest that the Cuban military was prepared to fight: “The best way to avoid aggression is for imperialism to have to calculate what the price of attacking our country would be.” But amid the second Trump administration’s crippling blockade of the island, he has begun signaling—albeit obliquely—that he recognizes that he must take a different approach. “We are making every effort so that the country can once again have fuel,” he said last month. “We have to do very hard, very creative, and very intelligent work to overcome all these obstacles.” If the current Cuban leadership is open to reform, the Trump administration may be amenable to working with them to settle on terms agreeable to both parties. Or Washington could push for more substantial changes, including deeper economic liberalization and a reorientation away from China and Russia. Under these conditions, the country would likely remain under single-party rule, but there would be a shakeup at the top. Díaz-Canel would step down as president, yielding power to someone who has Raúl Castro’s backing but is also acceptable to Trump.
27 – Trump’s bombing run
Atlamzogou, 3-4, 26 Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP, Here Are All the Countries Trump Has Bombed in His Second Term, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/countries-trump-bombed-second-term-sa-030426
The current US-Israel attack on Iran is the ninth time US forces have gone to war during President Donald Trump’s second term in the Oval Office, and the second time in as many months in 2026. It is undeniably the largest and most significant operation of them all. The US military has achieved significant successes under the two Trump administrations. In 2019, for example, Delta Force operators killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, during his 2024 presidential campaign, Trump pivoted away from advocating military force, arguing that his experience at making deals made him a peacemaker by nature. He promised that he would end the Ukraine War within “24 hours” if re-elected, and vowed not to start any other “forever wars” once in the Oval Office. Since he took office for the second time in January 2025, Trump has attempted to burnish his reputation as a peacemaker. He has dubiously claimed to have ended eight separate foreign wars, campaigning for the Nobel Peace Prize for that accomplishment. Although he lost out on the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, the winner, Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, ultimately gave him her medal and endorsed him for the prize the following year. Trump also won the inaugural “FIFA Peace Prize,” created by the international soccer federation to “recognize exceptional acts for peace and unity.” Most recently—on January 22, 2026, only a month before the most recent strikes on Iran—Trump set up his “Board of Peace,” a multinational body established to oversee the peace process in Gaza and potentially other conflicts. Perhaps ironically, the charter signing ceremony took place in the headquarters of the now-defunct United States Institute of Peace, a publicly-funded think tank which fell victim to DOGE cuts in early 2025. Overall, in spite of Trump’s public messaging, the data suggest that the White House is keen on using military force to resolve foreign policy issues. The nature of military action has ranged from counterterrorism to law enforcement to conventional conflict operations. In many of the cases, the military action is part of a long campaign that transcends administrations. Somalia (February 2025 – present) From February 2025 onward, the US military has launched more than 100 strikes in Somalia, targeting ISIS and al-Shabaab terrorist targets. America’s ongoing involvement in Somalia has received relatively little public attention, in part because it has overwhelmingly been fought with drones rather than human troops. Enter Your Name & State to Try. You May Have Unclaimed Money Enter Your Name & State to Try. You May Have Unclaimed Money Sponsored | PeopleLooker.com US forces have operated in Somalia for more than 15 years. The Trump administration has justified continued involvement by citing Congress’ 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the president to pursue military force against targets involved in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The 2001 AUMF’s detractors have argued that it has morphed into an open-ended justification for any war against any perceived enemy in the Middle East—even those with no connection to 9/11—but attempts to repeal it have been unsuccessful. freestar Yemen (March 2025 – May 2025) In March 2025, the US military launched “Operation Rough Rider,” a series of naval and air strikes intended to deter the Houthi rebels in Yemen from attacking commercial shipping and warships in the Red Sea. The strikes were intended to reduce the Houthis’ ability to target and strike international maritime lanes. The United States signed a ceasefire with the Houthis in May 2025. The Trump administration never sought to offer a coherent legal basis for Operation Rough Rider. However, Trump’s strikes on the Houthis mirrored the Biden administration’s “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” which had justified its strikes on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter’s right to self-defense. Indeed, the Houthis had attacked US ships in the months leading up to Operation Rough Rider, so the issue was not significantly debated in the United States. Iraq (March 2025) Last March, the US military conducted a precision strike in the al-Anbar province of Iraq, killing ISIS’s second-in-command, Abdallah “Abu Khadijah” Malli Muslih al-Rifai. Although the terrorist group has suffered significant setbacks in recent years, it still has a presence in Iraq and Syria, and the United States has been actively involved in combating it to prevent its resurgence. Like the Trump administration’s actions in Somalia, the ongoing US military campaign in Iraq has been justified under the 2001 AUMF. freestar Iran (June 2025) The first military operation against Iran in Trump’s second term in office was Operation Midnight Hammer, targeting Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, in June 2025. During Operation Midnight Hammer, several B-2 Spirit strategic stealth bombers dropped 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) 30,000-pound bombs on the Fordow and Natanz underground nuclear weapons facilities. At the same time, a Navy guided-missile submarine launched dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles against a third location. The Trump administration justified the strikes on Iran through the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which gives the president wide latitude to launch military force without receiving the support of Congress. However, the law’s application has been controversial, and critics accused Trump of failing to apply it properly. Multiple members of Congress introduced legislation that would have forcibly terminated the campaign, but these resolutions failed to move forward. The Caribbean (September 2025 – Present) Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the Trump administration’s most controversial foreign military operation was its campaign in the Caribbean leading up to the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro. freestar Codenamed “Operation Southern Spear,” the United States began to strike at “narcoterrorists” in the Caribbean in September 2025. In the months since, US forces have destroyed dozens of drug trafficking boats in over 45 strikes. The US military has used fighter jets, helicopters, warships, and special operations forces in an attempt to stem the influx of drugs in the US. The attacks have triggered a heated debate over their legality—both the overarching campaign and the specific kinetic actions within it. Critics have accused US forces of war crimes during the campaign, including killing targets who had already been disabled by an earlier strike. In addition, Congress has questioned the statutory basis for the campaign, citing the Trump administration’s evasive justifications for the use of force. Nigeria (December 2025) On Christmas Day 2025, the US military conducted strikes against ISIS affiliates and militants in the northwestern part of Nigeria. The US forces worked with the local military to target and strike at the terrorists. The Trump administration has repeatedly criticized the treatment of Nigerian Christians in the country’s majority-Muslim north, and has threatened to intervene in their defense. The Christmas strikes were launched in coordination with the Nigerian government. However, the Trump administration did not offer any specific legal basis for the strikes. freestar Syria (December 2025) Also in December, the US military struck targets in Syria in retaliation for the killings of two US soldiers and a translator in Palmyra. The assailant was a Syrian government employee who was fired for extremist views. The strikes were part of the US military’s larger campaign in Syria, authorized under the 2001 AUMF. Venezuela (January 2026) On January 3, 2026, the US military launched Operation Absolute Resolve against Venezuela. In a special operation, Delta Force operators, accompanied by FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) operators, arrested Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife. They are now awaiting trial in Manhattan. A Night Stalker special operations aviator received the Congressional Medal of Honor, the military’s highest award for valor under fire, for his actions that night. The legal justification for Maduro’s capture stemmed from his criminal charges in the United States. In 2020, Maduro was indicted on drug trafficking charges in the Southern District of New York, and a judge issued a warrant for his arrest. For the next five years, the United States sought his capture, eventually issuing a $50 million reward for information leading to his arrest. The America First Policy Institute, a pro-Trump think tank, noted that Operation Absolute Resolve was framed as a “law enforcement action” rather than a military one. freestar Iran, Again (February 2026 – present) On February 28, after weeks of buildup, Trump launched “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran, the largest military operation of his presidency to date. On Saturday morning, the air campaign struck Iranian military sites and leadership targets, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a handful of other senior officials. The attack was framed both as a preemptive strike to prevent Iran from attacking the United States and as retribution for past Iranian attacks—as well as Iran’s massacre of protesters in the street the previous month. Though few Americans mourned Khamenei, some in Congress have criticized Trump’s actions, insisting that he lacked the legal authorization to strike Iran. As with Operation Midnight Hammer, Trump has claimed that the War Powers Resolution justifies his campaign. Separately from the legal issue, many have also criticized Trump’s strategy, noting that the air campaign is open-ended and has no real conditions for victory. Only time will tell if Trump prevails over his critics.
26 – US now attacking in Ecuador
Aaron Pellish and Eric Bazail-Eimil, March 3, 2026 [Politico, US launches military operations in Ecuador, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/03/us-military-operations-ecuador-00811272]
U.S. forces have launched military operations with Ecuador against “designated terrorist organizations” inside the South American country, Southern Command said Tuesday. The military released no details on the operations but suggested in a statement that it was an extension of strikes carried out by the Trump administration against suspected drug trafficking organizations in the region. “We commend the men and women of the Ecuadorian armed forces for their unwavering commitment to this fight, demonstrating courage and resolve through continued actions against narco-terrorists in their country,” said Marine Gen. Francis L. Donovan, commander of U.S. Southern Command. Since President Donald Trump took office, the U.S. has taken aggressive steps to curb the flow of drugs from the Southern hemisphere. The administration has conducted about 45 strikes against suspected smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean, killing more than 150 people. In January, U.S. military forces executed a raid in Venezuela to capture President Nicolas Maduro and take him to New York to face charges that include drug trafficking. Security in Ecuador has deteriorated in recent years. The Andean nation has become a major hub for cocaine trafficking. The situation took a dramatic turn in January 2024, when gangs stormed a TV station, taking staff hostage during a live broadcast and launched a wave of violence that prompted President Daniel Noboa to declare a state of emergency. Since then, the government has been engaged in a low-level internal armed conflict with the gangs as it tries to stabilize the nation. Noboa has courted the Trump administration over the past year in the hopes of securing assistance. He came to Washington for Trump’s second inauguration and Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Ecuador in September, and told reporters that the U.S. would “blow up” criminal groups if needed. During Rubio’s trip to Ecuador, the U.S. designated two criminal groups in Ecuador, Los Lobos and Los Choneros, as terrorist organizations. Until now, the U.S. had conducted military operations near Ecuador but had not publicly disclosed anything inside the country. The Coast Guard had been deployed in the eastern Pacific, off the coast of Ecuador, Colombia and other countries, helping interdict cocaine shipments in a mission known as Operation Pacific Viper. After the operation to capture Maduro, Trump did not rule out using military force against targets in other countries in the name of combatting drug trafficking. The expectation, however, had been that Trump would conduct strikes in Mexico and Colombia, both of which have a more significant role in the drug trade.
25—Regime change in Iran was the only option – Iran was supporting regional groups that caused a million deaths and it destroyed human rights
Dan Perry, opinion contributor – 03/04/26, The Hill, In Iran, regime change is the only goal that ever made sense, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5763662-in-iran-regime-change-was-the-only-goal-that-ever-made-sense/
An easier case to make is when a government has been harming other countries. That makes the case against Iran’s Islamic Republic easier to justify. Iran has for decades been funding, arming, and training proxy militias across the region that have caused stupendous harm to a swath of Middle East countries. Hezbollah has undermined Lebanon and caused ruinous wars with Israel; it propped up the murderous Assad regime in Syria until its collapse. Iran’s Shiite militias in Iraq have made a mockery of that country’s independence. The Houthis in Yemen have taken over half the country, impeded global trade in the Suez canal, and caused almost a half million deaths. Finally, there is Hamas, which on Oct. 7 sparked a cataclysmic war with Israel that has left much of Gaza in ruins. Trump pulled together a massive armada near Iran’s shores based on carrier groups that took weeks to arrive. But his argument during that phase for some reason focused on getting Iran to sign a deal foreswearing uranium enrichment. He went too far in demanding no enrichment, since Iran actually retains the right to civilian-level enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, Trump himself repeatedly claimed that Iran’s nuclear program had been “obliterated” by his action last June, even suggesting back then that no deal was necessary. It is good that the U.S. widened its demands to include strict limits on ballistic missiles, and especially an end to the support for the proxy militias. But even then, a deal that gives the regime (at least as it was under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) sanctions relief is not a great idea. Freeing up billions of dollars would give the regime more runway to continue oppressing its people. And a war was always bound to entail massive risks that only a massive payoff like regime change could justify. But to the surprise of many, once Trump made the decision to go to war, he did in fact frame it in the logic of regime change. The second surprise (though it was telegraphed) was that the war was launched in partnership with Israel. The third has been its stunning degree of success so far. In the first 24 hours — and mostly in three massive strikes in the first minutes — the attackers killed not only Khamenei but also about 40 of his top lieutenants, including the defense minister, chief advisors, and top military and Revolutionary Guard commanders. The regime is moving quickly to appoint replacements, doubling down on the narrative that it was never about individuals but a system worth defending. But if Trump claims that what has been achieved is already a version of regime change lite, for once it will not be completely bluster. There is reason to believe that any new iteration of the regime will be more careful, more vulnerable, and less indifferent to the demands of the U.S. and the world. One possibility now would be to go for toppling the regime altogether, and assume the risks of chaos in the country. Israel will probably push for that. But it would not be surprising to see Trump halt the war and give the new authorities a chance to show that the lesson has been learned — in short, to agree to surrender terms. A bad scenario, meanwhile, would see Trump, having gone as far as he has, simply agree to a cap on uranium enrichment, and in exchange for some Iranian promises ease sanctions and give the regime longer life in its current form. The regime has imposed profound hardship on its citizens while enriching loyal power centers through patronage and corruption. Women live under legal coercion in matters of dress and personal autonomy. Gays face severe persecution, and Iran remains one of the few countries where same-sex relations can carry the death penalty, sometimes enforced publicly in grotesque displays. Media is tightly constrained, dissent criminalized, and fear deeply embedded in political life. It has repeatedly massacred protestors. There is no credible constitutional mechanism for removing the ruling structure, leaving internal upheaval or external force as the only plausible paths to systemic change – in the latter case, by trying to get the military and the IRGC to turn on the clerics. If Trump is serious about rescuing the people of Iran, and he does agree to pause the war, he will add further conditions that will force a transition to democracy — for example, allowing all candidates to run for president, and putting parliament above the Assembly of Experts and its clerics. That would be true regime change, and one that is badly needed. After 47 years — roughly the same timespan history allowed communism to endure in Eastern Europe — the mullahs’ time is definitely up.
24 – (Court DA Link) – No legal precedent to constrain attacks
Ella Lee and Zach Schonfeld – 03/04/26, The Hill, Trump’s murky legal landscape on attacking Iran, https://thehill.com/homenews/5765442-trump-iran-legal-constraints/
Though courts have emerged as the primary obstacle for Trump to accomplish many aspects of his sweeping second-term agenda, it’s unlikely they’ll have an avenue to wade into a fight over Trump’s latest moves in the Middle East. Presidents from both parties in have carried out military strikes across the globe without congressional approval: Trump during his first term ordered strikes in Syria. President Obama bombed Libya alongside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). President Clinton intervened in the Kosovo conflict by authorizing strikes against Serbian forces. President George H.W. Bush invaded Panama. President Reagan deployed U.S. forces to Lebanon (though, Congress later signed off). President Truman sent troops to Korea. And that’s just in recent years. Even former President Polk — the 11th president — sent the military to occupy the newly annexed state of Texas without Congress’s initial backing, a move that was seen as a declaration of war with Mexico. Republican leaders have stood firmly behind Trump as Democrats raise alarm. Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), noting he’s a constitutional lawyer, expressed confidence following a briefing from administration officials Monday, though he acknowledged to reporters that the system includes “timetables” for Congress’ role under the Wars Powers Resolution of 1973.
23- Trump’s attacks threaten international law
Ella Lee and Zach Schonfeld – 03/04/26, Trump’s murky legal landscape on attacking Iran, https://thehill.com/homenews/5765442-trump-iran-legal-constraints/
“And I am certainly hopeful and I believe we do have the votes to put it down.” Then, there are questions of international law. The United Nations Charter, which Truman ratified in 1945, bars the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres pointed to the provision in a statement Saturday that said the joint attacks by the U.S. and Israel, and retaliation by Iran, “undermine international peace & security.” All treaties properly ratified become part of the “Law of the Land,” per the Constitution, even though U.S. courts can’t enforce treaties like the U.N. Charter. Plus, while U.N. member nations are entitled to act in self-defense, they abide by a rule of international law that nations must show a threat was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,” known as the Caroline doctrine. Oona Hathaway, an international law professor at Yale University and former special counsel at the Department of Defense, wrote on X that the military effort amounts to an “attack on the postwar legal order.” “Yet again, Trump has taken an action that threatens to end an era of historic peace and return us to a world in which might makes right,” she said. “The cost will be paid in human lives.”
22- Iran planning long-term retaliation
Imran Khalid, March 3, 2026, Common Dreams, Trump’s Strategic Disaster in Tehran, https://fpif.org/trumps-strategic-disaster-in-tehran/
The smoldering wreckage of an American F-15 fighter jet in the Kuwaiti desert offers a grim, physical testament to the escalating costs of President Donald Trump’s latest Middle Eastern venture. Just 48 hours into Operation Epic Fury, the loss of advanced American hardware—and the precarious safety of its pilots—signals that the air campaign against Iran is not the one-sided surgical strike many in Washington had anticipated. Instead, the images of smoke rising over Tehran and the orange glow of interceptors over the Persian Gulf suggest a familiar script: a high-stakes military gamble intended to reshape the region through sheer force now meeting a reality of sophisticated, asymmetric resistance. As the conflict enters its third day, the most consequential drama is not occurring in the Iranian skies but in the corridors of power in Washington, Jerusalem, and New Delhi. For decades, the conventional wisdom in Washington was that a “maximum pressure” campaign, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would cause the Iranian clerical establishment to shatter along its internal fault lines. On February 28, 2026, President Trump, acting in close coordination with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, attempted to prove this theory by authorizing strikes that resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The strategic calculation was clear: decapitate the leadership, exploit internal dissent, and trigger a spontaneous domestic collapse. However, that calculation appears fundamentally flawed. The Iranian leadership had clearly prepared for this eventuality, swiftly activating a pre-arranged interim council—comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Mohseni-Eje’i, and the cleric Alireza Arafi—that has kept the security apparatus loyal and the streets under tight control. Although Washington may have expected a popular revolt, the immediate reaction on the ground has been a surge of nationalist indignation. State media reports and growing crowds in Tehran suggest that the killing of Khamenei has triggered a “rally-around-the-flag” effect. Many Iranians who are otherwise critical of the government now view the strikes as a violation of national sovereignty, vowing revenge rather than seeking liberation. Domestic reactions in Tehran remain a complex tapestry of grief and cold pragmatism. Although state-run media broadcasts massive crowds mourning Khamenei in Enqelab Square, the reality is more fractured. Though the January 2026 protests had already pushed the regime’s legitimacy to a breaking point, the presence of American B-2s over Iranian soil has, for the moment, complicated the opposition’s narrative. Many citizens who were chanting against the IRGC just weeks ago now find themselves in the uncomfortable position of defending a sovereign territory under foreign bombardment, fearing that “liberation” by F-35s will only mirror the chaotic aftermath of Baghdad or Kabul. The swiftness of Tehran’s succession suggests a regime that had already stress-tested its survival. By early March 3, the newly formed Interim Leadership Council had not only assumed control but issued a unified call for “sacred retaliation.” Washington bet on a vacuum, but the Council has effectively neutralized immediate power struggles by framing the strikes as an assault on the Persian nation itself, rather than just the clerical elite. The fundamental flaw in the current strategy is the assumption that airpower alone can induce a stable political transition. The administration’s rhetoric suggests a dangerous overconfidence in the speed of this collapse. Even General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has signaled the need to “finish this war quickly and decisively” to avoid a protracted regional meltdown. Yet, this push for a rapid conclusion ignores the reality of Iranian resilience. Decapitation strikes often lead to fragmentation and regional chaos rather than a stable transition to democracy. As Iranian proxies mobilize and the interim leadership in Tehran continues to target U.S. assets and Gulf neighbors, the “ultimate victory” promised by the White House seems increasingly distant. This resilience puts President Trump in a precarious position, both internationally and domestically. By launching a major military campaign without the mandatory approval of Congress, he has bypassed the constitutional norms that govern American war-making. There is no evidence of an imminent Iranian threat to the U.S. mainland that would justify such unilateral action. Consequently, a bipartisan coalition led by Senator Tim Kaine is already moving to invoke the War Powers Resolution. If this conflict persists for another two weeks without a clear political resolution, the president may find himself fighting a constitutional battle at home that is just as fierce as the military one abroad. The fallout is already being felt in global markets, where oil prices have surged following threats to the Strait of Hormuz. For the Gulf monarchs, the initial silence has turned into quiet panic as they realize that the American security umbrella may now be a lightning rod for Iranian missiles. They find themselves caught between a revisionist Iran with nothing left to lose and a Trump administration that appears to have launched a war without a “day after” plan. In Jerusalem, Netanyahu may see a strategic opening, but for Washington, the lack of a clear successor in Tehran and the absence of a domestic uprising suggest that Epic Fury has achieved tactical success at the cost of strategic disaster. The coming days will test the limits of Trump’s “America First” doctrine. If the president prioritizes his domestic narrative of “total victory” over the stability of his regional alliances, the Middle East could face a decade of vacuum and violence. For now, the silence in Tehran is not the silence of a collapsed state, but the quiet preparation for a long and expensive retaliation.
21- Decapitation won’t solve the Iran threat
Ameer Al-Auqaili | March 2, 2026, Killing Leaders Doesn’t Kill the System, https://fpif.org/killing-leaders-doesnt-kill-the-system/
President Donald Trump has repeatedly described Iran as a serious and immediate threat to U.S. interests, signaling a willingness to target senior leadership figures. That posture rested on a familiar assumption: remove the people at the top, and the regime weakens or collapses. In Iran, coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026, ending his 36-year rule of the Islamic Republic. Iranian state media confirmed his death, and intense retaliation is already underway. In Mexico, security forces killed Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, the head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and one of the fugitives most wanted by the United States, in a high-profile operation that provoked waves of cartel violence and upheaval across the country. And in Venezuela, U.S. forces captured former President Nicolás Maduro in January and flew him to New York to face federal charges, leaving the country under interim leadership as international debate swirls around the legality and consequences of the operation. Each of these operations was framed as a decisive moment, a strike against a figure seen as central to a dangerous or destabilizing system. They rest on the same strategic assumption: remove the person at the top, and the structure beneath begins to unravel. It feels decisive. It looks strong. And it makes for powerful headlines. But history, and the aftermath of these strikes, suggest something more complicated. Removing a leader can disrupt hierarchy and generate short-term shock. Yet it rarely dismantles the institutional, ideological, and coercive machinery that sustains power. The Illusion of Decisive Action Complex conflicts rooted in institutional decay, ideological rivalry, and geopolitical competition resist simple solutions. Removing a leader appears to cut through that complexity. But most contemporary political and criminal systems are not one-man operations. Research on leadership decapitation in counterterrorism and insurgency studies shows that organizations with bureaucratic depth, financial infrastructure, and layered command structures frequently survive the loss of top leaders. Some adapt. Others decentralize. A few even become more violent as factions compete for legitimacy and control. The assumption that power collapses with the person who holds it mistakes symbolism for structure. Leaders are often the most visible part of a system, not the most essential ones. Political regimes, militant movements, and criminal cartels are not just personalities. They are ecosystems, supported by institutions, revenue streams, security organs, patronage networks, and ideological narratives. The leader may symbolize the system, but the system rarely depends solely on the leader. Power in such systems is distributed across networks of elites, security institutions, and economic actors who share a common interest in the structure’s survival. When the top is removed, these networks reorganize new centers of gravity. Remove the figurehead, and the machinery often keeps running. In some cases, it runs harder. History’s Warning Recent history reinforces the lesson. In Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 eliminated a dictator. It did not produce institutional stability. Instead, state authority fractured, sectarian violence escalated, and insurgent movements filled the vacuum. The regime fell. The system did not reorganize around democratic stability. It was fragmented. In Venezuela, the capture of President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. forces in January did not dismantle the regime’s core structure. The governing apparatus, military leadership, ruling party networks, intelligence services, and patronage systems remain intact. The armed forces are institutionally embedded in the regime’s survival. The ruling party controls key bureaucratic and economic levers. Power has shifted internally. The structure is adaptable. In Mexico, repeated takedowns of cartel leaders have rarely eliminated the organizations themselves. Leadership removal often produces splintering, succession struggles, and spikes in violence as factions compete for territory. Cartels evolve into networks rather than hierarchies, becoming harder to dismantle over time. This pattern is not accidental. Systems built around coercion and patronage develop redundancy. They prepare for leadership loss. Succession mechanisms, formal or informal, exist precisely because elites anticipate vulnerability. The individual is replaceable. The network is resilient. The Pressure Beneath the Surface At first glance, the Islamic Republic appears deeply tied to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His constitutional authority, religious status, and oversight over the armed forces place him at the apex of the regime. But Iran is not merely one man. It is a layered political order composed of clerical oversight bodies, elected institutions, intelligence services, economic foundations, and, critically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which possesses independent military and economic power. Authority is institutionalized through the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, the “Guardianship of the Jurist,” which embeds the Supreme Leader within a constitutional and ideological framework that extends beyond personal charisma. Through this structure, Iran’s leadership is linked to allied armed movements across the Middle East via institutional channels, shared doctrine, funding pipelines, and long-standing strategic coordination, not simply personal loyalty to a single individual. In highly centralized systems, the leader often functions less as the entire structure and more as the force that holds competing factions in check. Remove that force, and what follows may not collapse but erupt. Rival elites maneuver for control. Security institutions are hardened. Hardline factions consolidate. The pressure that was contained does not disappear, it is released. Iran’s succession process involves the Assembly of Experts, clerical networks, and security elites. The IRGC’s entrenched economic and military role means that any transition would likely involve internal bargaining among powerful institutions rather than regime disintegration. Leadership removal, in such a context, could generate instability without producing systemic change. It could intensify factional competition while leaving the regime’s coercive and ideological foundations intact. Why Personalization Persists If the historical record is so clear, why does leader-focused strategy persist? Because it is visible. A strike, a capture, or a public threat is measurable. It signals resolve. It creates a narrative of control and simplifies a complicated geopolitical struggle into a single dramatic act. Structural reform offers no such clarity. Rebuilding institutions, reshaping elite incentives, disrupting financial networks, and encouraging negotiated political settlements are slow, ambiguous, and politically unrewarding. They lack spectacle. Symbolic action often substitutes for systemic transformation. But foreign policy is not a headline cycle. It is an encounter with institutions, incentives, and power structures that survive beyond individuals. The United States has the capability to remove leaders. The harder question is whether it understands the systems those leaders sit atop. If policymakers mistake personalities for structures, they risk triggering instability without producing transformation. Removing a figurehead may satisfy the demand for action, but it does not automatically weaken the architecture of power. Durable change requires something far less dramatic and far more demanding: sustained institutional engagement, elite bargaining, targeted economic pressure, and long-term strategic investment. The strike may change the headlines, but the transition will shape the future. World politics turns less on who falls than on what survives. In the months ahead, the real test will be whether the institutions in Iran harden, fragment, or adapt. History suggests that they will adapt. The question is whether policymakers in the United States and Israel are prepared for that reality.
20 – Continued deterrence needed; overthrowing the regmine won’t eliminate the threat
Alterman, 3-3-, 26 Jon B. Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, Why Decapitation Will Not Solve the United States’ Iran Problem, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-decapitation-will-not-solve-united-states-iran-problem
When Iranians took to the streets to celebrate the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, it was tempting to think that the hardest part of the current confrontation with Iran was over. Iran has been a wicked policy problem for the United States, its Middle Eastern allies, and the international community for decades, and Khamenei was more than merely the face of the problem. He was a bitter voice of opposition, a hard-liner who persistently undermined moderates, and in control of all of the most threatening elements of Iranian power: its nuclear program, its paramilitary forces, its proxy network, and the intelligence services that both terrorized Iranians and carried out acts of terror around the world. The United States and Israel were able to use exquisite intelligence and powerful munitions not only to kill Khamenei at the outset of the war, but also to kill many of his most senior advisers. Decapitating the regime seems to offer a tidy way to “solve” a problem that has resisted solution for almost half a century, and it could unfold along several paths. The new leaders who arise could adopt a wholly different posture toward the world. They could be incompetent in implementing Khamenei’s strategy. Or they could decide that self-preservation requires them to be more pliable in the face of U.S. demands. It is not unreasonable to think that any of Khamenei’s successors would be an improvement. Historical Record on Decapitation Unfortunately, though, meaningful improvement through decapitation is unlikely. Each situation is unique, and each involves an element of chance. Still, the track record for advancing ambitious political goals—which is what the United States has—through a limited military effort is poor. The most common outcome of external military intervention is instability or civil war; in some cases, new strongmen replace the old ones. While the fall of dictators certainly presents moments of euphoria, deeply networked people with money and guns (and few scruples) often triumph after periods of chaos. Even when the near term looks promising, the medium term often proves less so. Consider, for example, Israel’s repeated decapitation of Hamas. Since Hamas was founded in 1987, Israel has assassinated—or attempted to assassinate—a long line of Hamas leaders, including Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin (2004) and former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (2024), while attempts against Khaled Mashal (1997) and Khalil al-Hayya (2025) failed. One could argue that these assassinations were punishment or deserved. However, what is much harder to argue is that these assassinations have either changed the direction of the Hamas leadership or done much to blunt the broader political ambitions of Hamas narrowly or the Palestinian national movement more broadly. Hamas, as a political movement, absorbed its martyrs and lives to fight another day. Of course, the story is not all so gloomy. Japan and Germany emerged from World War II with new leadership and close partnerships with the United States that have grown stronger in the subsequent eight decades. Panama has flourished after the 1989 removal of dictator Manuel Noriega for his drug-running efforts, and democracy has been strengthened. Iran’s Own History with Regime Change A more mixed story can be found in Iran itself. As every Iranian knows, the United States and the United Kingdom worked together to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 after he nationalized the oil industry and partnered with the local communist party. The move allowed the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to rule unencumbered for a quarter-century. Fiercely anti-communist and close to the West, Iran stood as one of the “Twin Pillars” of Western strategy in the Persian Gulf, alongside Saudi Arabia. Between the two, they kept the region’s oil supplies firmly in the Western camp and far away from the Soviet Union. The Shah’s modernization efforts played well in Washington, and his close ties with Israel won Iran some friends; the Shah’s authoritarianism was easy for many to overlook. For the most dangerous part of the Cold War, then, the U.S. effort to remove what it saw as a dangerous leader was a success. The problem from a U.S. perspective was the almost-half-century that followed his fall. Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has presented an enduring threat to U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East, and it has harbored a special animus against the United States. Iraq as a Cautionary Tale Neighboring Iraq is a harder case to judge. Saddam Hussein was certainly a malign force in both Iraq and the region, but it is Iran that benefited most when the United States removed him from power. The prevailing view in the Bush administration was that if the “dirty dozen” at the top of the Iraqi government were removed, the Iraqi people would be in control of their fate after decades of brutal dictatorship. Great effort and planning went into the military campaign, and politics were something of an afterthought. Yet every Iraqi government since the fall of Saddam has understood the depth of Iranian penetration of their country, its security apparatus, its economy, and its politics. The indelible images of Iraqis proudly holding their ink-stained fingers aloft after voting in 2005 were moving, but they were followed by a brutal insurgency that allowed Iran to penetrate further still. Iranian-backed militias hold wide swaths of the country in their grip, and every Iraqi prime minister has known he needs to strike a modus vivendi with Iran. In addition, the United States built on Saddam’s strategy to use heightened sectarianism as a tool of Iraqi political management. That strategy provided short-term stabilization, but it reinforced the country’s fault lines. For all of the blood and treasure that the United States poured into Iraq after decapitating the government, the scoreboard is decidedly mixed. Why Systems Survive Leaders Elsewhere, the direct U.S. effort was less clear, and the outcomes remain murky. One set of arguable successes was in Eastern Europe. Although the United States’ role in precipitating the fall of the Iron Curtain was anything but acute, strong support to Eastern Europe—from the United States and European allies alike—helped many countries transition (back) to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. The United States moved Jean-Bertrand Aristide out (and then in, and then out) of power in the 1990s and 2000s, and Haiti has become steadily less secure and more dysfunctional. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi maintained an iron grip on his country. Since his fall in 2011, a power vacuum has persisted, and warring factions roam the country. Shortly thereafter, the United States helped ease Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power in Yemen, and chaos has followed in his wake. Little of this was by design, but it reveals an important truth: Efforts to change systems of government are destabilizing. Too often, the “great man” theory of history persists, fostering the belief that removing a single person can cause complex problems to disappear. But leaders do not rule by themselves. They are the product of systems that are attuned to local circumstances, and they preside over elaborate patronage networks whose members have everything to lose. Removing a leader often exposes the pathologies of a country that was struggling. By virtue of being close to power, groups often acquire money, guns, and networks. When there is any vacuum, they deploy them to remain in power. For example, in country after country in the Arab Spring, security services aligned with business elites to form some new version of the ancien régime. In those places where new elites came to the fore, they either made peace with existing elements or created similar structures with themselves in charge. What Successful Political Transitions Require Compare this to Syria. Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria built his rump state in Idlib province for eight years before moving into Damascus. In Idlib, he and his team created an entire governmental network that built popular support, as well as a track record of success. That is to say, al-Sharaa had the time and space (and money) to build resilient institutions. Officials who were competent could be promoted, and the incompetent shunted aside. Large and loyal cadres were built, and discipline was instilled. That way, when he moved to take over the government in Damascus in December 2024, he was able to draw on his existing apparatus. This network is accustomed to working together, can create and implement policies, and knows how to build support. While the future of Syria remains murky, early signs suggest the new government is internally coherent and has won significant public backing. Decapitation short-circuits that sort of process and does not allow resilient alternatives to emerge. Often, after decapitation, either some version of the current government remains in power, or countries dissolve into chaos. In an extensive survey of regime change efforts over the last two centuries, political scientist Alexander B. Downes found that “more than 40 percent of states that experience foreign-imposed regime change have a civil war within the next ten years.” He argued in his book that, paradoxically, “regime change is likely to result in unfavorable outcomes where it is easy and better outcomes where it is hard.” How Iran May Go Some argue that this argument is irrelevant for Iran. After what is expected to be an onslaught in the coming weeks, any Iranian government—even a continuation of the present one—would decide it is suicidal to pursue the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In that way, an acute danger to Israel and the United States will evaporate, and the war will be considered a success. But there are many ways that would not be the outcome. After all, for the current government, the attack validates their belief in the unrelenting hostility of the United States and Israel. An important part of deterrence is assurance: If a target refrains from proscribed behavior, threatened punishments will not follow. Iran’s leaders have often concluded that U.S. hostility to Iran has meant that the ratchet only goes one way, and the only consequence of Iranian concessions is demands that Iran make more concessions, albeit from a position of greater weakness. For many in the current regime, the war underlines Iran’s vital need to maintain its own deterrent. What shape that would take is unclear, but it is likely to emphasize asymmetrical tools that can cause serious damage. That could involve enduring threats to neighbors, to Israel, and to the United States. Iranian colleagues often remark that countries that have crossed the nuclear threshold—Pakistan, India, and North Korea—have never been attacked by Western powers, and the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons may well persist. Should the government fall, a replacement government may have difficulty maintaining control. This would be especially true if devastating attacks on energy infrastructure created enduring economic distress. The new government would have little ability to relieve suffering and few tools to build patronage. As the central authority dissolved, ungoverned spaces could emerge that provided cover for armed groups to operate, including recidivist elements of the current government. That chaos could well spread outward for many years to come. It is unlikely that any country would seek to occupy Iran, a country more than twice the size of Texas, with a population three times the size of Iraq. Iran could simply smolder. From Israel’s point of view, those sorts of scenarios may be an improvement on the status quo. Feeling an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear program and a persistent danger from Iran’s proxies, many Israelis would see even a chaotic situation in Iran as favorable. Israel believes it is already locked into an enduring battle with Iran, so its continuation, even on different terms, is an acceptable outcome. Diverging U.S. and Israeli Stakes The United States has more complicated interests. It has much more extensive relationships in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, and a much more robust presence there. Persistent and evolving threats to the United States and its partners would heighten dangers to Americans present in the region, jeopardize growing economic investments, and have enduring negative effects on global trade. Simply put, the United States has not needed to feel it was on a constant war footing with Iran, but it may need to going forward. The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei was not the hard part of the current campaign. Deploying intelligence tools and military instruments against an adversary is something that U.S. and Israeli forces have done with great success for decades. What is harder is using those tools to shape political outcomes, and in particular, to shape the political choices that Iran’s leaders—and its future leaders—make. While President Donald Trump has sometimes spoken about his desire for regime change and the freedom of the Iranian people, those things are hard to accomplish, and even harder to do from arm’s length and with little preparation. The record of decapitation creating much more favorable governments is generally poor. More likely, the U.S. and Israeli governments hope that future leaders of Iran will see that resistance is futile, and they will simply submit to the aggressors’ strength and will. Here, too, the record is not encouraging. Khamenei was 86 and ailing, and succession talk was swirling. That may have been an opportunity to help Iran move in a different direction, but that moment has passed. Conclusion The current war presents a much more acute challenge, and one where favorable outcomes will be much harder to secure. Much will depend on how the war unfolds and what is damaged in the process. The spectrum of possibilities is wide. But experience teaches that fighting the war successfully is a small part of achieving war aims. That is especially true here, where so many of the war aims seem to be political. Almost 60 years ago, the development economist Albert O. Hirschman wrote about the “hiding hand.” That is, individuals systematically underestimate the difficulty of what they hope to do while also underestimating the creativity that unexpected difficulties will demand. The U.S. and Israeli governments have vast power to destroy, but far less capacity to build—especially in foreign lands that they have just vanquished. They should understand that the hard work is just beginning. Killing the Iranian leadership is not the goal of this operation. Changing the political decisions of future Iranian leaders is. That is the challenge, and it will be harder than they expect. It will require more creativity—and effort—than they seem ready to deploy.
19-US military action against Iran undermines Hezbollah
Byman, 3-4, 26, DANIEL BYMAN is a Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Affairs, Is Hezbollah Still a Threat?, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/lebanon/hezbollah-still-threat
Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, has joined the war against the United States and Israel, launching missiles and drones at Israeli military sites in response to the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and other senior officials. Israel promptly responded by killing Hezbollah’s intelligence chief and bombing Hezbollah positions in Lebanon. On Tuesday, Israel even sent more ground forces into southern Lebanon and warned 80 villages to evacuate. Israel’s fight against Hezbollah will not be easy. Hezbollah remains deeply embedded in Lebanon, and the dysfunction of the Lebanese army and political system stands in the way of defeating the group. Hezbollah is adapting to war by promoting new leaders to replace those who have fallen and decentralizing its military operations. The group also still has rockets, drones, and missiles to launch and can likely mount overseas terrorist attacks, as it has in the past. Israel has fought Hezbollah for over 40 years—sometimes with on-again, off-again strikes, and in other cases with massive bombings and limited invasions of Lebanon—and the group, while battered, survived. But Hezbollah, once described by a senior U.S. official as the “A-team of terrorists,” is no longer what it once was. Since 2023, the group has been devastated by attacks from Israel, and its longtime ally, the Assad regime, has fallen. Its patron, Iran, has been battered by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, both ongoing and from last June, and by domestic unrest. And Hezbollah’s opponents at home, long cowed by the group’s popular appeal and willingness to kill, are finally standing up. Politically, Hezbollah today may be weaker than at any time since its founding in the 1980s. In other words, Hezbollah is down but not out. The United States, Israel, and regional partners should seize on Iran’s vulnerability to step up pressure on Hezbollah even further. It is possible to diminish the group’s power and influence permanently, but it will take sustained pressure, long-term investment in state institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, and careful diplomacy. ‘FROM AN ARMY TO A MILITIA’ Hezbollah’s trials began on October 8, 2023, the day after Hamas’s devastating attack on Israel. After decades of on-again, off-again conflict, Hezbollah and Israel exchanged limited tit-for-tat blows for months. In September 2024, however, Israel went on the offensive. It killed or wounded over 1,000 members of Hezbollah by detonating explosives hidden in their pagers and walkie-talkies. Israel followed by striking Hezbollah’s military positions, assassinating high-ranking officials, including the group’s long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah, and invading southern Lebanon. Reeling from these attacks, Hezbollah’s vaunted military forces and arsenal of rockets and missiles proved ineffective. In November 2024, the group agreed to a ceasefire, under which it withdrew its forces from south of the Litani River, which sits about 20 miles from the Israeli border, to be replaced by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Nasrallah’s successor, Naim Qassem, publicly admitted that Hezbollah suffered 18,000 casualties in the fighting, including 5,000 deaths. Israel claimed it had destroyed 80 percent of the group’s rocket arsenal. Other losses were less tangible. Qassem, for example, is markedly less charismatic and commanding than Nasrallah was. As Lebanon analyst Hanin Ghaddar has written, “Hezbollah has been reduced from an army to a militia.” But even after the fighting, Hezbollah still fielded 25,000 rockets and missiles and between 40,000 and 50,000 full- and part-time fighters and reserve forces. After the ceasefire, Israel kept five military posts within Lebanese territory and routinely fired at Hezbollah, which Hezbollah claimed was a violation of the truce. Between November 2024, when the ceasefire was agreed to, and the outbreak of war with Iran in February 2026, Hezbollah did little in response to Israeli operations, believing (probably correctly) that resisting would be ineffectual and could lead to punishing retaliation. The group’s muted reaction, however, cost it some credibility among its core supporters. Hezbollah, after all, has branded itself as part of a movement to resist the Israeli state. The group not only suffered militarily and reputationally but also financially. Throughout 2024, Israel bombed branches of a Hezbollah-affiliated bank in an attempt to damage the group’s financial infrastructure. And in response to U.S. pressure, the Lebanese government has put some restrictions on Hezbollah financial institutions. The organization’s expenses, meanwhile, have soared: it must recruit new fighters, acquire new weapons, and take care of the families of those killed in its service. According to the news outlet The New Arab, Hezbollah has frozen or reduced payments to its fighters and their dependents. FEW FRIENDS, MORE FOES Declining support from foreign governments has made Hezbollah’s problems worse. In December 2024, the Assad regime, which had supported Hezbollah for decades, was overthrown and replaced by a government vehemently opposed to the group. Syria’s new rulers now interdict weapons flowing to Lebanon and have cracked down on the drug trade that was once a revenue stream for Hezbollah. The United States, after its capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, has also cut Hezbollah off from an important hub for its international smuggling networks. Iran remains committed to Hezbollah in theory, but it, too, is on the back foot. Before 2023, Iran gave Hezbollah around $700 million per year, accounting for most of the group’s annual budget. It would be difficult for Tehran to send anywhere near that amount today. Iran’s infrastructure has been devastated by U.S. and Israeli strikes and its economy is sputtering from mismanagement and sanctions. Over the last eight years, Iranians’ purchasing power has fallen more than 90 percent. The domestic protests in January, in which the Iranian government gunned down thousands of its own people, were originally animated by a collapse of Iran’s currency and a broader affordability crisis. The next Iranian government, even if dominated by clerical or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps hardliners, might cut off, or at least substantially reduce, aid to Hezbollah, either because it is broke or because it could be bound to do so by an eventual ceasefire deal with the United States and Israel. U.S. President Donald Trump has justified his war, in part, by pointing to Tehran’s support for “terrorist militias.” Hezbollah is also suffering from a crisis of counterintelligence. Through the pager detonations and a string of assassinations, Israel proved it had deeply penetrated the group. (Israeli intelligence was similarly successful in Iran.) Hezbollah must now rid itself of spies and secure its communications systems—tasks that are daunting in peacetime and nearly impossible to accomplish while under siege from Israel. Hezbollah’s leaders are probably struggling to communicate with one another, let alone trust one another. Rival factions within Lebanon are also challenging Hezbollah in ways big and small, apparently less intimidated by the diminished group. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have deployed to southern Lebanon to disarm and replace Hezbollah forces there—a move that would have been inconceivable before 2023—and have even searched homes for weapons belonging to Hezbollah, in response to Israeli demands. In addition, the LAF now controls Beirut’s airport, which Hezbollah used for years to fly in weapons and supplies. In November, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun even broke a taboo by admitting the country had “no choice” but to negotiate with Israel (either on border demarcation or, more ambitiously, a peace agreement). Hezbollah’s foes will probably become more emboldened as Iran suffers through the latest round of fighting. On Monday, in response to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, the Lebanese government even announced a ban on Hezbollah military activities—a ban it cannot enforce, but the sentiment behind it shows more willingness to stand up to the group. FINISHING THE JOB Hezbollah’s biggest advantage lies in the weakness of its domestic opponents. The LAF is unwilling, and probably unable, to confront Hezbollah head-on throughout the country. And although many figures within Lebanon’s government oppose Hezbollah, they, too, are divided and have a history of turning on one another. Hezbollah also maintains support (however begrudgingly) among Lebanon’s Shia community, which makes up around 40 percent of the population. Many Lebanese Shia Muslims are alienated by Hezbollah’s corruption, protection racket, and violence, but they have no clear alternative. They rely on the group to fight for their share of the Lebanese political pie. Power in Lebanon is carved up along religious lines, and Hezbollah performed well in the May 2025 parliamentary elections. The group will also do whatever it can to resist the Israeli and U.S. goal of complete disarmament. Weapons are essential to its self-image; its flag even features an assault rifle. But there could be hope for a partial disarmament. Last year, the group held internal discussions on what that might look like. More recently, the Lebanese army has presented a vision for disarming Hezbollah between the Litani and Awali rivers. Hezbollah is down but not out. The United States can continue to chip away at Hezbollah by strengthening the Lebanese state’s institutions, including the LAF. Some military and financial aid will be stolen, while other programs will prove ineffective—as they have in the past. Although progress in building the LAF has been limited, the investment is still worth making. Washington should also provide support to the Lebanese state so it—not Hezbollah—leads the country’s reconstruction. According to a 2025 World Bank assessment, Lebanon needs $11 billion to rebuild, and that does not factor in damage stemming from this latest round of fighting. Lebanese citizens, especially those who are Shia, will turn to Hezbollah for services if the government cannot provide them. The United States’ goal should be to steadily increase government influence in Lebanon and create space for less violent alternatives to Hezbollah to emerge. The United States should also work carefully to get the Lebanese government and Israel on the same page. The United States should encourage the Lebanese government to negotiate a ceasefire with Israel with the promise of a more lasting peace at the end of it. An Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon should be part of these negotiations: so long as Israel occupies Lebanese territory, Hezbollah can claim it must remain armed to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty. Washington’s goal should be to demonstrate that negotiations, not resistance, will lead to positive change for Lebanon and that Hezbollah’s troublemaking has a cost for Lebanese citizens. That way, Hezbollah either acquiesces to talks or risks being blamed for dragging Lebanese civilians back into war. Any U.S. successes against Iran, both in the military sphere and at the negotiating table, can also help undermine Hezbollah. Even if Washington cannot convince Tehran to abandon its proxies, it could wear Iran down so much that it can no longer afford to provide massive funding to them—undermining Iran’s status as a reliable patron.
18-Christian fundamentalism driving US imperial aggression
Falyn Stempler, 3-3, 26, The Mirror, US commanders tell troops Trump ‘anointed by Jesus’ to start Iran war sparking hundreds of complaints, https://www.themirror.com/news/world-news/commanders-tell-troops-trump-anointed-1715791?1=
A damning new report found that evangelical Christian fundamentalism is underpinning U.S. military action in Iran. U.S. President Donald Trump announced Saturday that the U.S. and Israel launched a joint operation and struck Iran overnight, killing Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, among dozens of others across the region. The attack was launched amid Iranian nuclear negotiations and weeks of civil unrest in Iran due to economic turmoil. After the initial attack, Trump said “heavy and pinpoint bombing” would continue “uninterrupted throughout the week or, as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!” while calling for regime change in the Islamic Republic. Details about the operation have been sparse as the president repeatedly refused to speak to reporters following the attack. He told The New York Times that he ordered U.S. troops to continue attacking Iran for “four to five weeks,” without providing details of his plan. However, a fresh report found that hundreds of U.S. troops across dozens of units and installations have submitted complaints to the non-profit watchdog, the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF), since the attack about combat unit commanders providing Christian reasoning for the war, during which at least four U.S. troops have already been killed, independent journalist Jonathan Larsen reports on Substack. Non-commissioned officers (NCO) who attended a briefing Monday told the MRFF that a combat-unit commander “urged us to tell our troops that this was ‘all part of God’s divine plan’ and he specifically referenced numerous citations out of the Book of Revelation referring to Armageddon and the imminent return of Jesus Christ.” The commander also argued that Trump “anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth” and that the Iran war is part of God’s plan, the NCO claimed. Article continues below freestar The remarks were submitted in more than 110 complaints about commanders across all military branches, including more than 40 units across 30 military installations, the MFRR told Larsen. At least one complainant from an NCO identified themselves as a Christian, who could be deployed at any time to Iran, writing on behalf of 15 troops, including 11 Christians, one Muslim and one Jew. Trump View 3 Images Trump said he ordered troops to attack Iran for “four to five weeks” without providing details Article continues below In the NCO’s Monday email, he warned that their commander’s remarks “destroy morale and unit cohesion and are in violation of the oaths we swore to support the [C]onstitution.” MRFF President Mikey Weinstein, an Air Force veteran, told Larsen that his office has been “inundated” with such complaints, explaining, “These calls have one damn thing in freaking common; our MRFF clients [service members who seek MRFF aid] report the unrestricted euphoria of their commanders and command chains as to how this new ‘biblically-sanctioned’ war is clearly the undeniable sign of the expeditious approach of the fundamentalist Christian ‘End Times’ as vividly described in the New Testament Book of Revelation.” He added, “Many of their commanders are especially delighted with how graphic this battle will be zeroing in on how bloody all of this must become in order to fulfill and be in 100% accordance with fundamentalist Christian end of the world eschatology.”
17-US launching imperial wars of aggression that will trigger extinction
Cabinet of the Progressive International, March 3, 2026, We Must Stop This Brutal, Imperialist War!, https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/stop-the-war-against-iran
We, the Cabinet of the Progressive International, condemn in the strongest possible terms the US-Israel military assault on Iran—a devastating escalation that has already killed scores of civilians and propelled the world towards war. The assault once again exposes the true character of US diplomacy. Indirect talks between Tehran and Washington—mediated by Oman—were little more than a screen behind which the Trump administration coordinated an agenda of “major combat operations” under the banner of ‘Operation Epic Fury.’ Trump has been clear: This is a regime change offensive—devoid of any legal justification let alone authorization. Trump has framed these strikes as “pre-emptive,” necessary to eliminate “imminent threats,” and to defend national security. Yet Iran has made no immediate threats to the US. On the contrary, it is a longstanding ambition of the US and Israel to wage war on Iran—the lethal consequences of which will be borne by its people. These strikes did not begin today. They are an extension of a longer project to redraw the map of West Asia by force. From Afghanistan to Iraq, Libya to Syria, Yemen to Iran, each escalation is a stepping stone in a broader project to suffocate regional sovereignty in the service of US and Israeli interests. Each has left behind shattered states, displaced populations, and the wreckage of societies that dared to assert independence. Imperialist war does not liberate peoples—it subjugates them. The evidence is found in the ruins of Gaza, Baghdad, and Tripoli, where bombs leveled cities and “democracy promotion” left ashes in its wake. Marco Rubio made it clear in Munich: the US does not wage war for freedom, but for recolonization—whether in West Asia, or across the Western Hemisphere. We refuse to remain passive observers of this project to recolonize the planet. From the Cabinet of the Progressive International, we commit to working with members and allies across the world—in their factories and ports, parliaments and courts—to break the war machine that propels our species toward extinction.
16-Congress won’t restrain the President now
Emily Brooks, March 4, 2026, The Hill, GOP says it’s a targeted, limited combat operation, not a war, with Iran, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/5765650-republican-denies-trump-iran-war/
Congressional Republicans are denying that President Trump is waging a war in Iran, arguing instead that the U.S. is responding to acts of war by the Iranian regime and engaging in a limited combat operation. “This isn’t a war. We haven’t declared war,” Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.) said on CNN on Monday, later adding that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “declared war on us. We are not at war with the Iranian people.” “We’re not at war with Iran. We’re making sure that they do not have the capability to harm us anymore,” Mullin said. The distinction comes as Republican leaders in the House and Senate aim to defeat war powers resolutions being backed by Democrats this week that would limit Trump’s ability to conduct military operations in Iran. Supporters of the resolution say that Congress, which has the constitutional authority to declare war, should have the sole authority to authorize such actions and that every member needs to be on the record. “This power was explicitly given to the Congress, and now it’s the Congress’s responsibility to go on record because Donald Trump has unconstitutionally and illegally chosen to launch a war,” House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) said in a press conference on Tuesday. Opponents, however, argue that Trump is well within his constitutional authorities. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of a deployment of U.S. forces without a prior declaration of war, and it prohibits armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days without additional Congressional authorization. Calling the actions in Iran a “war” could change that legal argument — leading to the pushback from Republican supporters of the president’s actions. Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-Fla.) similarly denied that the U.S. is conducting a war in Iran in an appearance on MS NOW over the weekend. “Targeted, strategic military strikes and invasions are two totally different things,” Luna said, adding: “We did not invade. Are you seeing boots on the ground there? Because I have not.” After anchor Catherine Rampell pressed Luna on the administration initially using the term war, Luna responded: “According to the White House, and I just talked to them, I talked to the secretary of State, strategic strikes are not war.” The battle over phrasing comes even as Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speak openly of a war with Iran. “We didn’t start this war, but under President Trump, we are finishing it,” Hegseth — who runs a Defense Department referred to as the Department of War by Trump — said in a press conference on Monday. Trump, in a video announcing “Major Combat Operations” in Iran on Saturday, said: “The lives of courageous American heroes may be lost, and we may have casualties. That often happens in war.” Trump’s official letter to Congress on Monday provided notification, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, of the “military action taken in Iran.” It said: “I directed this military action consistent with my responsibility to protect Americans and United States interests both at home and abroad in furtherance of United States national security and foreign policy interests. I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.” A messaging memo from the White House sent to Capitol Hill Republicans on Monday and reported by Politico appeared to discourage framing the actions as a war. In a question-and-answer section, the question of whether the U.S. is at war with Iran did not give a direct yes-or-no answer: “The President announced major combat operations against Iran with clear achievable goals.” The memo added that the U.S. was taking action against “terrorists who have waged war against the our country and civilization” and stated: “A long and drawn-out war is not the President’s intention.” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) similarly argued that Iran has been the one waging war on the U.S. for decades, citing the long history of Iran-backed attacks against U.S. troops. “I think we’re in an undeclared state of war since 1979,” Graham said in the Capitol on Tuesday. “What happens when you kill 220 Marines, 18 sailors in 1983? Are you in war with Hezbollah? … Go tell these families that they weren’t in an undeclared state of war.” To some Republicans, calling it a “war” or not is a distinction without a difference. Asked if he was calling this a “war” or a “combat operation,” Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) told The Hill: “Who cares what you call it? … I don’t.” “Bombs are dropping. Bad people are dying. Unfortunately, some good people are dying, too,” Johnson said. “I hate war. So does Trump. The way you avoid a wider conflict or destruction is to get rid of these menaces, like Iran.” Republican leaders are starting to argue that Trump does not need additional authorities to continue operations in Iran past the 60-day window outlined in the War Powers Resolution. Asked whether Trump needs Congress’s permission to carry out strikes into May, Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) responded emphatically: “No.” “I think the president has the authority that he needs to conduct the activities, the operations that are currently underway there,” Thune said Tuesday. “There’s a lot of controversy around, questions around the War Powers Act. But I think the president is acting in the best interest of the nation and our national security interests by ensuring that he’s protecting Americans and American bases and installations in that region.” Trump initially laid out a four-to-five-week timeline for the Iran operations. Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) said after a closed-door briefing with administration officials about the operations in Iran on Monday that he does not think Congress should declare war on Iran. “In my view, right now, our military and the commander in chief — he is presiding over the completion of an operation that was limited in scope, limited in its objective and absolutely necessary for our defense,” the Speaker said. “I think that operation will be wound up quickly.” Graham also argued against Congress limiting the president’s authority as commander in chief in any way. “We should let him finish the job. We should cheer him on, in my view,” Graham said. “And if you don’t like what he’s doing, cut off funding. You can cut off funding. That’s the role we have. The War Powers Act is unconstitutional. You can’t have 535 people become commander in chief.”
15-Unlimited executive power now; Republic at-risk of collapse
Ball, 3-3-26, Ball is senior fellow at the Foundation for American, primary author of Trump’s AI Policy, The Atlantic, A Dire Warning From the Tech World, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/2026/03/dean-ball-anthropic-interview/686226/
Ball, now a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, was traveling in Europe as all of this was unfolding last week, staying up as late as 2 a.m. to urge people in the administration to take a less severe approach: simply canceling the contract with Anthropic, without the supply-chain-risk designation. When his efforts failed, Ball told me in an interview yesterday, “my reaction was shock, and sadness, and anger.” In the aftermath of the decision, Ball published an essay on his Substack casting the conflict in civilizational terms; the Pentagon’s ultimatum, in his reckoning, is “a kind of death rattle of the old republic, the outward expression of a body that has thrown in the towel.” The action, he wrote, is a repudiation of private property and freedom of speech, two of the most fundamental principles of the United States
Matteo Wong – 3-3, 26, The Atlantic
. In today’s America, Ball argued, the executive branch has become so unstoppable—and passing laws has become so challenging—that the president and his officials can do whatever they want. (When reached for comment, a White House spokesperson told me in a statement that “no company has the right to interfere in key national security decision-making.”) Yesterday, I called Ball to discuss his essay and why the standoff with Anthropic feels, to him, like such a dire sign for America. Ball is far from a likely source of such harsh criticism: He’s a Republican with close ties to the Trump administration who departed on good terms after its AI Action Plan was published, and an avid believer that AI is a transformational technology. Other figures who are influential among conservatives in the tech world, including the Anduril Industries co-founder Palmer Luckey and the Stratechery tech analyst Ben Thompson, have vigorously supported Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s move. Luckey, a billionaire who builds drones for the military, suggested on X that crushing Anthropic is necessary to defend democracy from oligarchy. Thompson wrote yesterday in his widely read newsletter that “it simply isn’t tolerable for the U.S. to allow for the development of an independent power structure—which is exactly what AI has the potential to undergird—that is expressly seeking to assert independence from U.S. control.” Thompson likened the necessity of destroying Anthropic to that of bombing Iran. But Ball sees the Trump administration’s strong-arming of the tech industry as a sign of his country falling apart—a decline, he told me, that he has been watching for decades, and which the AI revolution might only accelerate. This conversation has been edited for length and clarity. Matteo Wong: A number of people have described the Pentagon’s designation of Anthropic as a supply-chain risk as illegal or poorly thought-out. Why did you take a step further in saying that this is not just bad policy, but catastrophic? Dean Ball: What Secretary Pete Hegseth announced is a desire to kill Anthropic. It is true that the government has abridged private-property rights before. But it is radical and different to say, brazenly: If you don’t do business on our terms, we will kill you; we will kill your company. I can’t imagine sending a worse signal to the business community. It cuts right at heart at everything that makes us different from China, which roots in this idea that the government can’t just kill you if you say you don’t want to do business with it, literally or figuratively. Though in this case, I’m speaking figuratively. Wong: Walk me through the multi-decade decline you situate the Pentagon-Anthropic dispute in. What precisely about the American project do you see as being in decay? Ball: America rests on a foundation of ordered liberty. The state sets broad rules that are intended to be timeless and universal, and implements those rules. We have not always done that perfectly, but the idea was that we were always getting better. And during my lifetime, a lot of things have started to break down. It reminds me very much of the science of aging. A very large number of systems start to break down, all at similar times for correlated reasons, and then each one breaking down causes the others to do worse. I think that something similar happens with the institutions of our republic. The fact that you can’t, for example, really change laws
Balll —
means that more and more gets pushed onto executive power. Once that’s the case, you have this boomerang—I only know that I’m going to be in power for four years in the White House, so what I need to do is use as much executive power as I can to cram through as much of my agenda as possible. And we’ve seen that just get more and more and more extreme, really, since George W. Bush. It’s just these swings back and forth, and it feels like we’re departing from the equilibrium more and more. It’s possible for something to go from being a crime in one presidential administration to not a crime in another, with no law changing. The state can deprive you of your liberty—that’s the most important thing in the world. We can’t have that at the stroke of the executive’s pen. Read: Anthropic is at war with itself There are already Democrats who are talking about how if you work too closely with the Trump administration, when they get in power, they’re going to break your companies up. Right now, with Anthropic, Republicans are punishing a company that is associated with the Democrats, and I suppose in some sense that because I’m a Republican, I can cheer that on. But the point of ordered liberty is for that never to happen—because if I do that to you, when you take power, you’re going to do it to me even worse, and then around and around we’ll go. If you read any “new tech right” thinker on these topics—Ben Thompson, whom I’ve loved for years—saying it’s a dog-eat-dog world, that’s the way it goes. Palmer Luckey, same thing—equating property expropriation with democracy. These are people who have fully accepted that we live in the tribal world and that the republic is already dead. Wong: You were the primary author of the White House’s main AI-policy document. How does the Pentagon’s targeting of Anthropic differ from your own vision for good AI policy? Ball: I don’t think the actions of the Department of War are consistent with the persuasion toward AI laid out in the AI Action Plan. But more important than that, they’re not consistent with the persuasions toward AI articulated by the president in many, many public appearances. The people who were involved with this incident were not, by and large, involved in the creation of the AI Action Plan. They looked at the cards on the table and made their calls. I assume that they did what they thought was best at the time. I don’t think they acted with particularly great wisdom. Maybe I’m wrong; I don’t know. But they made very different decisions from the ones I would have made. Wong: As all of these negotiations were happening, the Pentagon was also preparing to bomb Iran. The war seems like a pretty clear example of the stakes of the growing executive authority you’re describing. Ball: We live in a state of perpetual emergency being declared, and that has all sorts of corrosive effects. Because then it’s like, Oh, well, did you know that Anthropic attempted to impose usage restrictions on the U.S. military during a national-security emergency? And it’s like, yeah, we’ve been living in a national-security emergency for my entire life, or at least since 9/11. We’ve been living in a state of endless emergency, perpetual emergencies, perpetual war. This is just cancerous. Wong: One other possibility, of course, is that the growing backlash to the Pentagon’s decision to target Anthropic could actually strengthen the nation’s institutions—that the courts or Congress, for instance, could ultimately protect Anthropic or prevent such future standoffs. Ball: The optimistic version of my interpretation is that there’s enough about the American system that’s resilient that these things will be reined in by the judiciary. I don’t think you can bet against America. The country has been remarkably resilient over time. At the same time, I view the sickness that we face as being pretty deep. And I also view the challenges that we have to navigate together as being more profound than any we’ve faced in our history. So I harbor fairly significant concerns that this time will be different. But I remain fundamentally an optimist. If I were a pessimist, I wouldn’t be sitting here talking to you.
14-Trump using AI to fight wars; we must push back to prevent normalization of AI in war
Chris Stokel-Walker, March 3, 2026, Trump is using AI to fight his wars – this is a dangerous turning point, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/03/trump-using-ai-to-fight-wars-dangerous-us-military, Trump is using AI to fight his wars – this is a dangerous turning point
There are a lot of things that AI can do. It can sort out your shopping list, and it can keep your kids entertained when they’re mutinous by spinning up a tailor-made bedtime story for them. It can make you more efficient at work, and can help our government operate more effectively.
What is written less about, and what we need to shout louder about now, are the risks inherent in the militarisation of AI. In the last three months Donald Trump’s White House has reportedly used AI twice to effect regime change, or to – in the most recent case in Iran – get as close to doing so as possible, and leaving it up to rank-and-file Iranians to finish the job.
First, Anthropic’s Claude AI model – which most people use as a slightly more discerning alternative to ChatGPT – was supposedly used both to plan and execute the snatching of Nicolás Maduro from his compound in Venezuela, but it’s unclear how the model was used in detail. Then this weekend, we learn that the AI tool was used again, to parse through intelligence that helped aid the hugely damaging barrage of missiles that have rained down on Iran, apparently for identifying targets and running simulations.
It’s hard to overstate how significant both moments are. AI has been used in the planning and execution of military operations that have led to an unknown number of casualties, and roiled the Middle East.
If that makes you feel uneasy, you’re not alone. The CEO of Anthropic, Dario Amodei, has been embroiled in a very ugly, public spat with the US president after he refused to relax two “red lines” for Claude: that it should not be used for mass domestic surveillance, nor to build fully autonomous weapons that select and engage targets without meaningful human control. OpenAI quickly swooped in and signed an agreement with the Pentagon, though it claims that the terms of its agreement mean that it actually has stronger protections than the ones Anthropic wanted.
Regardless of the specific subclauses in the contract, it bears repeating: a tool that began public life as a chatty interface for summarising emails and helping you write a cover letter is now sitting somewhere along the chain that turns information into violence.
It used to be that questions such as “Who should control AI and what happens if it gets used militarily?” were debated among academics at panels in the abstract. There were worries, but they felt remote because they hadn’t come to fruition. When Maduro got swept up by special forces in January, and the bombs started dropping on Iran, apparently all with AI help, that calculus changed.
The basic principles of armed conflict have been that you wield big scary weapons but never use them. They’re for deterrence. The theory of mutually assured destruction meant that people shied away from pushing the button on nuclear bombs. (Worryingly, the early indications from war games scenarios are that AI decision-makers are trigger-happy with nuclear weapons.)
Now that excuse is no more. More countries will use AI in their military planning and actions – rightly, because it’s been shown to be effective, although there are obvious moral questions if AI is used to make military decisions. When military historians look back at what has happened in the last few months, it’s easy to see them thinking the use of AI in this way will be similar to the nuclear weapons dropped on Japan: marking a moment where there was a clear before, and an unclear after.
Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, speaks at Davos in January. Photograph: Denis Balibouse/Reuters
So what can we do about it? Very little. We should have had a blanket ban on the use of military AI. We’ve been creeping away from that for more than a decade now since Demis Hassabis took a principled stand and said he would only sell his company, DeepMind, to Google if it agreed not to allow the technology to be used militarily. Last year the company, now called Alphabet, quietly dropped its promise that it wouldn’t use AI for weapons. And Trump’s actions have loudly blown a hole in the idea.
But now the international community needs to work hard to bring Trump back from the brink. Allies should put pressure on Trump’s White House not just to be responsible in its use of AI militarily, but to accept binding constraints. That should include international commitments, transparent procurement standards and meaningful oversight, to which others should also sign up, rather than treating ethics as a brake on action. Because if the world’s most powerful military normalises consumer-grade AI models as part of regime-change operations, we will be through the looking-glass on AI: we’ll be in a whole new, altogether more dangerous world.
13-We must reassert authority to prevent the abuse of Presidential power
Pomper, 3-3, 26, One Man’s War How Constraints on the U.S. President’s War-Making Authority Eroded—and How to Restore Them, STEPHEN POMPER is Chief of Policy at the International Crisis Group. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the National Security Council during the Obama administration and Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs at the State Department during the George W. Bush administration, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/one-mans-war, STEPHEN POMPER is Chief of Policy at the International Crisis Group. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the National Security Council during the Obama administration and Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs at the State Department during the George W. Bush administration.
For the second time in under a year, U.S. President Donald Trump has launched strikes against Iran without presenting the pluses and minuses of another war in the Middle East to the American people. The joint U.S.-Israeli attacks, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with several other senior Iranian officials, come in the wake of not just a U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign against Iran in June 2025 but also a series of U.S. strikes on boats said to be trafficking drugs in the Caribbean and the U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro—none of which received congressional approval.
It is hardly surprising that an American president who has taken the assertion of executive power to new and dangerous places in domestic politics feels emboldened to act unilaterally in the realm of national security and foreign affairs. But Trump’s actions, unparalleled in their brazen transgression of legal norms, do not represent a complete break from tradition. Trump has been enabled by decades of bipartisan practice that has insulated presidential decision-making on the most lethal and consequential actions the United States can take from scrutiny or accountability.
In word and deed, senior members of Trump’s cabinet have expressed outright contempt for the legal guardrails against the use of force. Trump’s powerful deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller, dismissed international law as “niceties” in a world governed by “strength . . . force . . . and power.” Vice President JD Vance labeled the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Congress’s Vietnam War–era effort to reclaim its constitutional war-making prerogatives, as “fundamentally a fake and unconstitutional law.” Yet those guardrails had been weakened before Trump returned to office. Some of the very national security lawyers who find so much to (legitimately) criticize in Trump’s current actions are responsible for chipping away at the laws and norms that constrain presidential power, and thereby for setting the stage for Trump’s unilateral rampage.
For decades, national security lawyers in Democratic and Republican administrations have developed and defended aggressive legal interpretations that preserve space for presidents to wage elective, nondefensive war. I saw and participated in this steady shading of legal precedent during my time in the State Department’s legal office dealing with political-military affairs in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. The resulting consolidation of U.S. war powers undercuts a constitutional design intended to force deliberation and encourage prudent war-making, and it puts the destructive power of the world’s most powerful military in the largely unaccountable hands of whoever occupies the Oval Office. Undoing the damage will not be easy. It will require the legal community to confront its own complicity and join with legislators to help restore Congress’s power on matters of war and peace.
In weighing the legality of any use of force, national security lawyers focus on three broad questions. One is whether an operation was legitimately taken in self-defense; if the United States faces an armed attack or is threatened with imminent attack, the U.S. Constitution and the UN Charter give the president unilateral authority to respond with necessary and proportionate force. A second arises if the United States uses force in the absence of such an attack or threat. In that case, lawyers will want to know whether the use of force has been duly authorized by the U.S. Congress or, internationally, by the UN Security Council or the country where U.S. force is deployed. A third line of inquiry concerns how war is conducted: whether U.S. forces have acted in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and related rules prohibiting the targeting of civilians and the killing or abuse of soldiers who have left the fight because they have been captured, wounded, or shipwrecked.
The Trump administration has tested these rules and norms in multiple ways. Whereas other U.S. presidents have usually taken care to at least pay at least lip service to the post–World War II prohibition against the use of aggressive military force, inscribed in the UN Charter and widely seen as the crown jewel of the international legal order, the current administration appears to long for the return of an international order in which war was routinely used as an instrument of statecraft.
The administration has provided the thinnest veneer of justification for the boat strikes in the Caribbean it has has carried out since September 2025. According to The New York Times, a nonpublic opinion authored by the Justice Department’s powerful Office of Legal Counsel accepted at face value Trump’s claim that the United States and several drug cartels were engaged in a “noninternational armed conflict.” From there, the office reasoned that drug cargoes are “war-sustaining objects,” and that the alleged smugglers are “directly participating in hostilities.” If wielded in good faith and in a military context, these legal terms can justify the use of force. But efforts to apply them to drug smuggling, in effect making an argument by metaphor, could set a precedent for the use of force to meet an endless array of policy challenges.
Trump’s cabinet has expressed outright contempt for the legal guardrails against the use of force.
The administration’s confusingly written rationale for the military operation to extract Maduro offered another dubious legal justification. Waving away international law as irrelevant based on the unsound claim that it “does not restrict the president as a matter of domestic law,” it argued that using force to apprehend Maduro would serve an important national interest because of the Venezuelan president’s “severe” and “dangerous” criminal and noncriminal activities, and that the operation would not rise to the level of what the Constitution considers to be a war.
Nor has the Trump administration has shown any inclination to recognize, much less honor, international law or the war powers that the Constitution grants Congress in its strikes on Iran. It executed Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, in June without a credible self-defense justification or congressional authorization, even though the operation threatened regional stability and risked reprisals against U.S. and allied troops and bases.
The escalatory risks of the June operation pale in comparison with what the United States and Israel set in motion on Saturday with Operation Epic Fury, another war of choice. The massive air campaign, designed to decapitate the Iranian government’s leadership and destroy the country’s military, was all but guaranteed to provoke an Iranian response that would put American troops and assets in danger and drag U.S. allies and partners into the war. Washington’s goals for the war remain unclear—in large part because, beyond a desultory consultation with senior legislators, the administration has once again gone around Congress.
On paper, Article 1 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, and Article 2 gives the president the power to wage it as commander in chief. In practice, presidents have long tested what they can do without congressional approval. The modern boundaries were set by a series of Office of Legal Counsel opinions dating back to the 1990s, when Clinton administration lawyers attempted to define limits on presidential war powers while approving unilateral uses of force in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo. According to executive branch interpretation that grew out of those and subsequent opinions, the president’s unilateral war powers extend not only to actions required for self-defense but also to actions in the “national interest” (a nebulous and low standard), as long as they do not amount to “war in the constitutional sense” (a nebulous and high one).
As if those porous standards did not create enough room for maneuver, several extreme Justice Department opinions have created more. During the administration of President George W. Bush, the Office of Legal Counsel asserted that the president had the right to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 without congressional authorization because of the threat posed by terrorism and by weapons of mass destruction, respectively. (Bush sought and received congressional approval anyway.) A 1989 opinion enabled President George H. W. Bush’s administration to snatch Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, effectively granting the president permission to violate international law in order to conduct law enforcement operations on another country’s territory. The Trump Justice Department cited that opinion as part of the legal justification for the military operation to capture Maduro in January. These opinions were all authored by Republican administrations, but no Justice Department in a Democratic administration has withdrawn them, even though they have been widely criticized.
While working to expand the president’s powers, executive branch lawyers have also worked to shrink Congress’s. They have done this in part through a narrow reading of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, in which Congress sought to reclaim powers it had lost over the course of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Among other things, the resolution put a 60-day limit on unauthorized presidential war-making, after which the president must end U.S. involvement in “hostilities” if Congress has not given its blessing. The law also empowered Congress to end wars with a resolution passed by both houses that does not require the president’s signature.
Presidents have long tested what they can do without congressional approval.
Over the decades, this safety mechanism has been eroded beyond all recognition by judicial decisions, creative executive branch lawyering, and congressional passivity. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha invalidated the use of bicameral war powers resolutions to bind the president. President Ronald Reagan’s administration insisted that U.S. strikes against Iranian ships and oil platforms in the so-called tanker wars of 1987 and 1988 were discrete events, allowing it to reset the War Powers Resolution’s clock before ever reaching the 60-day limit on unauthorized war-making. The Obama administration argued that the sorties that the United States continued to conduct over Libya well after the 60th day of the U.S. military intervention there in 2011 did not count as conducting “hostilities.” The Biden administration claimed that it was not triggering the resolution in its 2024 strikes against the Houthis because the naval vessels it had placed between Yemen and Israel were, as U.S. officials must have surely expected, attacked first by the Houthis. The administration answered the Houthis attack with a yearlong bombing campaign in Yemen, its lawyers contending that the Houthis’ initiation of hostilities made congressional authorization unnecessary. The net effect of these actions has been to render the War Powers Resolution, in the words of the legal scholar Jack Goldsmith, “Swiss cheese.”
Further limiting the reach of the War Powers Resolution, every administration since George W. Bush’s has relied on implausibly expansive readings of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed by Congress after the September 11 attacks, to encompass activities that lawmakers could not have contemplated at the time. That the AUMF expressly limited U.S. military action to groups with specific links to the 9/11 attacks (primarily al-Qaeda) did not stop Bush and Obama administration lawyers from stretching it to cover “associated forces” that had nothing to do with the attacks and in some cases did not exist when they occurred. Obama’s lawyers, for example, read the statute to include operations against the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS), a splinter group that had broken with al-Qaeda. Although Trump did not detail the legal basis for a strike against Nigerian jihadists in December 2025, his administration identified the targets as affiliated with the Islamic State, implying that it, too, was relying on the AUMF.
Rather than allowing the executive branch to treat the AUMF as a seemingly endless justification for military force, Congress and the courts (which wrestled with the statute in the context of detainee litigation during the global war on terror) could have insisted that presidents request additional authorization to target groups not credibly covered by the original statute. Each proposal then could have been scrutinized and debated, and perhaps made subject to temporal and geographic limits. Instead, the courts largely deferred to the executive branch, and Congress greenlighted appropriations legislation, giving the White House an effective rubber stamp. The Trump administration does not appear inclined to look to the 2001 authorization as the basis for the latest Iran strikes; instead, it has gestured toward a thinly substantiated self-defense rationale. But congressional and judicial atrophy has accustomed the public to an almost monarchical war-making process, smoothing the path for any executive justification.
STOP THAT MAN
Even seemingly promising efforts to check the executive branch have failed. From 2004 to 2008, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions refusing to endorse the Bush administration’s argument that no U.S. court could review the legality of detention operations at the U.S. military prison at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, where the administration had begun sending terrorism suspects after the 9/11 attacks. But having preserved the right of courts to examine the legality of holding detainees at Guantánamo without charge, the justices declined to give lower courts any substantive guidance on who could or could not be held. In doing so, they kicked questions about who could be detained as a combatant, and therefore who could be killed as one on the battlefield, down to the lower courts.
When the Obama administration came into office in 2009 promising to close Guantánamo within a year, it faced a decision: how far should it go in asserting the right to continue holding detainees, some of whom had at best highly tenuous links to al-Qaeda or 9/11? The administration ultimately decided to go all-in. Deferential judges played along, endorsing the indefinite detention of individuals on the basis of sometimes flimsy evidence of ongoing membership in al-Qaeda or an associated force. These decisions gave a judicial imprimatur to ever-broader assertions by the military on who could be killed or detained under the AUMF, not to mention prolonging the detention of men the administration eventually intended to free.
The Obama administration could have been more discriminating about what detention cases it chose to defend before the courts, to avoid having to assert uncomfortably broad authorities. It could have asked Congress for a revised AUMF that matched its operational needs instead of stretching an increasingly outdated statute. But the administration worried about appearing soft on terrorism and about the prospect of Congress providing an even broader authority (and then criticizing the administration for not expanding the “war on terror”) if asked to rewrite the AUMF. In its effort to avoid political pitfalls, the administration created the impression inside the executive branch that “creative” lawyering was a valued way to work around Congress. Even as it tried to project respect for the rule of law, from the outside the administration appeared to be treating legal limitations on the use of force as malleable.
Even seemingly promising efforts to check the executive branch have failed.
Things have hardly gotten better since. Drawing on the same logic as the Obama administration’s unauthorized Libya campaign, the first Trump administration struck Syria twice without congressional approval in 2017 and 2018. Despite having co-authored a scholarly article in favor of war powers reform as a senator in 1988, Joe Biden did nothing to meaningfully advance a reform agenda as president, while engaging in an unauthorized conflict with the Houthis. When Trump returned to office in 2025, the guardrails were arguably in worse condition than when he left in 2021.
Congress did not have to acquiesce to this degradation of its authority. It could have refused to appropriate funds for wars it had never authorized, or pursued oversight hearings with much greater vigor. It could have pushed through reform legislation to tighten the War Powers Resolution and the AUMF, expecting a veto but forcing the White House to bear the costs, and then incorporated elements of the original reform into must-pass legislation such as the annual defense authorization bill.
Instead, legislators have tended to focus on disapproval resolutions fast-tracked under the amended War Powers Resolution to demand an end to hostilities, knowing that any resolution that reaches the president will be vetoed before it can ever become law, and that a veto-proof supermajority is nearly always unattainable. There are currently pending resolutions in the Senate and House of Representatives. These votes can carry some weight (one such resolution seemingly helped soften the first Trump administration’s support for the Saudi-led coalition military campaign in Yemen), but are fundamentally toothless as a practical matter. If Congress wants the executive branch to involve it in decisions about war-making, it cannot wait until U.S. planes have already begun dropping bombs.
FIGHT THE POWER
Despite widespread acknowledgment by legal experts that the consolidation of war powers in the U.S. presidency defeats a constitutional design intended to cushion the risk of imprudent war making, there is no consensus on what to do about it. Some experts prefer to accept the steady drift of power into the president’s hands on the ground that in a dangerous world the U.S. government doesn’t have the luxury of long debates over when and whether to use force—or because an empowered Congress could deliberately withhold war authorization to harm the president politically or use expansive authorizations to pressure the president into more hawkish positions.
Yet preserving a status quo in which any U.S. president can launch a nondefensive war with Iran without having to sell it to Congress or the American people is much worse. No legal or technocratic fix can force the United States to make better foreign policy choices. Some of the country’s biggest strategic disasters since World War II were at least partly authorized by Congress: the Vietnam War, authorized by the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, authorized by a 2002 AUMF. Yet the point of forcing the president to come to Congress isn’t to guarantee good outcomes. It is to produce debate, insert a speedbump on the way to elective war, and require elected representatives to take a stand for which they will be judged at the ballot box. It is a way to ensure that Washington learns from its mistakes.
Rebuilding such a system will require a joint effort by legislators and an executive branch more amenable than the Trump administration to giving back some of its power. Congress should push to restore and strengthen the 1973 War Powers Resolution. Before Trump’s reelection, both the Senate and House were considering such legislation. The Senate’s National Security Powers Act, and a nearly identical bill in the House, the National Security Reforms and Accountability Act, would close many of the gaps in the current legislation. It would supply definitions for terms such as “hostilities” and the “introduction” of forces, making it harder for executive branch lawyers to argue that lethal military operations do not trigger the resolution. It would shorten the 60-day authorization window to 20 days to discourage presidents from thinking that they can begin and end a war quickly enough to skirt the need for congressional approval. And it would cut off funding for unauthorized wars that continue past their deadlines.
Trump’s transgressions do not let a generation of lawyers, lawmakers, and judges off the hook.
Something also needs to be done about the 2001 AUMF. To continue to rely on it, the executive branch should be required to demonstrate before Congress that the statute serves a vital counterterrorism function. If that case is not convincing, the authorization should be repealed. If it is, it should be replaced with a more narrowly tailored statute that requires specifying the groups against whom the U.S. is waging war and identifying the places where that war can be waged. It should also stipulate that separate authorizations must be obtained before the U.S. military targets additional groups, whatever their association with the named groups. Any replacement statute, and indeed every war authorization, should include a clause requiring Congress to renew it after two or three years if funding is to continue. That would prevent lawmakers from washing their hands of wars they voted to start and force them to assess the costs and benefits of a conflict as it unfolds.
Finally, the executive branch needs to stop searching for ways to circumvent safeguards on war powers through strained readings of the law. One important step would be to retract Office of Legal Counsel opinions that aggrandize presidential power, such as the 1989 opinion that creates space for presidents to circumvent international law and the 2001 and 2002 opinions that suggest the president can go to war without congressional authorization in situations involving terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.
These changes will not come in time to keep Trump from unilaterally prosecuting a reckless war with Iran. If Congress wishes to rein him in, its best option is to cut off funding, a tall order under any circumstances, and especially given Republican control of both houses. Still, now is the time to begin setting the stage for future reform.
For decades, national security lawyers in administrations of both parties, along with an acquiescent Congress and judicial system, have diminished the safeguards that restrain the use of force, laying the groundwork for a nearly unrestrained president to wield unilateral power over war and peace. Trump’s transgressions may be egregious, but that does not let a generation of lawyers, lawmakers, and judges off the hook. Reform remains possible, but only if those responsible for tearing down legal guardrails through years of short-sighted decisions and weak stewardship commit to putting them back up.
12-Full AI military integration needed to compete with China
Harrison Kaas, March 3, 2026, National Interest, America’s F-35 Lightning II Fighter Jet Now Comes with AI Integration, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/americas-f-35-lightning-ii-fighter-jet-now-comes-with-ai-integration-hk-030326
The F-35’s AI is not equipped to operate the plane’s weapons systems, or to make other important decisions that must be left up to the pilot. As part of “Project Overwatch,” Lockheed Martin has tested AI model integration into the F-35 mission system. This is the first instance of AI suggesting combat targeting in-flight, marking a significant milestone for human-AI collaboration in the cockpit. Of course, the AI involvement remains limited; there are no autonomous weapons, and the AI has no authority to pull the trigger. In other words, it is still used only as an advisory layer. But the test reveals part of a larger trend—in which air combat decision timelines are shrinking, and humans are increasingly outsourcing their decision-making to AI. Jump HVAC Yelp The F-35’s New AI Interface The test involved the embedding of an AI model into the F-35’s information control system. The machine learning model was trained on environmental inputs, allowing for real-time data processing during flight and the generation of potential target suggestions. The pilot retained decision authority, with the AI offering recommendations. Lockheed has emphasized that the AI can be reprogrammed on the ground, and that software updates would be available before the next sortie—and that they were still working on iterative model refinement. But the point is becoming clear that the F-35’s advanced software is quickly becoming as important as the airframe itself. The F-35 is an ideal platform for advanced AI integration. The platform is already sensor-fusion-focused, with AESA radar, DAS, and an advanced electronic warfare suite—all of which requires massive data ingestion. The F-35 historically burdens its pilots with a high workload; accordingly, the AI is designed to filter information, prioritize, and reduce the cognitive burden of operating the airframe. The F-35, which serves as more of a data node than a kinetic dogfighter, benefits from the AI enhancing the sorting of so much information. freestar Tactically, AI integration will allow for faster target recognition and pattern detection beyond a human’s capacity. AI can perform multi-sensor cross-correlation in a way that humans cannot match. In theory, this will lead to a reduction in reaction time—an attractive outcome given that in high-end air combat seconds matter. Lockheed is no doubt considering AI application in the context of Indo-Pacific warfare, or in situations where electronic assets promise to be dense, or where swarm or multi-vector attacks are more likely. Lockheed Martin’s New AI Is Far from Perfect But AI is not impervious. AI models are dependent on training data, and are susceptible to adversary spoofing and electronic deception. Machine learning is still brittle outside of training parameters and adversaries may intentionally manipulate the sensor picture, confusing the AI. Human factors complicate the use of AI, too. Pilots will be trained to trust onboard AI, which creates an over-reliance risk. If AI suggests a target, automation bias suggests the pilot is more likely to adhere. US AI integration with military hardware may seem accelerated, but that tempo is unlikely to slow given China’s own aggressive pursuit of AI integration. The US has strategic pressure to match or exceed China’s capabilities. The AI race is now embedded in force modernization efforts; refusal to integrate is not viewed as a viable strategic option. And while an F-35 taking targeting recommendations from an AI system is not Skynet-adjacent, it’s easy to be concerned about the direction and tempo of AI integration, which pushes forward under strategic pressure overriding caution or humility.
11- Concentration of executive power collapsing democracy
Ball, 3-3-26, Ball is senior fellow at the Foundation for American, primary author of Trump’s AI Policy, Clawed, https://www.hyperdimensional.co/p/clawed
At some point during my lifetime—I am not sure when—the American republic as we know it began to die. Like most natural deaths, the causes are numerous and interwoven. No one incident, emergency, attack, president, political party, law, idea, person, corporation, technology, mistake, betrayal, failure, misconception, or foreign adversary “caused” death to begin, though all those things and more contributed. I don’t know where we are in the death process, but I know we are in the hospice room. I’ve known it for a while, though I have sometimes been in denial, as all mourners are wont to do. I don’t like to talk about it; I am at the stage where talking about it usually only inflicts pain. Unfortunately, however, I cannot carry out my job as a writer today with the level of analytic rigor you expect from me without acknowledging that we are sitting in hospice. It is increasingly difficult to honestly discuss the developments of frontier AI, and what kind of futures we should aim to build, without acknowledging our place at the deathbed of the republic as we know it. Except there is no convenient machine to decide for us that the patient has died. We just have to sit and watch. Our republic has died and been reborn again more than once in America’s history. America has had multiple “foundings.” Perhaps we are on the verge of another rebirth of the American republic, another chapter in America’s continual reinvention of itself. I hope so. But it may be that we have no more virtue or wisdom to fuel such a founding, and that it is better to think of ourselves as transitioning gradually into an era of post-republic American statecraft and policymaking. I do not pretend to know. I am now going to write about a skirmish between an AI company and the U.S. government. I don’t want to sound hyperbolic about it. The death I am describing has been going on for most of my life. The incident I am going to write about now took place last week, and it may even be halfway satisfyingly resolved within a day. I am not saying this incident “caused” any sort of republican death, nor am I saying it “ushered in a new era.” If this event contributed anything, it simply made the ongoing death more obvious and less deniable for me personally. I consider the events of the last week a kind of death rattle of the old republic, the outward expression of a body that has thrown in the towel. III. Here are the facts as I understand them: during the Biden Administration, the AI company Anthropic negotiated a deal with the Department of Defense (now known as the Department of War, hereafter referred to as DoW) for the use of the AI system Claude in classified contexts. That deal was expanded by the Trump Administration in July 2025 (full disclosure: I worked in the Trump Administration at that time, though did not work on this deal). Other language models are available in unclassified settings, but until very recently, only Claude could be used for classified work, which is where the things that involve intelligence gathering, active combat operations, and the like occur. The deal, first negotiated between the Biden team and Anthropic—and it is worth noting here that several of the core architects of Biden’s AI policy joined Anthropic immediately after Biden’s term ended—included two usage restrictions. First, Claude could not be used for mass surveillance on Americans. Second, Claude could not be used to control lethal autonomous weapons, which are weapons that can identify, track, and kill targets with no human in the loop at any point in the process. When it negotiated the expanded deal, the Trump Administration had the opportunity to review these terms. It did, and it accepted them. Trump officials claim to have changed their mind not so much because they want to do mass surveillance on Americans or use autonomous lethal weapons imminently, but because they object altogether to the notion of privately imposed limitations on the military’s use of technology. The Administration’s change of heart on the terms of this deal have caused them to commit to a policy decision intended to harm or even destroy Anthropic, one of the fastest-growing firms in the history of capitalism, and arguably the current world leader in AI, an industry the Administration claims to believe is crucial to our country’s future. But we’ll get to that in due time. IV. The Trump Administration has a point: it does not sound right that private corporations can impose limitations on the military’s use of technology. Yet of course, thousands of private corporations do just that. Every transaction of technology between a private firm and the military involves a contract (indeed, the companies that do this are called defense contractors for a reason), and these contracts routinely contain operational use restrictions (“system X cannot be used in countries Y,” a common restriction with telecommunications technology such as Elon Musk’s Starlink), technological limitations (“this fighter jet is only certified for uses in X conditions and use of it outside those conditions is a breach of warranty”), and intellectual-property restrictions (“the contractor owns, and may repurpose and resell, the knowhow and IP associated with X weapon system developed with public funds”). In some ways, Anthropic’s terms resemble these traditional examples of privately imposed contractual limits on the military’s use of technology. The company’s position on autonomous lethal weapons, for example, is not one of outright opposition to the use of such weapons but instead a judgment that today’s frontier AI systems are not capable enough to autonomously make decisions about human life or death. This seems similar to the second example above (the limitations on the fighter jet’s use). The big difference, however, is that Anthropic is essentially using the contractual vehicle to impose what feel less like technical constraints and more like policy constraints on the military. Think of the difference between “this fighter jet is not certified for flight above such-and-such an altitude, and if you fly above that altitude, you’ve breached your warranty,” and “you may not fly this jet above such-and-such an altitude”). It is probably the case that the military should not agree to terms like this, and private firms should not try to set them. But the Biden Administration did agree to those terms, and so did the Trump Administration, until it changed its mind. That alone should make one thing clear: terms like this are not some ridiculous violation of the norms of defense contracting. Anyone attempting to convince you otherwise is misinformed or lying. It is that simple. There is no law that says “contractual terms between the military and the private sector can have technical limitations, but not policy limitations,” in part because the line between those things is awfully hard to draw in timeless and universally applicable words (i.e., in a statute). The contract was not illegal, just perhaps unwise, and even that probably only in retrospect. Note that this is true even if you agree with the underlying substance of the limitations. You can support restrictions on mass domestic surveillance and lethal autonomous weapons, but disagree that a defense contract is the optimal vehicle to achieve that policy outcome. The way you achieve new policy outcomes, under the usual rules of our republic, is to pass a law. Except the notion of “passing a law” is increasingly a joke in contemporary America. If you are serious about the outcome in question, “passing a law” is no longer Plan A; the dynamic is more like “well of course, one day, we’ll get a law passed, but since we actually care about doing this sometime soon, as opposed to in 15 years, we’ll accomplish our objective through [some other procedure or legal vehicle].” With this, governance has become more and more informal and ad hoc, power more dependent on the executive (whose incentive is to jam every goal he has through his existing power in as little time as possible, since he only has the length of his term guaranteed to him), and the policy vehicles in question more and more unsuited to the circumstances of their deployment, or the objectives they are being deployed to accomplish. There are two concerns that the Trump Administration says caused it to change its mind: number one, that Anthropic may impose these policy restrictions on them, by, say, pulling Claude from military use during active military operations. Number two, that these policy restrictions would be imposed by Anthropic in its capacity as a subcontractor for other DoW contractors. In other words, DoW could come to rely upon some other company’s technology, which is in turn enabled by Claude and governed by the same terms of use that restrict domestic mass surveillance and autonomous lethal weapons (or, in the DoW’s mind, arbitrary new restrictions Anthropic could add at any time). Add to this the reality that the Trump Administration perceives Anthropic to be its political enemy (they are probably right about this), and you have a situation in which the military suddenly realizes it is building reliance upon a firm it does not trust. The Department of War’s rational response here would have been to cancel Anthropic’s contract and make clear, in public, that such policy limitations are unacceptable. They could also have dealt with the above-mentioned subcontractor problem using a variety of tools, such as: Issuing guidance advising contractors to avoid agreeing to terms with subcontractors that constitute policy/operational constraints as opposed to technical or IP constraints; A new DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) clause pertaining specifically to the procurement of AI systems in classified settings that prevents both primes from imposing such constraints directly and accepting such constraints from their subcontractors, along with a procedure for requiring subcontractors with non-compliant terms to waive such terms within a prescribed time period. These are the least-restrictive means to accomplishing the end in question. If Anthropic refused to compromise on its red lines for the military’s use of AI, the execution of these policies would mean that Anthropic would be restricted from business with DoW or any of its contractors in those contractors’ fulfillment of their classified DoW work. But this is not what DoW did. Instead, DoW insisted that the only reasonable path forward is for contracts to permit “all lawful use” (a simplistic notion not consistent with the common contractual restrictions discussed above), and has further threatened to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk. This is a power reserved exclusively for firms controlled by foreign adversary interests, such as Huawei, and usually means that the designated firm cannot be used by any military contractor in their fulfillment of any military contract. War Secretary Pete Hegseth has gone even further, saying he would prevent all military contractors from having “any commercial relations” with Anthropic. He almost surely lacks this power, but a plain reading of this would suggest that Anthropic would not be able to use any cloud computing nor purchase chips of its own (since all relevant companies do business with the military), and that several of Anthropic’s largest investors (Nvidia, Google, and Amazon) would be forced to divest. Essentially, the United States Secretary of War announced his intention to commit corporate murder. The fact that his shot is unlikely to be lethal (only very bloody) does not change the message sent to every investor and corporation in America: do business on our terms, or we will end your business. This strikes at a core principle of the American republic, one that has traditionally been especially dear to conservatives: private property. Suppose, for example, that the military approached Google and said “we would like to purchase individualized worldwide Google search data to do with whatever we want, and if you object, we will designate you a supply chain risk.” I don’t think they are going to do that, but there is no difference in principle between this and the message DoW is sending. There is no such thing as private property. If we need to use it for national security, we simply will. The government won’t quite “steal” it from you—they’ll compensate you—but you cannot set the terms, and you cannot simply exit from the transaction, lest you be deemed a “supply chain risk,” not to mention have the other litany of policy obstacles the government can throw at you. This threat will now hover over anyone who does business with the government, not just in the sense that you may be deemed a supply chain risk but also in the sense that any piece of technology you use could be as well. Though Chinese AI providers like DeepSeek have not been labeled supply chain risks (yes, really; this government says Anthropic, an American company whose services it used in military strikes as recently as this past weekend, is more of a threat than a Chinese firm linked to the Chinese military), that implicit threat was always there. No entity with meaningful ties to government business would use DeepSeek, simply because the regulatory risk was too high. Now that the government has applied this regulation to an American company, the regulatory risk simply exists for all software. In a sense, DeepSeek is now somewhat less risky to use (since it’s almost as risky from a regulatory perspective as any American AI), and American AI is profoundly riskier than it was last week. This, combined with the broader political risk the government has created, will increase the cost of capital for the AI industry. Put more simply, this will mean less AI infrastructure and associated energy generation capacity. Stepping back even further, this could end up making AI less viable as a profitable industry. If corporations and foreign governments just cannot trust what the U.S. government might do next with the frontier AI companies, it means they cannot rely on that U.S. AI at all. Abroad, this will only increase the mostly pointless drive to develop home-grown models within Middle Powers (which I covered last week), and we can probably declare the American AI Exports Program (which I worked on while in the Trump Administration) dead on arrival. The only thing that would alleviate these self-imposed consequences is if we are really living through a rapid “takeoff” to transformative AI. There is some chance, in that world, that the capabilities of the leading American AI systems are just too significant for corporations or governments to pass up, and that the regulatory risk is worth it. This is the world I think we live in, it is worth noting. But consider the following: Even if I am right that we live in the “rapid capabilities growth” world, it will still be the case that the adoption of U.S. AI will be seen as especially risky—a vulnerability to be corrected once viable alternatives are available; The Trump Administration does not think we live in that world, and instead thinks that AI capabilities began to plateau around GPT-5 last summer. Thus, on the logic of the Trump Administration—where AI is a “normal” technology—this was an especially bad move that we did not have the leverage to pull off, since AI is about to become a commodity. If we do live in that world, on the other hand, the Trump Administration just cast itself as the enemy of the industry that is about to birth the most powerful technology ever conceived—as well as an enemy of the technology itself. In short, I can see only downsides to the Trump Administration’s decision to designate Anthropic a supply chain risk, particularly considering the far less costly policy alternatives it could have employed. One gets the sense that the people making these decisions at DoW are not acting with strategic clarity nor any respect for the basic principles of the American republic—not to mention in stark contrast to President Trump’s own stated vision of letting AI thrive in America. V. With each passing presidential administration, American policymaking becomes yet more unpredictable, thuggish, arbitrary, and capricious—a gradual descent into madness. It is hard to know at what point ordered liberty itself simply evaporates and we fall into the purely tribal world. Even if Secretary Hegseth backs down and narrows his extremely broad threat against Anthropic, great damage has been done. Even in the narrowest supply-chain risk designation, the government has still said that they will treat you like a foreign adversary—indeed, they will treat you in some ways worse than a foreign adversary—simply for refusing to capitulate to their terms of business. Simply for having different ideas, expressing those ideas in speech, and actualizing that speech in decisions about how to deploy and not deploy one’s property. Each of these things is fundamental to our republic, and each was assaulted—not anything like for the first time but nonetheless in novel ways—by the Department of War last week. Most corporations, political actors, and others will have to operate under the assumption that the logic of the tribe will now reign. There is something deeper about the damage done by the government, too. The Anthropic-DoW skirmish is the first major public debate that is truly about where the proper locus of control over frontier AI should be. Our public institutions behaved erratically, maliciously, and without strategic clarity. Our political leaders conveyed little understanding of their own actions, to say nothing of the technology and its stakes. They got off on an extraordinarily bad footing, and it is hard to imagine them ever recovering, because they do not seem to care about improvement. They are a cartoonish depiction of the American political elite, but sadly their failings have been the prototype of American political elites from both parties for much of my life now. “The same as before, but now noticeably worse” has been the theme of American politics for 20 years. The machinery of our current republic seems to be in such disrepair that it is hard to see how it lasts. No one knows what comes next, but I strongly suspect that whatever it is will be deeply intertwined with, and enabled by, advanced AI. It is with this that we will rebuild our world. As we do, and as we have future debates about the proper nexus of control over frontier AI, I encourage you to avoid the assumption that “democratic” control—control “of the people, by the people, and for the people”—is synonymous with governmental control. The gap between these loci of control has always existed, but it is ever wider now. No matter what world we build, the limitations imposed in the law on what we know today as “the government’s” use of AI will be of paramount importance. We really do want to ensure that mass surveillance and autonomous weapons/systems of control cannot be used to curtail our liberties—at least we want to try. So despite not being the focus of this piece, I applaud the AI labs for caring about these redlines. Over the coming years and decades, I expect that our liberty will be in greater peril than many of us comprehend. Each of us gets to choose which futures we wish to fight against, which we can live with, and which we will fight for. As you make your choices, I suggest ignoring the din of the death rattle and trying to think with independence. Do not process this with the partisan blinders of 20th century mass politics; one way or another, you are entering a new era of institution building in living color. Before you get to all that, though, take a moment to mourn the republic that was.
10-US Presidents are addicted to war, and a massive concentration of executive power makes it possible
Walt, 3-2, 26 [Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, Foreign Policy, The United States Is Still Addicted to War, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/02/trump-iran-war-united-states-addicted/]
No matter what they say, American presidents find it impossible not to go to war. Back in 1992, Bill Clinton won the presidency by saying “it’s the economy, stupid,” and declaring the era of power politics to be over. Once in office, however, he found himself ordering missile strikes in several countries, maintaining no-fly zones over Iraq (and sometimes bombing it), and waging a long aerial campaign against Serbia in 1999.
In 2000, George W. Bush captured the White House by criticizing Clinton’s overactive foreign policy and promising voters a foreign policy that was strong but “humble.” We all know how that turned out. Eight years later, a young senator named Barack Obama became president in good part because he was one of the few Democrats who had opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Within a year of assuming office, he had a Nobel Peace Prize he had done nothing to earn, simply because people believed he’d be a committed peacemaker. Obama did try on several issues and eventually reached an agreement scaling back Iran’s nuclear program, but he also ordered a pointless “surge” in Afghanistan, helped topple the Libyan regime in 2011, and grew increasingly comfortable ordering signature strikes and other targeted killings against an array of targets. As his second term ended, the U.S. was still fighting in Afghanistan and no closer to victory.
Then a mediocre businessman and reality TV star named Donald Trump ran for president in 2016, openly condemning the “forever wars,” denouncing the foreign-policy establishment, and vowing to put “America First.” After an unexpected electoral victory, he, too, announced a temporary troop surge in Afghanistan, kept the global war on terror going full-speed, ordered the assassination by missile of a top Iranian official, and presided over steady increases in the military budget. Trump didn’t start any new wars during his first term, but he didn’t end any, either.
Joe Biden did end a war when he pulled the plug on America’s futile U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, and he got pummeled for recognizing the reality his predecessors had ignored. Biden did orchestrate a vigorous Western response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but most observers ignored how his earlier efforts to bring Ukraine within the Western orbit had made war more likely. Having ignored the Palestinian issue during his first two years as president, Biden provided the billions of dollars’ worth of weapons and diplomatic protection for Israel’s genocidal response to Hamas’s attack on Israel in October 2023.
Biden’s errors (and his stubborn insistence on trying to win a second term) helped Trump to return to the Oval Office, once again pledging to be a peace president and to end the incessant interventionism that has cost Americans trillions of dollars and thousands of lives. But instead of making a sharp break with the past, Trump 2.0 turned out to be even more trigger-happy than the presidents he used to mock. The United States has bombed at least seven countries in his first year back in office, is energetically killing boat crews in the Caribbean and Pacific on the mere suspicion that they might be shipping drugs, has kidnapped the leader of Venezuela in order to take control of the country’s oil (while leaving the country in the hands of a new dictator), and has now launched his second war against Iran in less than a year. Having told the world that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had been “obliterated” last summer, he now says the U.S. had to bomb it to stop “imminent threats.”
What’s going on here? Since 1992, a series of presidents representing both parties have run for office vowing to be peacemakers and to avoid their predecessors’ excesses and mistakes, yet once in office they cannot resist the urge to blow stuff up in faraway lands. Once again, we must ask ourselves the question: Is the United States addicted to war?
Until Trump’s second term, one might explain this pattern by examining the hubristic mindset of the bipartisan foreign-policy “Blob,” which saw military force as a useful tool for advancing a global liberal order. But that explanation has trouble explaining Trump’s actions during his second term. Trump still loathes the establishment (aka, the “deep state”), blames it for the failures of his first term, has gutted the national security bureaucracy, and appointed a lot of loyal lackeys who will do his bidding to key positions. This latest war can’t be blamed on the Blob.
Defenders of these policies might argue that the United States has unique global responsibilities, and although presidents may come into office with a lot of idealistic notions about using force less often, they soon get schooled in the need to use American power all over the world. The problem with this explanation is that blowing things up with such frequency rarely solves the underlying political problems, doesn’t make the U.S. safer, and certainly isn’t good for most of the countries we’ve been pummeling. Even a country as slow to learn as the United States should have learned this by now. So the puzzle remains: Why does Washington keep doing these things, even under a president who would dearly love to win a real peace prize (and not just the phony one he got from FIFA)?
One obvious reason is the long-term consolidation of executive power that has been underway since the early Cold War and expanded even more during the war on terror. We have granted presidents enormous latitude over decisions for war and peace, the conduct of diplomacy, the activities of a vast intelligence apparatus and covert action capability, and tolerated a degree of secrecy that makes it easier for the executive branch to lie when it needs to. Presidents from both parties have been all too happy to accept this freedom of action and rarely welcomed efforts to trim their powers. The consolidation of executive power has been aided and abetted by Congress, which has become decreasingly willing to exercise any meaningful oversight over decisions to use force. Thus, when the Obama administration actively sought a new authorization to use force (to replace the outdated resolutions that had authorized the war on terror and invasion of Iraq), Congress refused to provide one because its members didn’t want to go on the record. And now they complain that the Trump administration didn’t ask their permission before it decided to start another pointless war on Iran.
Second, as Sarah Kreps and Rosella Zielinski have both shown, American presidents are free to go to war because they have learned not to ask the American people to pay for it in real time. Korea was the last war that we directly raised taxes to pay for; since then, presidents have just borrowed the money, let the deficit grow some more, and stuck future generations with the bill. The result is that most Americans don’t feel the economic consequences of even long and costly campaigns like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which cost at least $5 trillion.
The all-volunteer force also facilitates decisions for war, because the people sent into harm’s way all signed up for this possibility and are less likely to complain than random draftees might be. It also allows elites like Trump (and his children) to evade service entirely, thereby reducing the extent to which the wealthy and politically connected feel personally affected by these decisions and gradually turning the professional military into a separate caste that is less connected to the broader society it is supposed to defend. But don’t blame the military for these recurring decisions to use force; it is the civilians who are driving this train.
You can, however, blame the military-industrial complex. Please note: I’m not saying Lockheed Martin or Boeing lobbied for war with anyone, but when you are in the business of selling weapons, you are also in the business of selling insecurity. And that means portraying a world that is brimming with threats (some of which might need to be preempted), where diplomacy is devalued, and kinetic solutions are oversold. It is no accident that defense firms are prominent supporters of many foreign-policy think tanks, which often work to convince Americans that threats are lurking everywhere, that the United States might have to take military action against them no matter where on the planet they are occurring, and that bigger defense budgets are the obvious remedy. Once you’ve bought all those capabilities, it can be hard to resist the temptation to use them. There will also be special interest groups like AIPAC and the hawkish parts of the Israel lobby that will sometimes succeed in persuading presidents to go along and convince vulnerable congressional leaders not to object.
There’s a final reason American presidents have become addicted to war: The use of force has become too easy and seemingly risk-free. Cruise missiles, stealthy aircraft, precision-guided bombs, and drones have made it possible for the United States (and a few other countries) to wage massive air campaigns without having to put boots on the ground and without worrying very much about direct retaliation (at least initially). Iran may hit back at the United States or its allies in various ways, but it cannot hope to inflict the same level of damage on U.S. soil that Washington can inflict on it. When facing a vexing foreign-policy challenge, therefore, or when looking for a way to distract citizens from domestic problems or scandals (Jeffrey Epstein, anyone?), it can be immensely tempting to reach for the military option. Or as Sen. Richard Russell—who was no dove—put it back in the 1960s, “There is reason to think that if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something.”
I sometimes think of this as the problem of the “big red button.” It is as if every president has a big red button on his desk, and when foreign-policy troubles arise (or when a distraction is needed), his aides come to the Oval Office and describe the problem. They point out that pushing the button will show resolve and that he’s doing something, and might produce a positive result. If they are honest, they may acknowledge that there’s no absolute necessity to push the button and that doing so might make things worse. But the risks are small, they will remind him, the costs are affordable, and if you don’t push the button, the problem could almost certainly get worse, and you will look indecisive. They close the briefing by intoning solemnly: “It’s your choice, Mr. President.” It would take leaders with better judgment than most recent presidents to resist such blandishments consistently.
To be clear, this latest orgy of violence is the least necessary shedding of blood by the U.S. military since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But what it says about America’s addiction to war is at least as important as what it tells us about America’s current president.
9-Trump is the most trigger-happy President ever
DNYUZ, 3-2, 26, https://dnyuz.com/2026/03/02/peace-president-breaks-record-for-attacking-the-most-countries/, ‘Peace President’ Breaks Record for Attacking the Most Countries
Wannabe Nobel Laureate Donald Trump has now ordered more attacks against a greater number of countries than any other president in modern U.S. history. On the campaign trail, Trump repeatedly pledged to reduce American military engagements abroad. After assuming office for the second time last January, he modeled himself as the “President of Peace,” even claiming to have solved a highly contested number of conflicts around the world as he sought to secure himself the Nobel Peace Prize. In the same period, though, he has ordered strikes against targets across no less than seven nations—Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Yemen—at a rate that has already outstripped the total sanctioned by Joe Biden throughout the Democratic president’s four years at the White House, Axios reports. Plumes of smoke rise following reported explosions in Tehran on March 1, 2026, after Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed a day earlier in a large U.S. and Israeli attack, prompting a new wave of retaliatory missile strikes from Iran. (Photo by Mahsa / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images) Trump’s war on Iran has plunged the Middle East into chaos. Mahsa / Middle East Images / AFP via Getty Images The outlet adds that while attacks under Presidents George Bush and Barack Obama may have been “massive in scale,” they were largely “concentrated in inherited or congressionally authorized theaters,” like Iraq and Afghanistan. The first three of the countries targeted by Trump have never before come under attack by the U.S.
8-Congress excluded from wartime decision-making now
Fontaine, 2-2, 26, RICHARD FONTAINE is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain Trump’s Way of War: Iran, Venezuela, and the End of the Powell Doctrine, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trumps-way-war
When bombs began falling on Iran this weekend, most Americans were as surprised as the rest of the world. The U.S. force posture in the Middle East had been building in the preceding weeks, but negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still underway. Even as the U.S. military readied for an attack, the Trump administration obscured the exact objective. There was remarkably little national debate, scant discussion with U.S. allies, and no vote in Congress about the desirability of conflict. Two days into the war, administration officials have yet to articulate a specific vision for how it will end. Instead of employing decisive force, U.S. President Donald Trump is prioritizing flexibility. This stance reflects a new way of war—visible across multiple Trump interventions, from the Red Sea to Venezuela—that inverts traditional thinking on the use of force.
Indeed, in many ways, Trump’s use of force is the anti-Powell Doctrine. Developed during the Gulf War (1990–91) by General Colin Powell, who later served as Secretary of State, the Powell Doctrine held that force should be employed only as a last resort, after all nonviolent means have been exhausted. If war is necessary, however, it should proceed in pursuit of a clear objective, with a clear exit strategy, and with public support. It should employ overwhelming, decisive force to defeat the enemy, using every resource—military, economic, political, social—available. Derived from the lessons of Vietnam, the approach was designed to avoid protracted conflicts, high death tolls, financial losses, and domestic divisions. As Powell later wrote, military leaders could not “quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support.”
Powell’s approach, which built on criteria established by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in the 1980s, spurred debate from the start. Some critics thought the all-or-nothing approach to war would preclude the tailored use of force to achieve modest but still important goals. For supporters of the doctrine, that was precisely the point, and they saw continued interventions, such as those undertaken by the Clinton administration in Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, as a misuse of military power that risked failure or quagmire.
The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were key tests of the approach. The George W. Bush administration sought to apply the Powell Doctrine in both cases. It declared war only after the Taliban and Iraqi leaders, respectively, ignored U.S. demands, and after the president spent considerable political capital to persuade Americans that the decisions to go to war were wise. The administration’s stated objectives were clear: to eliminate the safe haven the Afghan government was providing al-Qaeda and to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, respectively. It also sought and received congressional authorization in both cases. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces combined a lean on-the-ground presence with withering air attacks and support for fighters in the Northern Alliance, which entered Kabul and overthrew the Taliban. In Iraq, 160,000 U.S. troops launched a ground invasion to topple the regime. In both instances, the planned exit strategy was to turn governing institutions over to exiles, local leaders, and domestic security forces, after which American troops would come home.
Things clearly did not go according to plan in either case. Attempting to avoid prolonged conflicts brought them about anyway. The wars proved extraordinarily costly and deeply divisive, and their objectives seemed only to shift over time. Whether the interventions’ problems came from a misapplication of the Powell Doctrine or from the misconception of the approach itself, the dark shadows of Afghanistan and Iraq have colored every U.S. military intervention of the past two decades, including the war now underway in Iran. In an effort to avoid repeating such debacles, the Trump administration has pursued something like their inverse. And while the Trump doctrine comes with serious challenges, it has also produced unexpected results—and it is likely here to stay.
THE NEW FORCE
This new approach to war began forming in Trump’s first term and has solidified in his second. In 2017 and 2018, Trump ordered missile strikes against the Assad regime in Syria, and continued U.S. military operations in Iraq and Syria against the jihadist militant group ISIS, including the raid that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2020, U.S. forces killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. Last year, Trump launched a war against the Houthis in Yemen, destroyed key Iranian nuclear sites, and attacked militants in northern Nigeria. This year, his administration invaded Venezuela to seize Nicolás Maduro and, just two days ago, launched a major operation in Iran.
Those operations’ departures from more traditional ways of employing force are striking. The Powell Doctrine, for its part, holds that war should be a last resort, turned to only after political, diplomatic, and economic means have failed to attain the desired objective. In 1990, President George H. W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein a deadline for withdrawing his forces from Kuwait, and a decade later President George W. Bush gave both Saddam and the Taliban public ultimatums before beginning hostilities.
Trump’s approach, on the other hand, has been to use ambiguity as a source of advantage, to catch his opponents off guard; the 2025 and 2026 U.S. attacks on Iran, for instance, took place as negotiations were ongoing. His administration issued no public ultimatums to Soleimani or Maduro. For Trump, it seems, force is not something to employ only when all other means have been exhausted, but rather one of several tools available to increase leverage, maximize surprise, and produce outcomes.
Another element of the Powell Doctrine that Trump seems to have done away with is the emphasis on public support. The Powell Doctrine treats the Vietnam-era protests against American intervention as the paradigmatic case to be avoided. If some objective is important enough for Americans to fight for, the thinking went, then the people in whose name the fighting takes place had better support it. Establishing such support generally requires the president to make a case, frequently and over the course of months. Congress is expected to demonstrate its own approval through a vote to authorize force after extended debate.
Where the Powell Doctrine calls for clarity, Trump instead prizes flexibility.
But not a single conflict during Trump’s presidencies has been preceded by a campaign to win public support, and Congress has not voted to authorize any of them. Instead, each conflict began suddenly and followed an unpredictable course. Rather than lay out a case for each war, the president often insisted he hoped to avoid it. His administration put a priority on surprise, attesting, for example, that the Caribbean military buildup was to stop drug boats, not to prepare for a direct regime change operation in Venezuela. Congress was largely sidelined. Iran today presents an even more ambitious regime change operation, but in last week’s nearly two-hour State of the Union address, Trump spent only talked about it in a few sentences. The scale and stakes of the war make the administration’s seeming disregard for public debate all the more remarkable.
7-Trump has maximum flexibility now
Fontaine, 2-2, 26, RICHARD FONTAINE is CEO of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the U.S. Department of State, on the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain Trump’s Way of War: Iran, Venezuela, and the End of the Powell Doctrine, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trumps-way-war
The Trump administration has also avoided articulating clear objectives for its use of force. When announcing that war with Iran had begun, the president said that the objective was “to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime,” even though Tehran was neither enriching uranium nor in possession of missiles capable of reaching the United States. A day into the attacks, Trump wrote on social media that bombing was aimed at achieving “our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!” He has said both that the goal is regime change in Iran and that he is planning to negotiate with the leadership that replaced the Supreme Leader. Trump similarly said at first that pressure on Venezuela was necessary to stop drugs and gang members from entering the United States, before later explaining that the goal was to bring Maduro to justice, that he wished to take back oil stolen from the United States, and that the operation was consistent with a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. What precisely Americans are fighting for in each country, and how they will know if they attain that end, remains unclear.
Where the Powell Doctrine calls for clarity, Trump instead prizes flexibility. By claiming multiple and often vague objectives, the president retains the ability to stop the fighting without admitting defeat. This, rather than obvious victory, is his exit strategy. When announcing attacks on the Houthis, Trump said, “We will use overwhelming lethal force until we have achieved our objective,” with the objective allegedly being to end Houthi attacks on American vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis, Trump said later, would be “completely annihilated.” A month into an expensive and only partially successful bombing campaign, however, the administration cut a deal with the group to end its attacks.
6-US must sustain visible deterrence to support moderate interests in Iran and prevent its collapse
Charari, 3-1, 26, Ahmed Charai is the publisher of the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune and serves on the boards of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest, How the US Can Sustain Deterrence After Khamenei, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/how-the-us-can-sustain-deterrence-after-khamenei
The end of the Islamic Republic is a tremendous opportunity for Iran and poses serious risks for regional stability. The United States should be prepared. President Donald Trump has long argued that deterrence of US adversaries, once eroded, must be restored decisively. In confronting the Iranian regime and eliminating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, he acted consistently with that doctrine. When intelligence assessments concluded that Tehran was stalling diplomatically while expanding destabilizing activity, and after US special envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff’s high-stakes negotiations in Geneva that helped shape the president’s judgment on Iranian seriousness, the administration recalibrated. Its objective was clear: reestablish credible deterrence and signal that gray-zone aggression would no longer go unanswered. That clarity matters. But restoring deterrence is only the first step. Strategy cannot end at retaliation. It must anticipate what comes next. It is a mistake to treat the Islamic Republic as a personality-driven regime. It is not a system that will collapse simply upon the removal of a single leader. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not merely a special branch of the military; it is an ideological institution, an intelligence network, and an economic conglomerate embedded deeply within the state. Hostility toward the United States and Israel is doctrinal. As long as coercive institutions remain guided by that ideology, the threat persists. Degrading capabilities may temporarily restore deterrence, but only institutional transformation will bring about long-term stability in the region. The Islamic Republic vs. Iran Strategic clarity also requires distinction. Iran is not synonymous with the Islamic Republic. Iran is a civilization-state with enormous human capital, a young and educated population, and a society that has repeatedly demonstrated civic courage. Protest movements led by women and younger generations reveal a population that seeks root-and-branch change. American policy is strongest when it reinforces this distinction: pressure on a destabilizing regime is not hostility toward the Iranian people. That framing weakens Tehran’s ability to use nationalism as a shield against accountability. And President Trump, in his speech announcing the strikes on Saturday, has made that clear. US interests are also directly implicated in the security of regional partners who chose modernization over confrontation. The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and Arab nations, represented a strategic shift toward integration, technological cooperation, and economic interdependence. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain assumed real political risk by embracing that path. freestar They also faced retaliation. Missile and drone attacks from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted civilian targets in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Manama. When states align with integration and are punished for it, the credibility of US security guarantees is tested. If Washington seeks a rules-based regional order, it must ensure that its defense architecture—including integrated air and missile defense, maritime coordination, and intelligence sharing—is durable and visible. Allies who choose modernization must not feel strategically exposed. Planning for Iran’s Day After the Islamic Republic Iran now faces mounting structural pressure: economic fragility, constrained proxy networks, sanctions, and recurring domestic unrest. The regime’s room for maneuver is narrowing rapidly. This does not guarantee transformation. But it creates the possibility. Responsible policy requires preparation for that contingency. If systemic change occurs—whether through elite fracture, or popular uprising—the most dangerous moment will be the immediate aftermath. Revolutions invite fragmentation, militia competition, or renewed authoritarianism. The United States cannot afford improvisation in a country of Iran’s size and strategic importance. Four priorities would emerge immediately. The United States should secure nuclear and missile infrastructure to prevent proliferation or sabotage; prevent fragmentation within the armed forces, and ensure elements of the IRGC do not reorganize into rogue militias; preserve territorial integrity and avoid separatist conflict; support the rapid formation of a transitional authority capable of restoring order and preparing constitutional governance. This requires engagement now with credible opposition figures and civil-society networks. In my assessment, the most visible and structured opposition figure is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. His father’s legacy remains debated—and history must be examined honestly—but he bears no responsibility for that past. It is also historically accurate in arguing that the early years of the previous monarchy were characterized by significant modernization and institutional development before political rigidity eroded legitimacy in the 1970s. Today’s Iran is fundamentally different from the country of 1979. Iranian youth are more educated, more globally connected, and more exposed to democratic norms than any previous generation. They are not seeking a rerun of autocracy. They seek dignity, prosperity, and accountable governance. Reza Pahlavi has consistently advocated secular statehood, national reconciliation, and a democratic referendum allowing Iranians to determine their political system. freestar The American interest lies in a Middle East where expansionist militancy is contained, allies feel secure choosing integration, and regional powers operate within predictable norms rather than ideological confrontation. Iran stands at a consequential juncture. Decisions made in Tehran will determine whether the country moves toward responsible statehood or deeper isolation. Decisions made in Washington will determine whether deterrence evolves into a durable security architecture or remains captive to episodic reaction. The choices made now will shape not only Iran’s trajectory, but also the strategic architecture of the Middle East—and America’s role within it—for decades to come.
5-Enormous power transition risks now
Yacoubian, 3-1, 26, Mona Yacoubian is director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)., CSIS, The Regional Reverberations of the U.S. and Israeli Strikes on Iran, https://www.csis.org/analysis/regional-reverberations-us-and-israeli-strikes-iran
Q3: What are the longer-term implications? A3: The conflict with Iran stands as a defining moment for the Middle East with generational implications for the region’s trajectory, highlighting the prospect of longer-term instability. For now, the region is entering a period of unprecedented uncertainty, including instability in Iran, regional fallout from the regime’s increasing desperation, and reaction to these dramatically changing circumstances from the Gulf and beyond. The U.S./Israeli strikes mark yet another tectonic shift in a region that has already been in the throes of a changing order. The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei underscores that Iran is entering a period of significant flux. Even if an uncontested successor is named, the country’s various competing power centers likely will enter a period of intense jockeying and rivalry. And regime collapse remains a possibility, potentially sparking internal chaos and civil war in Iran, with spillover impacts that could include large-scale refugee flows to Turkey and the Gulf. For its part, the Gulf can be expected to deepen Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coordination on defense and security, seeking to insulate the region from Iran’s continuing fallout. Over the longer term, GCC countries may move toward a more formal integrated air defense system. At this point, it is hard to imagine that the Gulf will return to the previous path of détente with Iran. With its reckless strikes, Tehran appears to have galvanized the Gulf, perhaps even providing a (possibly temporary) reprieve to the deepening tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. More broadly, the strikes on Iran and their complex repercussions stand as yet another development in the Middle East’s “hinge moment.” First gradually and now more rapidly, the region is amid a transformation from an old order that defined the region for the past several decades to an emerging new Middle East. These shifts began before Hamas’s October 7 terror attack—itself a spoiling effort by Hamas to derail potential normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The ensuing war in Gaza then accelerated and deepened the dissolution of the prevailing regional order with a succession of developments: the decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and now the dramatic weakening and potential collapse of the Islamic Republic in Iran. Fortified by their enhanced agency, regional actors—principally Israel and the Gulf—will play a key role in shaping the contours of the Middle East’s emerging order. Yet, the final shape of the new Middle East is far from certain; many more dramatic shifts lie ahead in the coming months, if not years.
4-Iranian cyber attacks, no de-escalation
Rogers & Schiff, 2-28, 26, Joseph Rodgers is deputy director and fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Bailey Schiff is a program coordinator and research assistant with PONI at CSIS, Operation Epic Fury and the Remnants of Iran’s Nuclear Program, https://www.csis.org/analysis/operation-epic-fury-and-remnants-irans-nuclear-program
Further Iranian responses will almost certainly involve cyber operations and terrorist attacks on U.S. and Israeli forces across the Middle East. Initial reports indicate that Iranian internet connectivity is down by at least 46 percent, suggesting that massive cyber operations are currently underway. Iran has used limited cyberattacks in the past to attempt to limit escalation spirals in conflicts. Given the systematic nature of the current strikes against Iran, it is difficult to see room for the de-escalation options that characterized previous U.S.-Iran military exchanges.
3-Power vacuums lead to more authoritarianism, not more democracy
Sajadpour, 2-28, 26, Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., The Iranian Regime’s Existential Crisis—and What Might Come After Khamenei: A Conversation With Karim Sadjadpour, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/iranian-regimes-existential-crisis-and-what-might-come-after-khamenei-trump
Insecurity tends to benefit security forces, because when power vacuums are introduced it’s usually the men who can mobilize violence who prevail. It’s not writers and intellectuals and human rights activists who rise to the top when power vacuums form in a society.
Around three-quarters of authoritarian transitions lead to another authoritarian form of government. And when those authoritarian transitions are triggered by either external or internal violence, the likelihood of democratic transition is much lower. The statistical odds are slim that Iran will transition to a stable representative secular democracy—even if I do believe that Iranian society is ripe for such a change.
2-State collapse, brutal authoritarianism, and a regional war are all possible; but a stable regime is also possible
Sajadpour, 2-28, 26, Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., The Iranian Regime’s Existential Crisis—and What Might Come After Khamenei: A Conversation With Karim Sadjadpour, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/iranianregimes-existential-crisis-and-what-might-come-after-khamenei-trump
As you see this unfolding, what do you see as the worst-case scenarios stemming from this intervention? And what might be a best-case outcome?
A regional war, for one. There are two types of actors in in the Middle East: those who are in the business of building and those in the business of destroying. The Gulf countries surrounding Iran have had very different priorities over the last five decades than Iran has. They’ve sought to become hubs of global finance, transport, and artificial intelligence. And Iran has been in the business of destroying and filling power vacuums and preying on the misery of failed and failing states in the region.
It’s a lot easier to destroy things than to build things. There is a danger of a regional war in which Iran attempts to destroy the positive things that have been built in the Gulf and to go after oil installations to spike the price of oil. Israel is better equipped to defend itself because of its military prowess and its distance from Iran, but those Gulf countries are more vulnerable.
Internally, the regime could emerge intact and become as brutal as North Korea—even more brutal than it has been in recent weeks after killing thousands of Iranians. There’s also the possibility of state collapse and a potential civil war, given how polarized Iranians are and because of agitation among ethnic groups.
But one can still hope that Iran fulfills its enormous potential as a nation. As I wrote last fall, this is a country that has the human capital, the natural resources, and the rich history to be a G-20 country. It has punched way below its weight. In the aftermath of this attack, if Iranians can cooperate and coalesce together, there could be a transition to, at best, a representative tolerant democracy or, at a minimum, a country that is stable and prioritizes its economic and national interest before ideology and allows people to live a normal life—as many Iranians have experienced firsthand in places such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
1-Military power will not trigger de-escalation
Swanson, 2-24, 26, NATE SWANSON is Resident Senior Fellow and Director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council. He was Director for Iran at the National Security Council between 2022 and 2025. In the spring and summer of 2025, he served on the Trump administration’s Iran negotiating team., Foreign Affairs, Why Iran Will Escalate U.S. Military Strikes and the Risk of a Quagmire
As foreign policy luminaries rush to warn about the perils of a U.S. attack on Iran, there is widespread confidence in the White House that President Donald Trump can manage a strike’s fallout. This confidence reflects a years-long pattern that has shaped Trump’s thinking. Washington’s foreign policy establishment warns the president against some norm-breaking act. He ignores their advice and plows forward. And he faces no apparent repercussions. In 2018, when Trump broke with U.S. policy to move the American embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, I was serving in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Our own bureaucratic experts predicted that the move would prompt widespread protests and violence against U.S. personnel, and we set up task forces and evacuation plans for a doomsday that never came. This dynamic repeated itself last June, when Trump joined Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. Analysts warned that the decision would trigger a broader war and hasten Iran’s nuclear breakout. Once again, little happened. When the administration ousted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January, pundits insisted that his country and even the region would plunge into chaos, but nothing of the sort has yet occurred. It is easy to see why Trump would believe that the warnings about another attack on Iran are overwrought and that he can repeat his formula of decisive action and a clean exit. But this time is different. I spent 18 years working on Iran in various U.S. government capacities, including as President Joe Biden’s Iran director and on Trump’s negotiating team in the spring and summer of 2025. From that experience, I can see that Trump fundamentally fails to grasp that Iranian weakness will not lead the country to capitulate at the negotiating table. On the contrary, Iran’s present fragility only narrows the space for meaningful compromises. Nor does Trump understand that Iran faces entirely different conditions than it did in June 2025, when it chose to de-escalate. The Islamic Republic now believes that Israel and the United States intend to repeatedly strike its ballistic missile program—the foundation of Iranian self-defense—and that it must be more aggressive to forestall the kind of perpetual assault that could topple it altogether. Trump’s own behavior also increases the risk of escalation. The president’s ever-intensifying wish to be seen as a historic peacemaker has led him to an unnecessarily binary choice—strong-arm Tehran into a major new deal or use substantial force. And the nebulousness of his motives makes this flash point much more dangerous. Trump seems interested, in no particular order, in demonstrating the prowess of the U.S. military, strengthening his negotiating position, showing he was serious when he vowed in a January Truth Social post to protect Iranian protesters, and differentiating his approach from President Barack Obama’s. This mishmash of objectives contrasts with the focus he brought to his previous successful operations and will make him less prepared if a strike does not yield the expected, swift capitulation. All told, today’s conditions mean that an attack by the United States on Iran could result in unexpectedly deadly retaliation—and a much longer and potentially damaging conflict for Washington. A SELF-MADE TRAP Strategically speaking, Trump has no great reason to attack Iran. Tehran is a threat to Washington’s Middle East interests, yes, but it poses no immediate menace to the United States. In the aftermath of Iranians’ widespread protests and their subsequent brutal massacre, sustained economic and diplomatic pressure would have further weakened the regime without risking open conflict. But this president is rarely satisfied with quiet victories. As a result, he has made a major, flashier demand. Either the Iranian government agrees to a grand nuclear deal in which it gives up all nuclear enrichment and its missile program, or Washington attacks. Launching a limited military strike on Iran to force it to meet U.S. requirements fits Trump’s playbook. It would afford him a spectacle. And he clearly wants either a surrender pact or a broad framework that validates his claim to have brought peace to the Middle East for the first time in several millennia. But Iran’s leaders are increasingly indisposed to offer him a big, symbolic victory. In general, Iranian negotiators like to focus on specifics and narrow, tit-for-tat concessions. Biden understood this, and as a member of his Iran negotiating team, I spent countless hours deliberating how to categorize nuclear-related sanctions. At a round of negotiations with the United States in Geneva last week, Iran fronted Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, his full complement of official advisers, and a team of technical experts to hammer out fine specifics such as how Iran would export its uranium stockpiles and which U.S. executive orders would be rescinded. Trump, by contrast, sent just two people: his catchall special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. He does not care about technicalities or grasp their particular importance to Iran. Iran’s leaders do not want to offer Trump a symbolic victory. Instead, Washington is demanding sweeping public concessions while offering virtually nothing concrete in return. John Limbert, a former U.S. diplomat and, in 1979, a hostage in Iran, has wryly observed in his book Negotiating With Iran that “Iran doesn’t give in to pressure—only to a lot of pressure.” He notes how Iran, after years of fiery defiance, accepted in 1988 a humiliating UN-sponsored cease-fire with Iraq after finally concluding that continuing the devastating eight-year war threatened the Islamic Republic’s survival. Iran will not cave to major demands simply because of a bombing campaign. And by extension, the Iranian regime will not sign on to arrangements that, in its view, fundamentally undermine its viability, especially without concurrent guarantees. Insisting that Iran dismantle its missile program, for example, is almost certainly a nonstarter—the regime believes that the missile program undergirds its grip on power. Trump fails to comprehend that no matter how weak Iran is or how much force the United States deploys, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will never willingly negotiate the end of the Islamic Republic. He would rather die a martyr. If anything, Iran’s negotiators have less flexibility now than they did a year ago. At this juncture, Khamenei should have authorized his negotiating partners to break with their traditional approach and offer Trump the appearance of a major win. Six weeks ago, the mere fact that Trump held off on his promise to retaliate on behalf of Iran’s protesters and offered negotiations created a huge opportunity for Tehran. But it squandered the opening when it rejected the Trump administration’s first proposal—a regional summit in Istanbul between foreign ministers, which could have differed enough from Obama’s negotiating framework to give Trump political cover. Iran simply couldn’t bring itself to let Trump save face and score a symbolic win. In truth, Khamenei is just as obsessed with appearances as Trump is, and he is increasingly catering to his most hard-line supporters. He has made it impossible for his negotiating team to offer even minor compromises, much less the kinds of big concessions Trump is demanding. POINT OF NO RETURN Iran knows that it cannot win an outright war with the United States or Israel. In theory, if Trump strikes, Tehran would be best off seeking a quick de-escalation—as it did with Israel in April and October of 2024 and with both countries in June 2025. But Iran is facing a very different situation now than it did then. Today, Israel and the United States both perceive Iran as a paper tiger. The proxy militias that it used to deter Israel and terrorize the Middle East for years have largely been neutralized. Its nuclear program is in ruins. Its air defenses are in tatters: the June strikes destroyed most of its surface-to-air missile sites and punched massive holes in its early-warning radar network. And in December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went to Mar-a-Lago and got Trump’s permission to strike Iran’s ballistic missile program, the keystone of the country’s defense, at a time and place of Netanyahu’s choosing. This development threatens the very existence of the Islamic Republic. The program is Iran’s only remaining means of threatening Israel. (Iran also mostly makes these missiles domestically, so Israel would have to strike Iran every six months or so to keep the arsenal sufficiently degraded.) The ambiguity of Trump’s current intentions also changes the Iranian calculus. The U.S. president is not threatening to attack Iran because of any imminent threat or in response to any act of Iranian aggression. His motives are various and unclear: he is disappointed by the negotiations’ progress, he feels compelled to defend the redline he established with his Truth Social post, he is desperate to avoid unflattering comparisons to Obama, and he believes he can undertake major operations with minimal consequences. From Iran’s perspective, both Israel and the United States appear to have concluded that they can strike without any direct provocation and when doing so serves domestic political needs; Iran even thinks the two countries will be tempted to strike frequently. As a result, Iranian officials feel they need to give Trump a bloody nose or they will perpetually be at risk. In a speech last week, Khamenei threatened to sink a U.S. aircraft carrier and close the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran is unlikely to do either of these things, given the current U.S. military buildup in the region. But it could more easily inflict U.S. casualties. Killing Americans may be a particularly appealing option: Iranian leaders remember that in 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan withdrew all U.S. forces from Lebanon after the Iran-backed suicide bombing of a Marine barracks there, despite initially claiming he would not be cowed by terrorism. Iran may seriously consider targeting the Gulf Arab states’ energy infrastructure. The United States has roughly 40,000 troops positioned across 13 regional bases, not including the significant naval and air power it has recently deployed to the Middle East. On February 19, Iran’s ambassador to the UN warned the body that if the country were attacked, all nearby “bases, facilities, and assets of the hostile force … would constitute legitimate targets.” Although Tehran’s regional proxies are degraded, Iraqi and Houthi militias still have the capacity to add to any Iranian response. According to a mid-January Quinnipiac poll, 70 percent of Americans—and a majority of Republicans—oppose military intervention in Iran. Trump will struggle to justify any American deaths in a conflict of his own making. Iran could also intensify its missile strikes on Israeli civilian targets, straining Israel’s defensive capabilities and challenging the United States to pour resources into bolstering its ally. Finally, Tehran could target global oil flows and international shipping, sending energy prices up and creating a serious political liability for Trump. Iran may well encourage the Houthis to resume attacking ships transiting the Red Sea. The country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has also been preparing to selectively seize adversary ships in the Strait of Hormuz. If conflict with the United States deepens, Iran may seriously consider targeting the Gulf Arab states’ energy infrastructure directly. In 2019, during Trump’s last “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran directly attacked Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing facility, the world’s largest. That assault appeared to be designed to damage easily replaceable components, thus limiting the consequences to the global energy supply. But if Tehran instead assaulted infrastructure that it knows would take longer to repair, the results would be much more damaging. The relationships between Iran and the Gulf Arab states are stronger now than they were then, but Tehran knows that Gulf leaders carry real influence with Trump and could appeal to him to back down if they came under pressure. Iran may be weak. But it still has ways to inflict real pain on the United States—and much more incentive to try than it did before. If Trump wants to maintain the playbook that has worked for him, he will need a decisive and low-cost end to this saga. But powerful forces, both within him and external to him, have led him to dismiss the many off-ramps he already had. Iran hawks such as Senator Lindsey Graham are urging Trump not to “talk like Reagan and act like Obama,” a comparison Trump hates and fears. It may seem implausible that Trump, who promised his supporters an end to forever wars, would take out Iran’s leaders or commit ground troops to regime change and nation building. Yet he has come this far. He may well be pushed onward, regardless of the cost.