NCFL 2025 Congress: A Resolution to Give Livign US Territories Fair Representation

Summary of the Proposed Amendment

A resolution titled “A Resolution to Give Citizens Living in US Territories Fair Representation” seeks to amend the U.S. Constitution to grant residents of all permanently inhabited U.S. territories and federal districts (notably, Washington D.C. and territories like Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Northern Mariana Islands) full voting representation in Congress and participation in the Electoral College, equivalent to that of U.S. states. The resolution’s preamble notes that roughly 3.6 million U.S. citizens in these areas currently lack any voting members in the House or Senate and cannot vote for President, which it frames as disenfranchisement contrary to the founding American principle of “no taxation without representation.” To remedy this, the operative text proposes a constitutional amendment (Article XXVIII) with two sections:

Section 1: All such territories and federal districts “shall be entitled to the same representation in Congress and the Electoral College as the States.” This implies they would elect voting members of the House and Senate and have presidential electors just as states do. It also stipulates that all voters (“electors”) in these areas would be subject to the same constitutional requirements applicable to voters in states (such as age, citizenship, and other qualifications set by the Constitution and its amendments).
Section 2: Congress is empowered to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation, a standard enforcement clause found in many constitutional amendments.

The resolution follows the Article V process, requiring two-thirds of Congress to propose the amendment and ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures within seven years. Below, we provide a detailed constitutional analysis, historical context, discussion of scholarly and political perspectives, and an evaluation of flaws in the proposal’s logic and research foundations.

Constitutional Law Analysis

Current Constitutional Framework: The U.S. Constitution, as it now stands, limits full federal representation to states. Article I, Section 2 provides that the House of Representatives is composed of members chosen “by the People of the several States,” and Article I, Section 3 (as modified by the 17th Amendment) specifies that the Senate is composed of two Senators from each state (Castañon v. United States – Seeking Congressional Representation for D.C. | ACLU of DC). In other words, only U.S. states have voting members in Congress under the Constitution. Likewise, the President is chosen by electors from each state (Article II, Section 1 and the 12th Amendment), with the sole exception of the District of Columbia, which was granted presidential electors (but not Congressmen) by the 23rd Amendment in 1961 (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). Territories (like Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.) are not states and thus have no constitutional right to vote in federal elections – they send non-voting delegates to the House and cannot vote for President (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). The proposed amendment would override these provisions by extending state-equivalent representation to territories and D.C.

Supreme Court Precedents: The Supreme Court has consistently upheld that the Constitution does not guarantee voting representation in Congress or presidential electors to U.S. territories or D.C. absent statehood. For example, in a 2000 case (★Adams v. Clinton★) and again in 2021, the Supreme Court affirmed that because D.C. “is not a state,” its residents have no constitutional entitlement to voting representation in Congress (Supreme Court: D.C. is not entitled to a vote in Congress – The Washington Post). A federal court in 2020 likewise reasoned that “the Constitution assigns Representatives and Senators to States, and the Constitution can’t be unconstitutional,” meaning that under the Constitution as written, those outside the states (D.C. in that case) have no right to voting members of Congress (Castañon v. United States – Seeking Congressional Representation for D.C. | ACLU of DC). Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that Puerto Rico residents have a right to vote for President or have voting members of Congress, emphasizing that such rights are reserved for states (e.g., the Igartúa line of cases). These rulings rely on the Constitution’s text and the long-established principle that “only States vote in Congress”.

The so-called Insular Cases (a series of early 20th-century Supreme Court decisions) also set a precedent that full constitutional rights do not automatically extend to unincorporated territories. In Downes v. Bidwell (1901), for instance, the Court held that certain constitutional provisions applied only to states and “are not fundamental” in territories, giving Congress wide discretion over territorial governance. While those cases dealt with issues like tariffs and civil rights, they underline the subordinate constitutional status of territories. In short, under current law, residents of territories can be U.S. citizens yet lack federal voting rights, a situation the courts have found permissible unless and until the Constitution is amended.

Ability to Amend: Because the text of the Constitution restricts congressional representation and presidential electors to states, a constitutional amendment is indeed the proper (and likely only) way to grant full federal voting rights to territories and D.C. Congress cannot simply pass a statute to give a territory a voting Representative or Senators – such a law would conflict with Article I (as past proposals have noted). Even D.C.’s limited presidential voting rights required the 23rd Amendment. Thus, the resolution correctly recognizes that a 28th Amendment is needed to effectuate this change. If adopted, an amendment could override the relevant clauses that currently exclude territories and D.C. (for example, by inserting language to treat these jurisdictions like states for representation). The proposed text in Section 1 would, in effect, function like an override: it declares that all U.S. jurisdictions with permanent populations must be treated the same as states for purposes of congressional and Electoral College representation. This would constitutionally enfranchise millions of Americans in territories by giving them the right to elect voting members of Congress and presidential electors.

Interaction with Existing Amendments: One constitutional issue to note is the relationship with the 23rd Amendment, which currently gives D.C. electoral votes “in such manner as Congress may direct” but “not more than the least populous state.” If D.C. were instead given full representation “as a State,” presumably it would receive at least 3 electors (as it does now) and potentially more if its population grows. A well-drafted amendment might explicitly repeal or modify the 23rd Amendment (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute), as was attempted in 1978 (discussed below). The proposed text does not mention the 23rd Amendment, but as the later constitutional provision, it would likely supersede any conflict (by, for example, rendering the 23rd Amendment’s limitations moot). Still, clarity on this point would be ideal, to avoid having two provisions on D.C.’s electors.

Historical Context: Voting Rights of Territories and D.C.

Territorial Representation in U.S. History: The United States has governed territories since its founding, and the norm has been that territories do not have full voting representation in the federal government until they achieve statehood. In the 19th century, territories such as the Northwest Territory, Louisiana Territory, etc., were allowed to elect delegates to the House of Representatives – a tradition that continues today – but these delegates historically have no vote on final passage of legislation (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). This compromise gave territorial residents a voice in debate but not an actual share of legislative power. As territories’ populations grew and they transitioned to statehood (e.g. Tennessee, Michigan, later Alaska and Hawaii), they gained full voting rights by becoming states. The path to representation was explicitly through admission as a state, as set out in Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution (which gives Congress power to admit new states). Congress has on occasion extended certain rights short of statehood – for example, granting U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917 and to other territory residents in the 20th century, and allowing territories to elect local governors and legislatures – but federal voting rights have remained tied to statehood.

By the mid-20th century, five territories remained inhabited but not states: Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Each has over time received authority to locally elect a governor and legislature, and each sends one non-voting delegate (or in Puerto Rico’s case, a “Resident Commissioner”) to the U.S. House of Representatives (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). These delegates can draft legislation and sit on committees, but cannot cast a vote on the House floor to pass bills. No territories have representation in the Senate. And with the exception of U.S. citizens who temporarily leave a state and reside in a territory (who in some cases can vote absentee in their last state under federal/state laws), residents of the territories cannot vote for President or Vice President (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). This situation has often been described as a democratic deficit or even a form of “colonial” governance, given that these Americans are subject to federal law but lack a vote in making those laws (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote).

The District of Columbia: Washington D.C., while not a “territory,” is a federal district with a unique status. For much of U.S. history, D.C. residents likewise had no vote in Congress or for President. In 1961, the 23rd Amendment was ratified to at least grant D.C. the right to participate in presidential elections (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). D.C. today appoints a number of presidential electors (three electors, equal to the minimum for any state) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). However, D.C. still has no voting Senators and only a non-voting House delegate (currently Eleanor Holmes Norton) (Castañon v. United States – Seeking Congressional Representation for D.C. | ACLU of DC). Despite a population (about 712,000) larger than two states (Wyoming and Vermont), D.C. residents remain without Congressmen on par with states (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). The slogan “Taxation Without Representation” is famously displayed on D.C. license plates in protest of this situation, highlighting that D.C. citizens pay federal taxes and serve in the military yet lack full representation.

Notable Attempts at Reform: The plight of D.C. and territorial voters has prompted various reform efforts:

23rd Amendment (1961): As mentioned, this gave D.C. presidential voting rights but not congressional representation (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). It was a major acknowledgement that disenfranchising the capital’s residents was unfair, yet it stopped short of addressing Congress.
D.C. Voting Rights Amendment (1978): In 1978, Congress approved a constitutional amendment that would have treated Washington D.C. almost as a state for representation. It aimed to repeal the 23rd Amendment and grant D.C. two Senators and at least one Representative (apportioned by population), thereby fully enfranchising D.C. in Congress and presidential elections (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute) (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute). However, this amendment failed to be ratified by the requisite 38 states within the seven-year deadline (only 16 states agreed) (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute). The failure illustrated the difficulty of expanding representation through amendment, especially when states may be reluctant to dilute their own exclusive status.
Statehood Movements: There have been ongoing political movements for Puerto Rico statehood (with multiple plebiscites in PR, most recently showing majority support for statehood) and for D.C. statehood (with legislation passing the House in recent years but stalling in the Senate) (Supreme Court: D.C. is not entitled to a vote in Congress – The Washington Post). Statehood, if achieved, would automatically grant full congressional representation and Electoral College votes to those jurisdictions. For instance, if Puerto Rico became a state, it would likely receive 4–5 House seats (based on population ~3.2 million) and 2 Senators, and D.C. as a state (often proposed as “Washington, Douglass Commonwealth”) would get 1 House seat and 2 Senators (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute). While statehood is a separate path from an amendment, the existence of these movements shows the political pressure to resolve the representational gap.
Other Proposals: Legal scholars and activists have floated creative ideas such as a “Territorial Representation Amendment” (similar to this resolution) or compacts to assign territorial electoral votes to a state. One recent law journal proposal suggested an amendment to allow territories to appoint presidential electors using language modeled on the 23rd Amendment, and to give the territories a voting member in the House by statute. However, no such amendment has gained serious traction in Congress to date. Another radical idea, noted in a Harvard Law Review piece, is to admit multiple new states or subdivide existing ones to alter the balance of representation in the Senate (Pack the Union: A Proposal to Admit New States for the Purpose of …) – though that approach addresses broader representation inequalities and is not targeted specifically at territories.

In sum, historically full voting representation has been an exclusive right of U.S. states, and only constitutional amendments (like the 23rd) have managed to slightly broaden that to include the federal district in presidential elections. The proposal at hand is unprecedented in that it seeks to give state-equivalent representation to territories without making them states.

Scholarly and Political Perspectives on the Proposal

The question of territorial representation is both a constitutional law debate and a political issue. Critiques and concerns include:

Constitutionalists & Originalists: Many legal experts argue that the Constitution’s text and structure tie representation to statehood, and they are wary of deviating from this design without statehood. As one scholar put it, “The Constitution is clear: Only States vote in Congress.” This view is that the framers intended a union of states, and that creating a new category of quasi-states with congressional power might conflict with the Constitution’s fundamental framework. Opponents in this camp often favor statehood (for those territories that want it) over an amendment that grants representation while they remain territories. They also note that giving small territories equal Senate votes would further skew the principle of equal representation of citizens (since the Senate is already malapportioned, adding, say, 50,000-population islands with two Senators exacerbates the disparity). Additionally, some point out that the Admission Clause (Article IV) provides a clear path (statehood) and that an amendment short-circuiting that could be seen as an ad hoc solution.
Civil Rights and Pro-Democracy Advocates: On the other side, many scholars and commentators view the denial of voting rights to territorial residents as a blatant civil rights violation and democratic flaw. They argue that U.S. citizens should not be treated as second-class simply due to their geographic location. For example, commentators have highlighted that territorial Americans pay billions in taxes and serve in the U.S. military, yet have no say in the government that taxes and deploys them (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). This, they claim, violates basic principles of consent of the governed. Some go so far as to argue that the current disenfranchisement might run afoul of constitutional guarantees – pointing to Supreme Court dicta that voting is “fundamental” and should be equal where possible (Equal Enfranchisement: Extending Complete Voting Rights in the U.S. Territories — California Law Review) – although so far courts have not accepted that interpretation in the territorial context. These advocates often cite the Revolutionary War slogan “no taxation without representation” and describe the status quo as “colonial” or “racially discriminatory” (since many territorial residents are people of color). They generally support any measure that would extend voting rights – be it statehood or a constitutional amendment like this proposal – and often invoke international human rights norms as well, noting that international law calls for self-determination and equal political rights (indeed, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights commits signatories, including the U.S., to ensure citizens have the right to vote).
Political Parties and Practical Stakeholders: In U.S. domestic politics, the issue has a partisan tinge. Granting representation to D.C. (a predominantly Democratic city) and to territories like Puerto Rico (which leans Democratic in national politics) could shift the balance of power in Congress. Therefore, many Republicans oppose such changes absent statehood (and often even oppose statehood) on political grounds, fearing it would add congressional seats likely to be held by Democrats. Democrats, conversely, have generally supported D.C. statehood and at least respecting Puerto Rico’s self-determination votes. However, there is also a constitutional purist streak on both sides that recognizes a need for an amendment if representation is to be extended without creating new states. The failed D.C. Voting Rights Amendment of 1978 had bipartisan support in Congress at the time (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute), suggesting that in principle, an amendment route was considered acceptable, but the states (often through Republican-controlled legislatures) declined to ratify it.
Territorial Leaders and Residents: Views among the territories themselves are not monolithic. Puerto Rico has well-organized factions: those favoring statehood (who would welcome representation, though they prefer achieving it by becoming a state), those favoring the current Commonwealth status (some of whom might prefer an amendment to improve rights without full statehood’s obligations), and those favoring independence (who might oppose anything that further integrates Puerto Rico into the U.S. system). The proposal essentially offers a halfway measure – more rights without full statehood – which might appeal to some moderates but not satisfy either the statehood advocates or the nationalists fully. American Samoa raises a unique issue: people born in American Samoa are US “nationals” but not automatically US citizens. The amendment talks about citizens in territories; Samoan leaders have historically been protective of their local autonomy and wary of imposed citizenship. They might be concerned about how this amendment applies to them (would Congress require citizenship for voting rights? Would American Samoa get representation despite its nationals not being U.S. citizens?). Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Northern Mariana Islands generally have pushed for more equal treatment; their small populations would benefit from at least a voice in Congress. Leaders from these islands often testify in Congress about being overlooked in federal policy (for example, lacking voting power during natural disaster relief bills that affect them). Many have supported bills to give territories voting rights, but they also recognize the political hurdles.

In academia, various proposals have been made to address these concerns. A law review article by Colin P. A. Jones in 2022 specifically proposed a “Territorial and District Representation Amendment” very similar to this resolution’s text. It argued for a constitutional fix to include territories and D.C. in the federal political process, noting that Congress has the authority to initiate such an amendment and that it would be a more straightforward solution than multiple separate statehood admissions in the short term. Other scholars, however, argue that anything short of statehood perpetuates a form of unequal status – they liken giving representation without statehood to treating the territories as “second-class states.” Despite these debates, there is a growing consensus that the status quo is democratically deficient, even if there is not agreement on the remedy.

Logical Flaws in the Resolution’s Text

While the intent is clear, the drafting of the resolution contains several logical and structural flaws and ambiguities. Key issues include:

Unclear Scope – “Permanently Inhabited Territories” and “Federal Districts”: The amendment refers to “all permanently inhabited territories and federal districts subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” This phrasing is vague and not defined in constitutional law. It likely intends to cover the five major U.S. territories (Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands) and the District of Columbia. However, the term “federal districts” (plural) is odd since the United States has only one federal district (D.C.) as the seat of government. Unless it contemplates a scenario of multiple federal enclaves, the language should have explicitly named “the District of Columbia.” Similarly, “permanently inhabited territories” is not a precise legal category – it presumably excludes uninhabited U.S. territories (like Midway Atoll) and perhaps temporary trust territories. A more precise listing of which jurisdictions are covered would be expected in a real amendment. The broad wording could even invite confusion about edge cases (for example, if a new territory were acquired, it would presumably be included by this language automatically, which some might consider problematic without further political process).
Internal Inconsistency in Including D.C.: The preamble (“Whereas” clauses) mentions only “Territories of the United States” and cites “3.6 million citizens” disenfranchised. That figure roughly corresponds to the populations of the five territories excluding D.C. (which alone has about 0.7 million) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). Yet the amendment text then includes “federal districts,” implying D.C. is meant to be covered. This inconsistency suggests a logical flaw in the resolution’s scope – D.C.’s situation is part of the problem being addressed, but the resolution’s own stated facts overlook the District. In a well-crafted proposal, the drafters would either include D.C. in the statistics or clearly state that both territories and D.C. are included. The mismatch here indicates assumptions not aligned with the resolution’s actual content.
Ambiguity in “Same Representation as the States”: The core mandate that territories “shall be entitled to the same representation in Congress and the Electoral College as the States” is ambiguous in application. Does each territory become its own “state-equivalent” unit for representation (implying each territory gets two Senators and at least one House member)? Or could it be interpreted collectively or in some other way? The most straightforward reading is that each territory and D.C. would be treated like a state. That means, for example, Puerto Rico would get representation as if it were a state (likely 1 House seat per ~700,000 population, so perhaps 4 seats, and 2 Senators), Guam would get at least 1 House seat (despite only ~170,000 people) and 2 Senators, and so on. This would drastically alter the composition of Congress, adding possibly 5 new House seats and 12 new Senate seats (if five territories + D.C. each get two senators). However, the amendment doesn’t spell out how House apportionment would work. The Constitution fixes the House apportionment by population among states (14th Amendment, Section 2), and currently the total number of House seats is set by statute at 435. Would these territories simply be added on top of 435 (bringing House to 440 seats or more)? Or would the 435 be reapportioned to include them (which could actually take seats away from some states)? The proposal is silent on this crucial implementation detail, which is a logical gap. In contrast, past real-world amendments (like the 1978 D.C. amendment) explicitly provided for representation based on population and even mentioned repealing conflicting provisions (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute). The lack of clarity here could lead to confusion and conflict in implementation, undermining the “equal” representation it seeks to establish.
Omission of Amendment Interactions: The text does not address how it interacts with existing constitutional provisions like the 23rd Amendment (D.C.’s electors) or the constitutional amendment process itself. For instance, if D.C. and territories are “like states” for representation, should D.C. continue to have its own separate presidential electors clause? The resolution’s silence implies the new amendment is simply supreme over the old, but typically, drafters would clarify by repealing or modifying the 23rd. Additionally, the amendment grants representation in Congress but does not say whether territories would now count as “states” for other purposes, such as ratifying future constitutional amendments (Article V involves state legislatures). In fact, under this proposal, territories would still not be states, meaning they presumably could not vote to ratify amendments. This creates a paradox where these regions would have voting members of Congress who can propose amendments, but when it comes to ratification, only the 50 states would still count. A logically consistent approach might have been to also allow territories to partake in amendments or even to grant them statehood outright. The omission of any language on these matters is a flaw in the proposal’s comprehensiveness.
Confusing Terminology – “Electors in Territories”: The second sentence of Section 1 says, “All Electors in Territories are subject to the details within the Constitution and its articles of amendment.” The term “Electors” here is confusing. In U.S. constitutional jargon, “Electors” can refer to presidential electors (members of the Electoral College) or to voters in general (as used in Article I, Section 2, referring to those qualified to vote for the House). If they mean the voters in the territories, of course those voters would be subject to the same constitutional provisions as other voters – for example, the Fifteenth Amendment (no racial discrimination in voting), Nineteenth Amendment (women’s suffrage), Twenty-Sixth Amendment (18-year-old vote), etc., would all apply. But this is already implied by extending federal elections to those areas. If they mean the presidential electors from territories, those individuals are already bound by constitutional procedures (and any federal law) just like state electors. In either case, the sentence is largely redundant or unclear. It reads as if the drafters wanted to reassure that the normal constitutional rules apply in territories, but as an amendment, this is unnecessary verbiage. In a constitutional text, such unclear wording could be problematic – what exactly are “details” within the Constitution? This lack of precision is a logical flaw that could complicate interpretation. A real amendment would likely omit such a statement or replace it with a specific provision if any deviation or special rule was intended (here it seems none is intended, making the sentence needless).
Assumption of Taxation Principle: The resolution claims that disenfranchisement of territories “runs counter to the very principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ on which the United States was founded.” This is a sweeping historical assertion that, while rhetorically powerful, is logically oversimplified. The idea of no taxation without representation was indeed a driving force in the American Revolution, but the U.S. Constitution did not enshrine a requirement that all taxed citizens must have representation. In fact, from the founding onward, there have been populations subject to federal authority and taxes who lacked representation (early examples include D.C. residents once the capital was established, and women, who paid taxes but couldn’t vote until 1920, etc.). The principle is thus more of a moral guiding value than a legal rule. Invoking it doesn’t itself change the legal reality. The logical flaw here is an appeal to a principle that the Constitution did not fully implement – effectively, it assumes a standard (“no taxation without representation”) that isn’t actually a binding rule. Critics might point out that not all of the 3.6 million people in question pay federal income taxes (for example, Puerto Rico residents generally do not pay federal income tax on income earned in Puerto Rico), so the taxation argument is not uniform across territories. The resolution’s language glosses over these nuances. While this doesn’t negate the democratic fairness argument, it shows a somewhat imprecise justification, leaning on slogan rather than legal substance.
Enforcement Mechanism Limitations: Section 2 gives Congress power to enforce the article by legislation. This is standard (seen in the 14th, 15th, 19th, 26th Amendments, etc.), so not problematic by itself. However, one might question what “enforcement” entails here. Presumably Congress would need to pass laws to implement the new representation (e.g. increasing the size of the House, setting up election procedures in territories, etc.). The logical gap is that a lot is left to Congress’s discretion. For instance, if Congress delayed or only partially implemented (say, gives House seats but drags feet on seating Senators), the amendment itself doesn’t spell out the details, meaning the promise of equal representation relies on subsequent action. A stronger amendment might dictate immediate entitlement to a minimum number of seats or a method of calculation. Relying on Congress to fill in the blanks is logical in a sense (Congress handles election laws), but given Congress historically has been the body denying these very rights, it might be seen as a flaw to trust enforcement entirely to legislative good will.
Practical Feasibility and Process: Implicitly, the resolution assumes that achieving this amendment is politically feasible (“by two-thirds of Congress… and ratified by three-fourths of states”). This is aspirational, but many would argue it’s unrealistic, which is a logical consideration for any proposal. Amending the Constitution is deliberately very hard. This proposal asks state legislatures to approve an amendment that would create new de-facto states (with votes) without those states’ full responsibilities. It would also potentially shift the balance of power in Congress. From a logical standpoint, the resolution does not address why states would agree to this or how to surmount that hurdle, leaving a huge question mark over its viability. While one might say this is more a strategic flaw than a logical one, a resolution should ideally anticipate counterarguments or implementation challenges. Here, the text does not reconcile the bold proposal with the political reality of Article V’s requirements, giving it an air of wishful thinking on the process front.

In summary, the resolution’s text has vagueness in definitions, incomplete provisions for implementation, and some inconsistent or redundant clauses. These logical flaws could undermine the clarity and effectiveness of the amendment, even if one supports its overall goal.

Research Flaws and Factual/Practical Challenges

Beyond textual issues, a number of research and factual errors or omissions in the proposal can be identified – as well as real-world obstacles that the resolution overlooks:

Overlooking American Samoa’s Citizenship Status: The resolution repeatedly refers to “citizens” in U.S. territories. However, not all people born in U.S. territories are U.S. citizens. American Samoa is a key exception: persons born in American Samoa are U.S. nationals but not automatically U.S. citizens (unless one of their parents is a citizen or they go through naturalization) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). This is a quirk of law – American Samoa is an unincorporated territory that has resisted automatic citizenship to preserve certain local traditions (and U.S. courts have upheld that the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause doesn’t automatically apply there). The proposal does not acknowledge this nuance. If the amendment passed, would American Samoans who are non-citizen nationals be allowed to vote for Congress and President? Currently, only citizens can vote in federal elections. The amendment says “subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.” which American Samoans are, but calls the disenfranchised people “citizens.” This oversight suggests the drafters may have been unaware of or glossed over this issue. In practice, Congress might need to address American Samoa separately (possibly by extending citizenship or otherwise clarifying the status). The resolution’s failure to research this point is a flaw, as it leaves an entire population’s status in limbo under the amendment.
Population Figure and Inclusion of D.C.: Citing “3.6 million citizens” as the number disenfranchised appears outdated or incomplete. The five inhabited territories together had around 3.5 million residents as of a few years ago (Puerto Rico ~3.2M post-hurricane migration, Guam ~170k, U.S. VI ~100k, CNMI ~50k, Am. Samoa ~55k). Washington D.C. adds another 700k+, bringing the total U.S. population without congressional voting rights to over 4.2 million. Many sources use a figure of “nearly five million Americans” when combining D.C. and territories (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote). By using 3.6 million and talking only about “Territories,” the resolution undercounts or omits D.C. (as noted in logical flaws). It also ignores recent population changes. This suggests a research flaw: possibly relying on an older statistic or not including D.C.’s residents in the count of disenfranchised Americans. Accuracy in these figures matters for making the case; undercounting weakens the urgency (and is inconsistent with including D.C. in the solution).
Taxation and Representation Complexities: The resolution leans on “no taxation without representation” but does not acknowledge the complicated reality of federal taxation in territories. For instance, residents of Puerto Rico do not pay U.S. federal income tax on income earned in Puerto Rico (they pay into PR’s own treasury), though they do pay other federal taxes (Social Security, Medicare, import/export duties, etc.), and Puerto Ricans have served and even been drafted in the U.S. military. Residents of Guam, CNMI, and USVI have similar arrangements where their income taxes are paid to their local territorial governments (mirroring the U.S. tax code) rather than to the federal IRS. Only D.C. and, to an extent, American Samoa (which has its own tax system too) pay federal income taxes directly. This doesn’t mean these citizens aren’t entitled to representation – but the blanket slogan doesn’t cleanly apply to all. A well-researched argument might have noted that even without full federal tax obligations, Congress makes laws that deeply affect territories (trade, defense, social programs, etc.), so representation is justified. The resolution instead uses a broad historical claim without nuance, which could be challenged as factually misleading. Historically, one reason territorial residents were not given income tax obligations initially was precisely because they had no representation; over time some contributions are made indirectly or via other taxes. The proposal’s research glosses over this history and might invite critics to say: “Puerto Ricans don’t pay IRS taxes, so the analogy to the Revolution is imperfect.” A stronger case would address and refute that counterpoint (e.g., pointing out other forms of contribution and citizenship duties).
Historical Precedent and the Founders: The resolution asserts the U.S. was founded on the principle of no taxation without representation, yet the Founders themselves created the District of Columbia with no representation in Congress, and for most of U.S. history millions (women, minorities, etc.) were taxed without a vote. The research flaw here is a simplification of history. The phrase originates with colonial American protests against British rule; it was indeed a rallying cry for independence. However, when the Constitution was written, it did not guarantee universal suffrage or representation for all – it left voting qualifications largely to the states and created scenarios (like the D.C. federal district) where people could lack representation. In fact, the decision to have a federal district was influenced by the idea that Congress needed exclusive control over the capital (Article I, Section 8, Clause 17) and that those living there might have to sacrifice a state voice for the national good. One could argue the resolution’s drafters anachronistically project a modern ideal back onto the founding era. This doesn’t undermine the moral argument, but historically it’s not quite accurate to say the nation has always lived up to “no taxation without representation.” A nuanced research perspective would acknowledge America’s own history of disenfranchisement (and how D.C. and territories ended up excluded).
Constitutional Conflicts & Omissions: Aside from the 23rd Amendment issue noted earlier, the proposal doesn’t reconcile with 14th Amendment, Section 2, which talks about apportionment of representatives “among the several States”. Nor does it modify Article I, Section 2’s language about “people of the several States.” In practice, an amendment can be read to carve out an implicit exception or addition. But good legal drafting would either quote and amend those sections or explicitly state that territories shall be treated as states for those purposes notwithstanding those provisions. By not doing so, the research feels incomplete. The resolution might be assuming that its broad language is enough, but in constitutional law, clarity is crucial to avoid litigation and confusion. This omission could lead to legal challenges about how to interpret “same representation” vis-à-vis the old language. For example, if someone argued the 14th Amendment apportionment clause still limits House seats to states only, there would need to be a clear indication that the new amendment overrides that. The 1978 D.C. Voting Rights Amendment was careful to specify changes (including repealing the 23rd and treating D.C. akin to a state in Article I contexts) (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute). The lack of similar detail here signals a research gap in understanding how amendments have to interface with existing text.
Political Impracticality – State Ratification Reluctance: From a political science perspective, a major flaw is underestimating the difficulty of ratification. The amendment asks 38 state legislatures to voluntarily dilute their exclusive privilege of representation by adding six new fully represented constituencies (D.C. + 5 territories). Historically, states have been hesitant to approve changes that elevate non-states: the D.C. amendment failed in 1980s largely because states had little incentive to approve a new “pseudo-state.” With this proposal, that reluctance would be even greater. Small-population states might object to territories with even smaller populations getting the same two Senate seats as them, medium/large states might object to further disproportionate Senate power away from population centers, and some states might fear partisan outcomes (since D.C. and Puerto Rico’s likely voting patterns are known). The resolution does not address any of these concerns or propose any compromise (for instance, it could have suggested grouping territories for Senate representation or something creative, though that would raise its own issues). By failing to engage with the political reality, the research underlying the resolution might be seen as naive. This is a flaw because any serious proposal must reckon with the path to implementation. For example, proponents of D.C. statehood have tried to counter arguments by highlighting D.C.’s contributions and American ideals, but even then it faces an uphill battle. This broader amendment would face not just partisan opposition but also constitutional purists and possibly local oppositions (as noted, not everyone in territories may consent to this arrangement).
Lack of Self-Determination Perspective: One research aspect missing is a discussion of what the territories themselves want. Puerto Rico has had referenda offering statehood, status quo, or independence/Free Association; other territories have expressed contentment or varying desires. Imposing “state-like” representation by amendment without their direct consent could be viewed through a self-determination lens as questionable. For instance, if a territory preferred the option of independence in the future, integrating them into Congress might complicate that. The resolution is framed entirely in terms of U.S. constitutional mechanics and fairness, and doesn’t reference any input from territorial citizens beyond the assumption they are disenfranchised and presumably desire representation. This omission could be seen as a research flaw – neglecting the political status processes and debates ongoing in those territories themselves. Any real move to change their status usually involves local plebiscites or at least consultation. The amendment route could bypass that unless carefully handled.
International Law and Comparative Cases: The resolution focuses on U.S. founding principles but doesn’t mention that the U.S. is virtually alone among democracies in denying national legislative representation to residents of its overseas territories. For example, France and the UK allow residents of their overseas departments/territories to elect members to the national legislature. Including such comparative context could strengthen the argument that this change is in line with democratic norms. Its absence isn’t exactly a flaw, but it is a missed research opportunity that could have been used to bolster the case or show precedent elsewhere. By not leveraging such information, the proposal relies solely on U.S. historical principle, missing a chance to answer “Has this been done successfully by others?” (Yes, elsewhere territories vote in parliament).

In conclusion, while the resolution is well-intentioned in addressing a real democratic gap, it contains several factual inaccuracies/oversights and ignores significant practical challenges. To withstand scrutiny, a more thorough effort would be needed – one that corrects these research flaws, presents airtight historical and legal reasoning, and lays out a convincing strategy for implementation. As it stands, the proposal highlights an important issue but would require substantial refinement to become a viable amendment in the real world.

Sources

U.S. Constitution, Article I, §2 (House representation tied to “people of the several States”); Article I, §3 & 17th Amendment (Senate representation for states); Article II & 12th Amendment (Electoral College members from states); 14th Amendment, §2 (apportionment among states); 23rd Amendment (Electoral College for D.C.) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote).
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) – on differential application of constitutional provisions in territories.
Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940 (2000) – D.C. not entitled to congressional representation because it is not a state (Supreme Court: D.C. is not entitled to a vote in Congress – The Washington Post).
Castañon v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 3d 118 (D.D.C. 2020), summarily aff’d, 141 S.Ct. 1026 (2021) – reaffirming Adams; Constitution assigns voting in Congress to states, and thus D.C. residents have no such right absent amendment (Castañon v. United States – Seeking Congressional Representation for D.C. | ACLU of DC).
Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (Igartúa II) – residents of Puerto Rico have no constitutional right to vote for President; see also Igartúa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Igartúa III) (only states have the right to congressional representation and electoral votes). See generally: “Citizens Without Representation” – S. Ill. U. Law Journal, vol. 46 (2022) (discussing Igartúa and other cases).
Washington D.C. Voting Rights Amendment (Proposed 1978) – Congressional proposal to give D.C. full representation (2 Senators, House seats, repeal 23rd Amendment); failed ratification by 1985 (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute) (Washington DC Voting Rights Amendment | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute).
Rock the Vote – “D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories: An Explainer” (2021) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote) (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote) – outlines the current representation and tax status of D.C. and territories, and notes criticism as “taxation without representation” (D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories – Rock the Vote).
Yale Law Journal Forum – John C. Fortier, “The Constitution Is Clear: Only States Vote in Congress” (116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 403 (2007)) – argues that granting Congress voting rights to territories would require constitutional change, as the structure only permits states to have voting members.
California Law Review – Note, “Equal Enfranchisement: Extending Complete Voting Rights in U.S. Territories” (2023) (Equal Enfranchisement: Extending Complete Voting Rights in the U.S. Territories — California Law Review) (Equal Enfranchisement: Extending Complete Voting Rights in the U.S. Territories — California Law Review) – argues disenfranchisement of territorial citizens is inconsistent with the fundamental right to vote and should be subject to strict scrutiny, highlighting the injustice from a constitutional rights perspective. (Contrasts with prevailing court doctrine).
Colin P. A. Jones, “The Territorial and District Representation Amendment: A Proposal,” 36 BYU J. Pub. L. 175 (2022) – proposes a constitutional amendment to provide representation to territories and D.C., similar to the one in the resolution (cited in secondary sources) ([PDF] The Territorial and District Representation Amendment: A Proposal). This provides scholarly underpinning for how such an amendment could be structured and justified.